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Jt'OREWURU
This thesis is a study of the relation of Jesus Christ 
to redemption. It is essentially an historical study with 
special reference to the positions of three representative 
nineteenth century uerman theologians, Strauss, Medermann, and 
Troeltsch. The thesis does not claim to "be an exhaustive treat- 
ment of the doctrine of redemption or of the Person of Christ 
except as the two are related in the systems of these three 
thinkers. Only indirectly is it concerned with the history and 
theological expression of the doctrine of redemption in the 
Christian uhurch or with such uhristological considerations as 
the Incarnation and Atonement of Christ. It is primarily a study 
of a specific problem, within a specific period of time, and as 
developed by a specific group of theologians.
Strauss, iiiedermann, and Troeltsch held a common 
position in separating the person of Christ from the principle 
of redemption. They regarded redemption as a principle or 
eternal truth in its own right apart from the Person of Christ. 
AS over against this position, this thesis takes its stand without 
apology upon the evangelical experience of the uhurch which knows 
only a Redeemer and nothing of a principle.
The first two chapters deal with the philosophical and 
theological tendencies in the nineteenth century as they bear 
upon the problem of person and principle. The third, fourth, 
and fifth chapters are devoted to detailed exposition of the 
positions of Strauss, ±>iedermann, and Troeltsch. chapter six 
compares and contrasts these three positions. The concluding 
chapter opposes the principle interpretation of redemption with 
the Christian experience of the Redeemer.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTRODUCTION
Redemption lies at the very centre and core of religion, 
without it man has no hope. It is the raison d'etre of religion. 
It is the road that leads to uod. However, this road, highway 
that it is, is marked with different and sometimes confusing sign- 
posts. AS it is possible to reach a destination "by different 
routes, so redemption, it would seem, may be approached from 
different directions and over different paths. Nearly every 
religion makes the claim to be a religion of redemption. Moham- 
medanism, Buddhism, Confucianism (if it is a religion), even Com- 
munism which is a substitute for religion, lay down definite 
programmes which must be followed if the desired goal is to be 
reached. me cannot here trace the devious and difficult paths to 
be followed. we are concerned with the Christian way of redemp- 
tion. Christianity presents us with a straight thoroughfare, an 
unbroken avenue, a King's Highway. It makes the claim that all 
other roads lead astray and that the Gospel of Jesus Christ offers 
the only adequate redemption.
If redemption is the highway that leads to God, where 
can the pilgrim find it? Who or what is there to guide him along 
the way? How must he approach the portal? How can he be ad- 
mitted? What, finally, must he do to be saved? This is the 
great question, it is the S.O.S. call of humanity.
Christian redemption is bound up with Jesus Christ. Any 
attempt to interpret Christianity without reference to Him must 
end in defeat. Whatever we do with Him, wherever we place Him, 
however we think of Him, we must at least take account of Him. 
The New Testament points to Him on every page. 1'he Gospels are 
the/
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the record of the good news which He heralded. The Epistles find 
their content in Him. Any attempt to interpret Christianity 
without Jesus Christ is impossible. Those who do not honour Him 
find it necessary, nevertheless, to deal with Him if only to ex- 
plain Him away. This is not a point to be argued, it is a simple 
declaration of fact.
Though there is no disagreement that Jesus Christ is the 
centre of Christianity, there is wide disagreement among those who 
try to explain and interpret Him. "What think ye of Christ?" - 
this is the intrusive question which must be answered. It is the 
great watershed, the Continental Divide, that separates into two 
camps those who would answer this question.
The position of those who make Jesus Christ the object 
of faith and find redemption in His Person is the traditional 
evangelical viev/ of the uhureh. To the question, "v/hat must I do 
to "be saved?" the answer is given, "Believe on the uord Jesus 
Christ." Through Him and through Him alone is redemption possible. 
Man is a helpless sinner immeasurably separated from u-od. by a gulf 
over which there is no bridge. Llan is unable to produce, as the 
Westminster Confession says, "any spiritual good accompanying 
salvation." But once-and-for-all Uod, the jeiternal, has entered 
human history in the Person of Jesus Christ, and through Him re- 
demption is made effective. He does not only preach the i>ivine 
V/ord, He is the nord. Redemption is not only illustrated in Him, 
He is the Redeemer.
On the other hand, there are those who regard Jesus 
Christ as the subject of faith and the exemplar of redemption. 
This/
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This is the position of all literal speculative theologies. Jesus 
Christ is not the Way, He is the way-shower. Me is regarded with 
the greatest reverence and admiration and is given a unique place 
in Christianity as an index to faith and redemption, "but it is not 
required that we have faith in Him. The idea or principle of 
redemption to which He gave expression in His life and teaching is 
the important consideration. Once we have received from Him the 
principles of Christianity, we can dispense with nis Person. The 
argument is as follows: Humanity as a whole is ever progressing 
toward divinity; there is in every man the divine spark which 
needs but to "be fanned into flame; to speak of a Kedeemer or 
Mediator is to discredit humanity; Jesus, thus, becomes the first 
Christian, the first to tell us of uod 1 s true character, the first 
to illustrate what it means to "be redeemed; He is the pathfinder,
the pioneer of faith.
These two interpretations of redemption, the one emphasiz- 
ing the jeer son of Christ and the other the principle of redemption 
have always had advocates in the Christian church. There have 
been times when other issues submerged the doctrine of redemption, 
but whenever Christology came into focus, then redemption became 
a crucial matter. In the history of the early Church it was dur- 
ing the period of the great Christological Councils that this 
question reached a climax. Jj'rom that time until the beginning of 
the nineteenth century there was practically no acute Christ ological 
controversy. It is true, there were outcroppings of the problem, 
advocates of old heresies, but in general the church regarded her 
Christology as secure. with the advent of the nineteenth century, 
however/
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however, the issue came again into the open, and the christological 
controversy occupied the centre of the theological horizon. In 
the nineteenth century the greatest minds struggled with the issues 
"between the Person of uhrist and the principle of redemption, riot 
since the fourth century had this subject been so crucial for the- 
ology.
This thesis is a study of this great subject. AS the 
title suggests it is a study of the relation between the rerson of 
Christ and the principle of redemption as set forth in the theology 
of atrauss, .biedermann, and Troeltsch, all of whom were represen- 
tative thinkers of the nineteenth century. It is not our purpose 
to prove that these men were the only ones or the greatest who 
dealt with this subject. .Nor is any attempt made to connect these 
three names in a logical or historical sequence. They are, how- 
ever, important names in the consideration of the problem of 
redemption.
Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch are chosen for specific 
reasons. They group themselves quite definitely on the side of 
the issue which emphasizes the principle of redemption, and yet 
they represent quite different approaches to the problem. They 
appear in this thesis, accordingly, as examples or illustrations 
of the theological position which gives a supreme place to the 
principle of redemption and a correspondingly inferior place to
the Person of Christ.
Strauss is the leading representative of what may be
called/
-6-
called the JMythical interpretation of the relation between the 
Person of Christ and the principle of redemption. According to 
Strauss, Jesus Christ, as we know Him from the New Testament re- 
cords, was a good "but disillusioned prophet. His followers were 
prone to exaggerate what He did and said because they wished to 
see in their Master the fulfilment of Old Testament messianic 
prophecies and promises. We cannot believe in Jesus Christ as 
the Redeemer, Strauss would say, but we find in His life and teach- 
ing various metaphysical ideas and principles which are eternally 
true. The principle of redemption is one of these ideas. Later 
in life Strauss repudiated this position and denied that Christian- 
ity contained eternal truths. He became a materialistic philosopiher 
ancl found it necessary to substitute for Christianity scientific 
and mechanical law.
Biedermann represents what may be called the Symbolic 
theory. He agreed with Strauss 1 s criticism of the life of Jesus, 
but he refused to accept Strauss's conclusions. Convinced that 
the Church had wrongly predicated of Jesus what was true only of 
humanity, Biedermann separated the Person of Christ from the prin- 
ciple of redemption but, nevertheless, insisted that the Person 
was a necessary support for the principle. Denying Jesus T s 
efficacy as the Redeemer, Biedermann affirmed His significance in 
revealing and illustrating the principle. The clear cut dis- 
tinction which he made between Person and principle in his earlier 
works is still evident in his last great book, but the clearness 
of the distinction gives way to a confusion of thought, and we 
find/
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find Medermann wrestling with his speculative theology in an 
attempt to show that, while separate, Person and principle are 
closely related.
Troeltsch is the outstanding illustration of what may 
"be called the Relative theory. In Troeltsch 1 s Christology, Jesus 
is a link in a prophetic chain which extends from Plato to Schleier- 
macher. As Redeemer, Jesus has but little significance, for, 
in the last analysis, u-od is the Redeemer, Jesus 1 s importance for 
the Christian religion lies in the fact that He is the centre and 
symbol of the Christian cult and community. Redemption, as the 
knowledge of G-od f s V/ill, is mediated through Christ only in so far 
as He is the revealer of u-od. Jesus is not absolute or unique. 
He is the incarnation of the metaphysical idea of Uod. Although 
He is an uplifting and vitalizing personality, He has no other 
part to play in redemption than that of showing us what Uod is 
like.
Before entering in fuller detail upon the analyses of 
these theological positions, it will be helpful first to trace the 
outlines of the philosophical and theological background of the 
nineteenth century from which Strauss, Biedermann, and 1'roeltsch 
derived their common inheritance.
CHAPTER I
PHILOSOPHICAL TENDENCIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Two causes which gave rise to the development of the 
nineteenth century theology were the political events of the 
period and the systematic movement of philosophy. i'he Napoleonic 
Wars which threatened to destroy the kingdoms of Central Europe 
were in large measure responsible for the great wave of religious 
revival which swept over the country dissolving the smug complac- 
ency of creedal and ecclesiastical orthodoxy and nourishing a new 
personal approach to U-od. In those days of national humiliation 
many attributed the perils and misfortunes of their land to the 
Divine Ju<%oTient. On the other hand, the philosophical trend of 
the nineteenth century had a still more profound influence upon 
the theology of this period. 'i'o enter into the effect of the 
political status upon theology is not necessary, but it is nec- 
essary to review the philosophical situation.
There is no definite break in philosophical thought 
between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Kant, who is 
generally recognized as the starting-point for a survey of nine- 
teenth century thought, lived and wrote in the eighteenth century. 
It was not until the closing years of the century, however, that 
his critical works were given currency, and his influence was felt 
chiefly/
1. Lichtenberger, History of u-erman Theology in the Nineteenth 
Century, pp.3,4,7; Hurst, History of Kationalism, pp.!79ff.
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chiefly in the opening years of the nineteenth century.
Two main streams of philosophical thought in the eighteenttt 
century from which Kant derived the impulse and incentive for a new 
system were the nationalism of Leibnitz, especially as it had been 
modified in the philosophy of wolff, and the Empiricism of the 
jainglish philosophy as expressed especially in the works of Jiume. 
nationalism based its discussions of ultimate reality upon logical 
concepts. .taaglish .Empiricism found the metaphysical touchstone 
in sensation. Kant was quite sure that neither held the truth. 
The nationalism of logical concepts was reasonable enough but it 
was not in accord with experience. Empiricism, on the other hand, 
seemed to ally itself with experience, and in so doing severed its 
tie with reason. To find a solution to this antinomy was Kant's 
primary task. The "dogmatic slumber" from which he was awakened 
by Hume referred to the dogmatism of Empiricism, and, once awake, 
Kant saw that both Empiricism and Rationalism were essentially 
dogmatic. Nevertheless, Hume stimulated Kant in a negative way, 
for Kant T s awakening led to a reaction against the philosophy of 
Hume. The Wolffian philosophy, too, except for the dualism of 
mind and matter which Kant carried over into his own thought, 
underwent a similar transformation.
How Kant attempted to solve the contradictions of 
Rationalism and Empiricism by means of the "critical" or "trans- 
cendental" philosophy does not lie within the province of this 
thesis. We are concerned with the development of nineteenth 
century philosophy only as it influenced the theology of the 
century/
century in regard to the Person of Christ and. the principle of 
redemption. The above discussion of Rationalism and Empiricism, 
however, is not out of place, for the leading tenets of these 
schools were reproduced in the theology of the time. English 
Empiricism gave rise to the Deism of the eighteenth century, while 
Rationalism was itself "both a philosophy and a theology. ,1'he main 
proposition of the Deists lay in the assertion that there is a 
"natural religion" at the heart of all religions. Special revela- 
tions are only the excess "baggage with which natural religion has 
"been encumbered throughout the ages. I'o separate the husk from 
the core in religion was the aim and purpose of the Deists. The 
Rationalists, on the other hand, accepted the creeds and doctrines 
of Christianity, but attempted to explain and reinterpret them in 
the light of reason alone. Anything not rationally conceived in 
Christianity must go by the board. Reason was the Procrustean 
bed upon which the Rationalists subjected Christianity.
At first associated with Rationalism but later separated 
from it was the Pietistic movement in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century. Pietism was essentially a protest against 
formalism and ecclesiastical authority, and in this protest it 
joined hands with Rationalism. Both fostered freedom in religion; 
both emphasized morality. Later as it countenanced separation 
from the world and conversion experiences, Pietism itself became 
conventionalized and broke with Rationalism.
The philosophy of the nineteenth century as formulated 
mainly by Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, became the foster-mother of 
the nineteenth century theology. It is necessary, therefore, 
to/
-11-
to deal with the thought of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel in order to 
make clear their contribution to theology especially as it in- 
fluenced the particular problem which we have in view.
First of all, we deal with Immanuel Kant. Although 
Kant inherited from his mother a sympathetic appreciation of 
Pietism, it was not to last for long. In so far as Pietism took 
its stand against formalism, Kant was one of its most loyal ad- 
herents, but when it "became sentimental and clothed its simple 
faith in dogmas and ceremonies, Kant not only lost interest in the 
movement, he became openly antagonistic to it.
During his early schooling at the Collegium Friderieianum, 
Pietism took the form of emotionalism and was so abhorrent to him 
that he refused to have anything to do with prayers or hymn-singing 
an attitude which remained with him until his death. Ho doubt it 
was only the simple faith of his mother which kept him from turn- 
ing away from all religion. We are told that he never attended 
church services, and that even in later life when his presence in 
church as Rector of the University was expected, he refused to 
enter the building after leading the academic procession to the 
doors.
Kant's education at the University included a few 
lecture courses on theology given by a boyhood friend, the pastor 
of his parents 1 church, Franz Albert behulz. Whether Kant had 
a genuine interest in studying theology is doubtful. It seems 
rather that these courses were taken not because of any leaning
toward/
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toward theology, "but "because he wished to widen his cultural out- 
look and placate his pastor-friend who was growing alarmed at 
Kant's rapid departure from the pietism of his youth.
When Kant stood in line for a professor's chair at the 
University, Schulz refused to grant his approval until Kant satis- 
factorily answered the question, "Do you fear God with all your 
heart?" The question itself shows the extent to which Kant had 
drifted since his early Pietism. He apparently was able to answer 
the question to the satisfaction of all for he was granted the 
chair. The lectures which he heard under Schulz marked the 
beginning and the end of his theological training. It is said 
that when he came to write his main theological work, Die Religion 
innerhalb der Urenzen der blossen Vernunft,his only source of in- 
formation for the traditional theology was an old copy of a 
catechism which he had used as a child.
The ruling passion in Kant's life was not religious but 
moral. His high ethical standards, his conception of life as 
service, his honesty, and his unquenchable thirst for truth are 
all admirable traits. As to Kant the man, it has been well said 
that, "It is a highly estimable type of human character which here 
meets us, but not a lovable one." 2
The question which Kant set himself to answer in The 
Critique of Pure Reason, his main philosophical work, was: 
How/
1. Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, edited by 
T.M. G-reene and H.H. Hudson, pp.xxix-xxi.
2. .b'. Paulsen, Immanuel Kant - his life and doctrine, p.54.
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How are synthetic a priori juflgpments possible? In other words, 
where is true knowledge possible? In the three sections of The 
Critique of Pure Reason, the Aesthetic, the Analytic, and the 
Dialectic, Kant deals with the three stages of knowledge, - per- 
ception, understanding, and reason. The Aesthetic, or perception 
stage, has to do with pure mathematics. The Analytic, or under- 
standing stage, is concerned with physical science. .tioth offer 
synthetic a priori juclgements. TO the question, ilow is .knowledge 
possible in mathematics, Kant answered that space and time are the 
a. priori principles which render knowledge valid. In physical 
science, knowledge is possible because of the categories of the 
understanding which, like space and time, are also a priori prin- 
ciples. In the Aesthetic and Analytic Kant's question was, How 
is knowledge possible? In the Dialectic the question became, 
Is knowledge possible? The reason for this change lay in the 
subject matter of the Dialectic. Here he was concerned not with 
space and time or with physical science but with the ideas of the 
soul, the universe, and God. These ideas are outside the province 
of perception and understanding. They do not respond to space 
and time or to the categories of the understanding. Kant's thesis 
in the Dialectic is that knowledge is impossible where these three 
ideas occur.
The Cogito ergo sum of Descartes had no place in the 
epistemology of Kant. The soul is not an object of knowledge 
simply because it cannot fit into the moulds of space and time or 
into the categories of the understanding. It is possible to 
know the "empirical ego", the sensations and thoughts of the changing
self,/
-14-
self, "but the "transcendental ego," the pure "I", remains aloof 
from the knowledge process. In like manner, the idea of a uni- 
verse stands outside the pale of knowledge. »rfhen it is made an 
object of knowledge, "antinomies" are the result.
While not denying God, Kant declared that we cannot make 
God an object of knowledge, we cannot know Him. A God who is the 
sum total of reality, the ens realissimum, cannot be made the 
object of finite experience. In the traditional thought of the 
time three logical proofs for the existence of uod were current. 
Kant showed that they were all fallacious. 1'he ontological proof 
confused essence and existence. The cosmological proof uttered 
a logical fallacy in speaking of an uncaused cause. The physico- 
teleological proof, which attributed the design and beauty of the 
world to a Creator, was a mere assumption, for it may be that 
nature acts freely without the help of a Creator or Architect.
The argument of The Critique of Pure Reason demonstrated 
the limits and extent of knowledge. what is of immediate interest 
in this survey is the proposition that any knowledge of God is 
impossible. The refutation of the Nationalistic proofs for the 
existence of God showed that they do not prove what they were 
meant to prove. Kant had no other motive in so dealing with 
these arguments. He was not destroying in the spirit of an icono- 
clast, for he doubtless had in mind the moral argument for God's 
existence which he introduced in the subsequent Critique.
Kant's philosophy was further developed in the Critique 
of Practical Heason. After defining the part that reason plays 
in the knowledge process, Kant turned to the problem of the will, 
or/
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or the Practical Reason as he called it. ihe moral law is a 
Categorical Imperative which, as universally valid reason, is a 
law unto itself, the "basis of all morality. »»e are confronted 
with three postulates of the Practical Reason: the postulate of 
freedom, to say "I ought"demands the corollary "I can," thus the 
Categorical Imperative is the guarantee of freedom; the postulate 
of the immortality of the soul, since we can only approach the 
moral law in this life, the soul must "be eternal; the postulate 
of the existence of Uod, the moral consciousness demands a harmony 
between moral worth and happiness, this harmony presupposes a u-od 
who will see that justice is done.
The contributions made by the Critique of Practical 
Reason are obvious enough. Pure reason gives way to practical 
reason. The Will becomes of paramount value; ethics takes the 
place of metaphysics. -brom the role of der Allzermalmende. the 
all-destroyer, in pulling down the rationalistic proofs for the 
existence of uod, Kant adopted the role of a restorer and found in 
the moral law the only true basis for uod 1 s existence.
The Critique of Jucfcgnent forms a link between the other 
two Critiques. Between understanding and will comes judgement. 
But this Critique which is essentially a discussion of the beautiful 
and the sublime need not detain us in our survey of the philoso- 
phical-theological thought of Kant-
Kant's most comprehensive treatment of religion and theo- 
logy is contained in Die Religion innerhalb der Q-renzen der 
blossen Vernunft which was published in 1793, eleven years before 
his death. It is the last work from his pen of any lasting value. 
The/
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i'he "book is an exposition of the relation between rational "belief 
and the faith of the Christian Church. i'he first section, on the 
Radical Evil in man, was "brought before the College of Censors in 
.Berlin for examination. Although it seemed to stand outside the 
traditional exposition of the Lutheran and Reformed faiths, it 
passed the censors who justified their verdict saying that Want's 
language would be understood only by the most erudite and there- 
fore its influence would be harmless. I'he second section, on 
the conflict between the Uood and Evil Principles, was banned at 
first, but K.ant submitted the whole manuscript to the theological 
faculty of the University of Kflnigsberg and succeeded in getting 
it printed there. Later Kant was advised to refrain from theo- 
logizing, and the university professors were prohibited from 
lecturing on the Religion.
The findings of the Critical philosophy concerning 
phenomena and noumena, things taiowable and unknowable, the con- 
ception of Joaowledge, the refutation of the proofs for the 
existence of trod, the moral argument for uod, the immortality of 
the soul, and freedom form the background of the argument which 
is set forth in the Religion. The aim of the work itself was 
not to destroy or disparage the orthodox Christian faith, but to 
deal a death blow to the religion of reason and in so doing 
actually help to bring religion to the hearts of the people.
In this treatise Kant put forth his position concerning 
the Radical 4vil in man, a position which had lasting influence 
upon the thought of the theologians of the time. Emil Brunner 
is/
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is willing to grant that Kant was the only one of the great modern 
thinkers to understand evil in the sense of a positive resistance 
of the will to the law of good. Evil in Kant, he says, lay at 
the very centre of the human personality, and in this respect Kant 
approached the Christian doctrine of sin. Professor We "fab in his 
"book on Kant calls this section "epoch-making" because it revived
the doctrine of original sin which to the Aufklarung had always
2 
"been a stumbling-block. Kant's notion of original sin, however,
is not here stated as a doctrine or dogma of the Church, but as
a necessary implication of morality. we note this in his descrip-
2 tion of the "biblical account of the Jj'all. The exegesis of the
passage was unimportant for Kant. He was not concerned with what 
the writer had in view or what his religious convictions were. 
The important thing is the moral lesson which the story of the 
Jj'all patently indicates, namely, that our perfect self is hampered 
and hindered by the Radical Evil which is a part of the human per- 
sonality, we catch here the first glimpse of Kant's method in 
dealing with the doctrines of the Church.
In the second section of the Religion Kant seems to deny 
what he had affirmed in the first part. Although the human per- 
sonality has evil at its centre, it also has a good disposition. 
There is, therefore, in Kant's thought not only a total depravity 
but also a susceptibility to good. »«e are not created good, but 
we/
1. Emil Brunner, The Mediator, p.127.
2. C.C.J. Ytebb, Kant's Philosophy of Religion, p.92.
3. The Religion, p.39.
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we are created to be good. How the Radical -ttvil is overcome by 
the Good Principle or the good disposition is not discussed by 
Kant. Such a transaction is beyond the limits of reason alone. 
This Good Principle, Kant goes on to show, is what we, 
as human personalities encumbered with Radical Evil, seek to 
elevate to the place of primacy in our lives. But where shall 
we look for this principle? What are its distinguishing char- 
acteristics? Kant answered these questions by pointing to the 
personification of the Good Principle in Mankind which is iden- 
tified with the Person of Jesus Christ. r> Mankind (rational 
earthly existence in general) in its complete perfection is that 
which alone can render a world the object of a divine decree and 
the end of creation.....he (i.e. perfect mankind) is no created 
thing but His only-begotten Son..... Wow it is our common duty as 
men to elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection, that 
is, to this archetype of the moral disposition in all its purity - 
and for this the idea itself, which reason presents to us for our 
zealous emmulation, can give us power. But just because we are 
not the authors of this idea.....it is more appropriate to say 
that this archetype has come down to us from heaven and has assumed 
our humanity. . . . .Such union with us may therefore be regarded as 
a state of humiliation of the oon of G-od if we represent to our- 
selves this godly-minded person, regarded as our archetype, as 
assuming sorrows in the fullest measure in order to further the 
world's good, though he himself is holy and therefore bound to
endure no sufferings whatsoever." Jesus Christ and the ideal 
of/
1- *he Religion, p.54.
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of mankind are synonymous. «e have here the first suggestion of 
the separation of the Person of Christ from the principle of 
Christianity.
iwan finds his redemption "through a practical faith in 
this son of God." 1 This does not mean that the object of faith 
is the historic Jesus, it is rather the "Ideal of humanity well- 
pleasing to God." In so far as this ideal is not of our own 
creation, we can speak of it as the son of God. 1'he ideal stands 
as a model of perfection toward which man must strive. The 
"archetype" which we must imitate lies within our reason. It 
may "be there was a "truly godly-minded man" in history who, by his 
teaching, conduct, and suffering, was a perfect example of the 
Good Principle, "but such a person would not necessarily influence 
us, since the Good Principle is to be sought in ourselves and not 
in any one else. "The elevation of such a holy person above all 
the frailties of human nature would rather, so far as we can see, 
hinder the adoption of the idea of such a person for our imita- 
tion. ... .his distance from the natural man would then be so in- 
finitely great that such a divine person could no longer be held
2 
up as an example to him."
Certain/
1. The Religion, p.55.
2. " "P»57; Kant's argument continues on the line 
that redemption is more desirable when it is the result of 
one's own effort and will. Jesus Himself, we are told, when 
He spoke of Eis perfection and His relation to the father was 
referring not to Himself but to the "disposition" which was 
in Him and which governed3&s life. i'o display this dis- 
position objectively was, of course, impossible; it was seen 
through His teaching and conduct.
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uertain difficulties in Kant's notion of a Good Prin- 
ciple did not escape him. How can man ever attain the goal of 
perfection if he is constantly striving against the Radical Evil? 
Kant's answer to this was, that man will be judged not by what he 
is or by what he has done but according to his disposition toward 
goodness. "This moral disposition which in all its purity (like 
unto the purity of the a on of G-od) the man has made his own - or, 
(if we personify this idea) this Son of God, Himself, bears as 
vicarious substitute the guilt of sin for him, and indeed for all 
who believe (practically) in Him; as saviour He renders satis- 
faction to supreme justice by His sufferings and death; and as 
advocate He makes it possible for men to hope to appear before 
their judge as justified."
Jesus Christ is for Kant the originator of a great idea, 
the Uood Principle. He is the ideal of perfect manhood. As an 
abstract principle of perfection He has more meaning for us than 
as a Person. His moral ideal has been perpetuated in the Church 
and has served as the ideal for mankind. He was both human and 
divine. Human He was in his teaching and example; divine in 
His ambassadorship from heaven. In Him the Good Principle made 
its first full appearance, and thus He was made an example for all 
men who wished to leave their old lives behind and enter into a 
new and eternal life. The teachings which He set forth in parable 
and precept are convincing to all men through their own reason. 
Jj'aith, therefore, must find its object not in this Person but in 
the/
1. The Religion, pp.60-69.
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the ideal of a humanity well-pleasing to tfod. Christ, says 
.Brunner of Kant's Christology, "is the highest expression that can 
be imagined of a moral and religious being, no less, but also no 
more."-*1 For this reason Kant is called the father of religious
»
modernism because he separated the form of Christian doctrine from 
the content as it is expressed in the Person of Jesus Christ. -Re- 
demption for Kant was a matter of self-regeneration. It is the 
victory of the u-ood principle over the Radical Evil. Man himself 
in the final analysis, is his own redeemer. salvation is made 
possible when man adopts moral principles. God does not effect 
this salvation for any interference on His part would be a disa- 
vowal of man's liberty and freedom.
Heligion, as such, really played but a small part in the 
moral system of Kant. Faith, in Kant's vocabulary, always means 
rational faith. Religion in Kant's own words is "the recognition 
of all duties as divine commands." 2 The emphasis is always upon
morality. "Kant's religion", as Professor Pringle-Pattison has
2 said, "is his ethic writ large."
Jj'ichte is the link between Kant and Hegel. The Kantian 
philosophy, which was being discussed in all the Crerman univer- 
sities, was radically modified by £'ichte whose philosophy became 
the stepping stone in the development from the critical philosophy 
of/
1. Emil .Brunner, 'i'he Mediator, p. 100.
2. The Religion, p.142.
3. Pringle-Pattison, The Development from Kant to Hegel, p.110.
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of Kant to the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. It is in this transi- 
tion role that Jb'ichte's importance in the study of nineteenth 
century thought lies. Although his system claimed to go beyond 
the limits set "by Kant, his influence was short lived. We still 
read Kant, but Fichte's works are dismissed with a summary state- 
ment as we pass on to Hegel. But just because J'ichte takes his 
position in the philosophical line of development, he becomes 
important as an index to the tendency of the period.
While there is little of interest in the life of Kant, 
Fichte's biography is the tale of an energetic and impulsive lover 
of life. we think of Kant as the quiet, self-contained, specula- 
tive philosopher; i'ichte was not content to live with his philo- 
sophy, he was a man as well as a philosopher. Of the two Fiehte 
is undoubtedly the more human and though not so great as Kant, he 
is more lovable.
Fiehte 1 s earliest writing on the subject of religion 
was a small fragment called Aphorismen uber Religion und Deismus, 
1790. The purpose of this essay was to clear up the controversy 
between philosophy and Christianity. This he attempted to do by 
relegating each subject to its proper field of enquiry. I'his 
stucty brought him for the first time into contact with the writings 
of Kant. He was so attracted by the logic and reasonableness of 
the Critiques, especially the Critique of Practical Heason, that 
he henceforth devoted his entire time in their exposition and 
development. Of this introduction to Kant, which as a sort of 
philosophical conversion marked a transition from the old to the 
new in his life and thinking, he writes to several friends with
passionate/
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passionate exultation. "I threw myself into philosophy," he 
writes, "and, as you loiow, into the Kantian. Here I found the 
remedy for all my evils, and joy enough to boot. ihe influence 
of this philosophy, and particularly the moral part of it (which 
however is unintelligible without previous study of the Critique 
of Pure Reason), upon the whole spiritual life, and particularly 
the revelation which it has caused in my own mode of thought, is 
indescribable." To another he wrote, "I have lived in a new 
world since I have read the Critique of Practical Reason. Prin- 
ciples which I believed were irrefragable, are refuted; things 
which I thought could never be proved, - as for example, the idea 
of absolute Freedom, of Duty, - are proved; and I am so much the 
happier. It is indescribable what respect for humanity, what 
power this system gives us." To his wife he wrote, "A circum- 
stance which seemed the result of pure chance, led me to give 
myself up entirely to the study of the Kantian philosophy..... 
I have accepted a nobler morality, and instead of occupying myself 
with outward things, I employ myself more with my own being..... 
It is difficult beyond all conception, and stands much in the need 
of simplification." 1
Fichte felt that the best introduction to the personal 
friendship and advice of his philosophical hero would be to publish 
something to attract his attention. With this in view he wrote 
the Versuch einer Kritik aller Qffenbarung, 1793. There was some 
difficulty in getting it published; the theological faculty at 
Halle/
1. From Wm. Smith's Memoir, pp.31-33 contained in Vol.I of the 
Popular Works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte,
-24-
Halle objected to its contention: that no proof of the divinity 
of a revelation can be derived from an appeal to miracles occurring 
in connection with it, but that the question of its authenticity 
can be decided only by an examination of its contents. The 
dissenting censor, however, was replaced by another with more 
liberal leanings and the Kritik was printed. It was published 
anonymously, the editor neglecting to include JJ'ichte's name, and 
was at once seized upon as a work of Kant. The Allgemeine 
Literatur-Zeitung even suggested in its review of the book that 
any one who had read a line of Kant could not but recognize these 
words as his. Kant himself informed the public whose work it was. 
The incident, rather than the book itself, placed .eichte before 
the eyes of the thinking world, establishing his prestige and 
placing before him the chair of philosophy at Jena.
Kant had declared that the moral consciousness is the one 
necessary and universal absolute upon which thinking can depend, 
tfichte took a step further and posited the ti&o as the only absolute. 
The Ego became tfiehte's chief concern in philosophy. The Ego is, 
however, not mere intellect or changelessness, it is activity and 
will. ivioral obligation is the essence of the Ego. Its very 
existence supposes its activity, and this in turn responds, with 
free action, to duty. Thus the Ego, moral obligation, and free- 
dom, become for .b'iehte synonymous terms to express ultimate reality. 
Kant's discussion of freedom had a profound effect upon J'ichte with 
the result that moral freedom became his main principle. The chief 
end of man in ^'ichte's catechism is to live morally.
To/
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To say all is Ego, or all is mind, was not new in philo- 
sophy; Bishop Berkeley had said as much some years before in 
England. But Fichte not only said there is nothing but Ego, he 
said there is only one Ego. We as finite creatures have no in- 
dividuality outside of the absolute Ego, the image of which is 
impressed upon each of us in the form of duty. Such a theory 
must radically influence one's estimate of G-od. Thus Fichte con- 
ceived of G-od as the universal moral process, the Universal Ego. 
Since the essence of the Ego is to act freely and morally, God is 
the freely acting moral process in which the individual has a share 
and a responsibility.
Although Fichte did not trouble himself, as did Kant, 
with the idea of a Radical Evil (for evil was to Fiehte no more 
than the inertia of the will), still he saw that man, no matter 
how hard he try, cannot realize the moral goal to which duty beckons 
him. But this does not give cause for despair, the true vocation 
of man lies in the increasing approximation to this goal, he cannot 
ask for more, he cannot do less. "The ultimate purpose of each 
individual man, as well as of all society, and consequently of all 
the labours of the Scholar in society, is the moral elevation of 
all men."l
Fichte 1 s ever recurring idea is that religion is as old 
as creation. He did not distinguish in essence between different 
kinds/
1. The Vocation of the Scholar, p.192 in Smith's edition of 
Fichte, Vol.1.
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kinds of religion, at heart they are all one, worshipping the same 
G-od. In his younger days when he was faced with an invitation 
to become a pastor, he wrote, "I am neither of the Lutheran nor 
of the Reformed Church, but of the Christian." 2 Religion for 
.B'ichte is recognizing this earthly life as a counterpart of or 
development toward the perfect Divine life. This life is not re- 
presented in outward forms and does not impose external conventions, 
it is insight and light into the "One True Life." Christianity 
is the highest expression of this relationship. The words of 
St. John, "I and the father are one," contain the Christian ex- 
pression of this truth. The insight that religion gives enables 
us not only to see G-od, but to have and possess Him. We do not 
create Him, He is in us. <Je find Him by forsaking our earthly 
ways. By removing all earthly obstacles, God is able to stand at 
the centre of our being. He has never been elsewhere than at the 
centre though His place has been obscured. Man and God cannot 
be/
1. JTichte at one time was charged with atheism and the controversy 
reached such a stage of disagreeableness that .b'ichte resigned 
his chair at Jena. He himself never agreed to the charge and 
was never convinced that he taught anything but the highest 
religion. He was well aware that he lived in an age of re- 
ligious doubt and agnosticism, but he considered himself to 
stand on the other side talcing up the weapons of truth against 
the scoffers. "I am not ignorant," he writes in The Way To- 
ward the .blessed Life, p.409, "that in this age we can enter 
no circle at all numerous among the cultivated classes, in 
which there shall not be found some one in whom the mention of 
the name of Jesus, or the use of scriptural expressions, excites 
unpleasant feelings, and the suspicion that the speaker must 
be either a hypocrite or a fool." In such a situation we find 
.tf'ichte daring to mention the name of Jesus and daring to use 
Scripture not as one of the "cultivated classes" and not as 
"a hypocrite or a fool."
2. Ifemoir, p.28.
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be disunited. "Sublime and living Will," says -t'ichte of &od, 
"named by no name, compassed by no thought, I may well raise my 
soul to Thee, for Thou and I are not divided. Thy voice sounds 
within me, mine resounds in Thee; and all my thoughts, if they 
are but good and true, live in Thee also. In Thee, the Incom- 
prehensible, I myself, and the world in which I live, become 
comprehensible to me, all the secrets of my existence are laid open, 
and perfect harmony arises in my soul."
The Fourth Uospel best expresses this relation of man to 
God. Pichte's interpretation and acceptance of Christianity were 
based upon the truth contained in the words, "I and the Father are 
one." The Synoptics he regarded as teaching nothing more than 
morality.
when we come to Fichte's treatment of the Person of 
Christ, we find that he followed closely the thought of Kant. 
Whether or not he was impressed with the Religion, we do not know 
but 'at least his conclusions show a parallel trend. Questions as 
to the personality of Jesus, who He was and what lie was, did not 
interest j'ichte. These are the questions with which Paul dealt 
who was concerned in making Jesus the Mediator of a IMew Covenant. 
The true Christian, says JJ'ichte, will know nothing about a .New 
Covenant or a Mediator. There can be but one eternal relationship 
between man and u-od. In the jeiternal we live and move and have 
our being. This relation makes a Mediator unnecessary and superfluous.
Jesus/
1. Vocation of Man, p.463.
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Jesus is the manifestation of the divine. On the "basis 
of this statement .e'ichte found agreement between his philosophy 
and Christianity. The historical person, however, is of no sig- 
nificance. An oft-quoted saying of i'ichte's describes very well 
his conception of Christianity; "The Metaphysical only," he said, 
"and not the Historical, can give us .blessedness. il1 Fichte was 
so sure of this that he made bold to suggest that if Jesus were to 
return to earth to-day, He would be quite satisfied to find the 
metaphysical idea of Christianity in the minds of men. Certainly 
He would not look for the worship of Himself. Through the Person 
of Jesus the Eternal entered time; this is the significance of His 
Person. For this reason the Incarnation was a doctrine which 
readily appealled to him, but in idea only, not because of the 
historical Person of Jesus. His contribution is great and we 
thank Him for it but He no longer contributes anything. We have 
the ideas, we do not need the originator of them. Jesus Christ, 
therefore, is not superior to humanity, He is humanity^ exemplar. 
As we discover our tie with the eternal we, like Christ, become 
Sons of God.
Redemption, then, is for i'ichte in no way connected with 
the Person of Christ except as He manifests the principle of re- 
demption, juan has need of no Mediator to forgive sin and present 
us faultless before the throne. Redemption is really an un- 
necessary conception in i'ichte's thinking, for man is redeemed when 
he/
1. The Y/ay towards the .blessed Life, p.392.
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he knows that he is in uod and God is in him. Man is his own 
Redeemer. Redemption is a necessary consequence of moral activity; 
man "must lay hold of it for himself, and with his own hands." 1
The philosophical movement "begun in Kant and continued 
by i)'ichte found its logical conclusion in Hegel. iJ'rom the criti- 
cal epistemology of Kant through the ethical exhortations of J'ichte 
we come to the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. It was Hegel who 
gathered together the threads of his predecessors 1 philosophy and 
wove them into a system which revealed the familiar warp and woof 
but displayed an altogether new pattern. Kant had divided reality 
into phenomena and noumena, things knowable and unknowable, tfichte, 
dissatisfied/
1. The way towards the .blessed Life, p.349.
2. It is true that the name of bchelling appears as an important 
step in the historical development from iJ'ichte to Hegel, but 
for the present purpose it is unnecessary to include him in 
our survey. Actually there is a narrow margin of difference 
between achelling and Hegel. Schelling was perhaps the dis- 
coverer of the germ of the Hegelian philosophy, but what he 
began Hegel finished. we speak of the Hegelian philosophy, 
but we seldom use the adjective ichellingian. The agreement 
between Schelling and Hegel quite obscures their disagreement. 
Schelling 1 s philosophy cannot be called systematic. It is 
said that he changed his mind five times, and that his develop- 
ment is not so much evolution as revolution. He is more of 
a Romanticist than a philosopher; his gift is analogy not 
logic. The main contribution of bchelling lies in his en- 
deavour to supplement ^'ichte's philosophy of the iigo with a 
philosophy of nature. The theory of Identity on which he 
hoped to reconcile these two propositions was the stumbling- 
block which caused Hegel to break with bchelling and develop
his own system. bchelling's Identity, he said, was "the night 
in which all cows are black."
dissatlsfiecL with this, had attempted to solve the dualism "by em- 
phasizing the JSgo. The Hegelian system claimed to be a higher 
synthesis in so far as it did not regard matter and mind, phenomena 
and noumena, the knowable and unknowable, as opposites in the 
manner of Kant and tfichte , "but as necessary elements of a unified 
reason which he called the Absolute.
Hegel T s aim was to define reality and .knowledge in terms 
of this Absolute. He did not wish to be understood as creating 
the Absolute as though it were "fired from a pistol," but he hoped 
to show its origin and development and dialectically demonstrate 
that the Absolute contains all that is. i'o do this it must be 
shown how consciousness progresses and evolves from sensation to 
pure knowledge culminating in the recognition of the Absolute as 
the ultimate reality, not as an abstract identity in which opposites 
are merged, but as living spirit toward which all knowledge con- 
verges. Philosophy was for Hegel the science of this Absolute.
The method which negel used in his reconciliation of the 
Kantian opposites has been called Dialectic. At the centre of 
this method lies the thought that the world of experience is pro- 
gressive. Hegel has often been credited with standing on the 
brink of the theory of evolution. He was the champion of the 
historical point of view. If we look at things as they really 
are, we must realize the importance and significance of their de- 
velopment. The Dialectic method has three stages, thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis. «Jhat at first seems to be true and 
final is recognized as a relative truth in the light of its oppos- 
ite, both of which can then be reconciled into a larger whole.
The/
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The progression of this "yes," "no," and "both" is a zig-zag move- 
ment which pushes steadily onward toward the Absolute. It is the 
movement from the "everlasting nay" to the "everlasting yea." The 
Dialectic method is, therefore, a protest against one-sidedness and 
partiality. Ho particular item of reason or fact is ultimate, 
only the process is Absolute.
Hegel undertook the elaboration of these principles in 
his Phanomenologie later supplemented by the Logic. The .Encyclo- 
paedia, containing the philosophy of nature and the Philosophy of 
Mind, complete, with the Logic, the Dialectic triad of thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis. In the Philosophy of Mature the prin- 
ciples contained in the Logic are applied to the external world 
thus acting as the antithesis to the Logic. In the Philosophy 
of Mind the synthesis of the Logic and the Philosophy of Nature 
is effected through the Absolute. In all three, thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis, the Absolute is revealed in different but progressive 
stages. In the Logic it is as Being and Essence, in the Philoso- 
phy of Nature as matter and external forms, in the Philosophy of 
Mind as consciousness in art, morality, and religion.
When we come, more specifically, to Hegel's treatment of 
religion, we find him applying his philosophical principles against 
the Rationalism of the Aufklarung and in defence of Christianity 
which he regarded as being in harmony with his theory of the Absol- 
ute. In words reminiscent of JJ'ichte, Hegel denounced the religious 
tenor of his day. "It no longer gives our age any concern," he 
says, "that it loiows nothing of G-od; on the contrary, it is re- 
garded as a mark of the highest intelligence to hold that such 
knowledge/
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knowledge is not even possible. what is laid down by the Christian 
religion as the supreme, absolute commandment, ! Ye shall know G-od,' 
is regarded as a piece of folly." 1
God is the only true reality for Hegel; religion is the 
only true and absolute knowledge. The object of the religious 
man is to come into contact with God. This union of the Infinite 
and the finite is the centre of the Hegelian conception of religion. 
G-od is not unknowable; He is, in fact, the only reality we do 
Icnow. "Why should liod not reveal Himself to us," Hegel asks,"if 
we earnestly seek the knowledge of Him?.....If the knowledge of 
God were kept from us in order that we should know the finite only, 
and not attain to the Infinite, God would be a jealous God, or God 
would become an empty name."^ The Dialectic method which ends in 
a synthesis of two apparent opposites, a coincidentia oppositorum. 
underlies Hegel's conception of G-od and man. The Infinite and 
the finite are brought together into a larger reality, the Absolute. 
In the Oriental religions of the world, Hegel pointed out, stress 
is placed upon the Infinite. u-reek religion put the accent on 
man. In Christianity these two extremes are brought together into 
a synthesis wherein Uod and man become a unity.
Christianity is the highest religion. "In it the 
universal/
1. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol.1 edited by Spiers 
and Sander son, p. 36; cf. Jf'lohte , The Way toward the .blessed 
Life, p.409.
2. History of Philosophy, edited by Haldane and bimson, Vol.11, 
p. 73.
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universal spirit and the particular spirit, the infinite Spirit 
and the finite spirit, are inseparably connected; it is their 
absolute identity which constitutes this religion and is its sub- 
stance or content." 1 Although man is by nature evil, he is also 
to be regarded as potentially good. .civil is no more than "Being- 
not-yet-spirit" which is eventually swallowed up in the Absolute. 
Hegel's method in dealing with Christianity was to subject the 
doctrines of the Church to his dialectic system. He found in 
this experiment that there was usually a grain of truth, often- 
times a fundamental principle, expressed in these doctrines. Of 
course, the doctrines were modified and subtracted of their his- 
torical content but in their application and intrinsic meaning 
they were retained. This led many to regard Hegel as the defender 
of Orthodoxy. Hegel, however, was not concerned with the doc- 
trines as such but with the truths which they embodied. "Until 
theology is something more than a bare enumeration and compilation
of these doctrines ab extra," he argued, "it has no right to the
p title of science."
Hegel was quite insistent in placing Jesus Christ at the 
centre of Christianity. As the trod-man, Jesus conveys to us the 
highest philosophical, as well as religious, principle - the union 
of the Infinite and the finite. The technical terms of the Church, 
such as the -'divine and human natures in one person," are mislead- 
ing and awkward, but they express the truth that is essential to 
an/
1. Lectures on the philosophy of Religion, II, p.330.
2. The Logic of Hegel, by Wallace, p.61.
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an "understanding of Christianity. Although Jesus is a figure in 
history, nis real significance lies not in His life but in His 
spiritual manifestation. tie represents the eternal history of 
spirit. "Make of Christ what you will exegetieally, critically, 
historically.....the only real question is, What is the Idea or 
the Truth in and for itself?"1
History for Hegel, says JBrunner, "is merely a picture-
f) 
book, whose text he knows without the aid of the pictures." It
is the Absolute drawn out through time. ^'or this reason no single 
event in history is of any more importance than any other. Thus 
the historic Jesus loses His uniqueness; His worth lies in His 
testimony. This does not mean that Jesus is unimportant or in- 
significant in Christianity. On the contrary, He has the central 
place, not as Hedeemer or Mediator, but as the first among men to 
realize the fundamental principle of Christianity. The Death of 
Christ means that He was the God-man. His manhood demanded that 
He die like other men; His Resurrection and Ascension reveal His 
divinity and union with God. "The death of Christ is in one 
aspect the death of a man, of a friend who met his death by violence, 
etc.; but then it is just this death which, when conceived of in
a spiritual way, becomes the means of salvation and the central
ij> 
point of reconciliation." His Atonement is, moreover, not simply
an individual affair; it is the individual expression of the 
universal/
1. philosophy of History, edited by Sibree, p.337.
2. Jiimil .Brunner, The Mediator, p.36.
3. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, III, p.97
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universal principle of atonement. "The history of the atone- 
ment..... is not the history of one individual; on the contrary, 
it is God who accomplishes what is told in it; i.e., the view 
which it gives is that this history is the -universal and absolute 
history, the history which is for itself." 1
The part that Uhrist plays in redemption was for lie gel, 
as for Kant and ^ichte, purely exemplary. The principle of re- 
demption is separated from the Person of Uhrist. Christianity is 
made the supreme religion, but the historic Jesus fades into un- 
importance in the light of the truths which He taught and illus- 
trated. Redemption is a great ontological idea which applies to 
humanity as a whole. we are made partakers of redemption when we 
realize our kinship with u-od. i'here is no room, there is no need 
even, for a Redeemer or Mediator in Hegel's philosophy.
The movement of philosophy from Kant to Hegel provided 
the intellectual basis for the theology of the nineteenth century. 
Their speculative adventures into a new land of knowledge unearthed 
a priceless treasure upon which subsequent thinkers quickly relied. 
Their contributions to the thinking world became the common pro- 
perty of theologians. Their philosophical systems were the ter- 
minus a quo in which every theology, good and bad, found its 
beginning.
It is not to be supposed, however, that every theologian 
of/
1. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, III, p.95.
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of the nineteenth century made a deep and exhausting study of this 
philosophical movement in all its details. Philosophy and theo- 
logy have much in common, but they are nonetheless two quite 
different sciences. The influence of philosophy upon theology 
was confined to general principles. It was the recognition of 
these general principles in the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and 
Hegel that influenced the theologians. What the philosophers did 
was, "to discipline the mind, to perfect the methods and processes 
of our investigations, to habituate us to rigour and precision in 
our demonstrations, to elevate intelligence above the world of 
changing phenomena and transitory impressions, to learn to discern 
in all things their essence, their inner law, their genesis and 
progressive development, to embrace, connect, and co-ordinate 
everything in order to reach at one view a great, simple and fer- 
tile whole." 1
Kant T s greatest contributions to the theological thought 
of the century lay in his separation of things loiowable and un- 
Jcnowable, in his criticism of reason as a means of describing the 
divine, in his emphasis upon the authority of the moral conscience, 
and in his insistence that the truths of Christianity are eternal 
truths. J?'ichte's importance for the theological world is accoun- 
ted for partly in his intermediate position between Kant and Hegel. 
Dissatisfied with the dualism of Kant, Fiehte would regiment all 
things under the banner of the Ego. The religious life is for 
j'ichte/
1. Lichtenberger, History of German Theology in the Nineteenth 
Century, p.16.
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Fichte essentially a moral life lived in the recognition that G-od 
and man are one. Hegel's progressive synthesis of opposites, as 
an historical development leading to the Absolute, is his rich "be- 
quest to theology. The Infinite and finite are united into a 
higher synthesis than in either Kant or Fichte.
In the light of our problem, the relation between the 
Person of Christ and the principle of redemption, Kant, Fichte, 
and Hegel had a profound influence. Of course, none of them was 
primarily concerned with the problem or doctrine of redemption per 
se. When they spoke of Christianity at all it was to show the 
harmony of its principles with those of their individual systems. 
Redemption for them was not a paramount concern except as they be- 
lieved philosophy to be redemptive, and they were only secondarily 
interested in the Person of Christ. Yet they had a permanent 
effect upon the problem of redemption, for they opened the door 
which lead to a study of this problem.
Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, whom we are about to 
study in relation to the problem of redemption, found their point 
of departure in this philosophical movement. The philosophers 
pointed the way toward a deeper consideration of redemption, and 
as we look at the theology of the nineteenth century their influence 
in regard to redemption becomes obvious. .Before turning to Strauss, 
who found in Hegel's philosophy the impulse and incentive for his 
Leben Jesu, we must first look at the general development of the 
theology of the nineteenth century as it was influenced by Kant, 
Pichte, and Hegel, and as it developed for itself especially in 
regard to the problem of redemption.
CHAPTER II
THEOLOGICAL TENDENCIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
In the preceding chapter we followed the movement of 
philosophy from Kant through .fcichte to Hegel with special regard 
to its theological implications. we concluded that Kant, Fichte, 
and Hegei were primarily philosophers and, as such, only concerned 
with theology as it impinged upon their philosophy. 'i'heir con- 
tribution in disciplining the mind, in constructing logical systems 
of thought, and in defining the essence of things was eagerly re- 
ceived "by the theologians. In a sense their contribution was 
indirect and negative for they were not interested in constructing 
a systematic theology. This task they left for the theologians. 
They opened the doors of philosophy a little wider and revealed new 
corridors of thought. i'hey stood as sentinels and heralds outside 
these new avenues. It was the theological thinkers who passed 
through these portals and explored the beyond.
The main threads of the theological movement in the nine- 
teenth century are all tied together and have a common source in 
the philosophical movement. This does not mean that before the 
time of Kant there was no theology, but the productive theological 
thought of this century began properly with the philosophical era 
of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. They gave to theology a new impetus.
In the study of the theology of this century, we find 
that there is no distinct line of development as in the philoso- 
phical movement. Schools and personalities overlap both in time 
and/
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and in thought. A glance at the table of contents of any book 
on the subject will indicate what difficulty there is in classify- 
ing the trends. Whether we speak of the Old Schools, the Hew 
Orthodoxy, the Speculative school, the Radical School, the Hew 
Lutheranism, the school of Conciliation, the New Liberal Schools, 
and the itfeo-Kantian Schools as does Lichtenberger; or of the 
Liberal and Mediating Theology, the Erlangen School, and the Modern 
Synthesis as does R.S. Franks, we can see that there is disagree- 
ment and liberty of interpretation. »*e cannot put our finger on 
any one man or any one school and say, "This is the theology of 
the nineteenth century." It was a period of ups and downs, of 
affirmations and negations, of radicalism and conservatism.
All the various schools and personalities involved in 
the theology of the century had at least one thing in common, and 
it is upon this touchstone that we must make our orientation as we 
look at the century. It was an era of Uhristological thought. 
"Who is Jesus Christ and what are we to think of Him?" This was 
the question which was uppermost in the minds of theologians. 
Professor H.R. Mackintosh declares that not since the fourth cen- 
tury had the Person and irfork of Jesus Christ been so much the 
centre and substance of theological thought. i'here is no trace 
in the theology of this period of the Christological lethargy of 
the seventeenth century which contented itself in the fixed doc- 
trines of the Church.
Between/
1. The Person of Jesus Christ, p.248.
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.between the formalism of the seventeenth century and the 
Christological revival of the nineteenth century, the nationalism 
of the intervening century had done much to smother under the 
"blanket of reason any attempt at Uhristology. J.F. Rohr, a typical 
example of Rationalism, insisted that Uhristology be detached from 
theology. He was intolerant of anything he did not understand and 
Uhristology was to him thoroughly unintelligible. Taking his 
stand with Kant, R8hr emphasized the moral aspect of religion to 
the exclusion of everything else. Paulus, a contemporary of 
Rohr, attempted to write a life of Jesus after the postulates and 
principles of the Kantian philosophy. n'e are familiar with the 
results of this experiment. Paulus's treatment of the miracles 
contained in the Gospels explained them away with a rational twist 
leaving nothing but hallucinations and exaggerations in their place. 
Uhristology, therefore, had no place in the theology of Paulus. 
It is not surprising, therefore, to read that the theologians and 
preachers were often more interested in sports and agriculture than 
in theology. "The pulpit," says Hurst, "became the rostrum where 
the shepherdless masses were entertained with vague essays on such 
general terms as righteousness, human dignity, light, progress, 
truth, and right. The peasantry received frequent and laboured 
instructions on the raising of cattle, bees, and fruit. i'he poets 
of/
1. "That which the dogmatic language of the supernaturalists calls 
Uhristology forms no integral part of my system, for this con- 
sists indeed of a religion which Jesus taught, but not one of 
which He Himself could be the Object," Rohr in Briefe uber 
den Rationalismus, p.36, quoted by Brunner, The Mediator,p.45.
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of the day were publicly recited in the temples where the Refor- 
mers had preached." 1 Theology was identified with morality, and 
Uhristology was deemed unimportant. i'he influence of Kant and 
j;'ichte can be seen at work in this nationalistic theology with its 
emphasis on reason and its assurance that religion can be equated 
with morality.
In opposition to the nationalists a group of so-called 
Supranaturalists endeavoured to make a place for revelation in 
theology. This they did by associating it with reason. The 
Bible was for the Supranaturalists, as for the nationalists too, 
a collection of truths and eternal ideas which must become the 
ruling principles of the mind of man. They differed from the 
Rationalists in explaining the manner in which these truths have 
become apparent. The Rationalists said it was through reason 
alone; the Supranaturalists agreed with this but declared that 
reason is what it is just because it is the off-spring of revela- 
tion. Scripture and reason, therefore, are in essential agree- 
ment. But the Supranaturalists followed in the wake of the 
Rationalists as far as Ohristology was concerned. "The essential 
point, " they said, "is to believe that Christ is more than we are, 
that ne is better than we are, that He is not what we are." 2
The contradictions and inconsistencies of Rationalism 
and Supranaturalism led some theologians, principally i>e Wette, 
to attempt a reconciliation of the two schools. i>e Wette, whom 
Lichtenberger/
1. J.F. Hurst, History of Rationalism, p.162.
2. Lichtenberger, History of G-erman Theology in /the Nineteenth 
Century, 1889, p.28.
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Lichtenberger calls the Hathanael of modern theology, was instructed 
in the Kantian philosophy "but felt that the key to understanding 
Christianity did not lie in philosophy. The Rationalistic ex- 
planation of miracles by Paulus convinced him that the basis of 
Christianity could not be rational. dupranaturalism, he felt, 
was no better, for its notion of revelation was too far removed 
from the spirit of the age. i)e Wette found shelter from this 
struggle of opposites in aesthetics. The religious sentiment, 
he concluded, is the vehicle which carries man to the Infinite. 
This sentiment is beyond the reach or scope of reason. Dogmas, 
therefore, become symbols of poetic truths. In later life, the 
sermons of achleiermacher had a profound influence upon .De V/ette 
and he began to devote himself to preaching. He tried to reach 
the ordinary fold through a more positive statement of his theory 
of the religious sentiment, but his noble intentions were met with 
indifference. De Wette ! s genius lay in criticism not in system- 
atic theology.
This background of conflicting theological movements, 
which seemed to get nowhere and which stifled the religion of the 
people by offering them a moral philosophy or an aesthetic was the 
point of departure for Schleiermacher, the initiator and renovator 
of modern u-erman theology. Up until his appearance theology had 
been bridled with the bit of reason fashioned after the Kantian 
philosophy. Our problem concerning the Person of Christ and the 
principle of redemption was not as yet a vital issue in theology 
simply because Jesus Christ was shrouded in rational garments which 
covered/
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covered over conflicting doctrines "but which hid His Person, ivith 
the advent of bchleiermacher a radical change took place in the 
theological thought of the nineteenth century. As in Rationalism 
so too in ichleiermacher, the Kantian philosophy was the starting- 
point, but it was no more than that. U'e said "before that Kant 
opened the doors of philosophy to undiscovered corridors of truth 
which lay "beyond his philosophy. Jchleiermacher was the first to 
step over the threshold and begin the work of exploration. Others 
followed him; some penetrating further than he, and others not so 
far, but bchleiermacher carried the torch which enabled those who 
followed to see. Of all the corridors opened up for theological 
investigation the one which attracted most attention was the Person 
of Christ. It is down this path that we will follow the footsteps 
of the theological thinkers of the nineteenth century.
bchleiermacher has been called the father of modern theo- 
logy, i'or the first time since the Reformat ion a brilliant theo- 
logian centred his whole theological system in the Person and work 
of Christ. nearly two centuries of incredulity and indifference 
elapsed before there was heard a voice which called men back to the 
Person of Christ. The philosophical movement of Kant, Fichte, and 
Hegel had fostered this Christologieal apathy. Rationalism had 
been content to regard Christ as an ideal and an example. Any de- 
tailed discussion of His Person in relation to the doctrines of the 
Church was met with little sympathy. bchleiermacher stood at the 
turning of the ways deflecting the current of thought through
channels/
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ehannels long forgotten and -unused.
The peculiar genius of ^chleiermacher lay in the in- 
spiration of selection rather than in originality. His theology 
is always eclectic, but is is not so much of a mixture as it is 
the apex of conflicting opinions. It has "been said that he took 
both sides to every question. "Either or" was no challenge to 
him, his answer was always "both and." He was the great gatherer 
who gleaned stray bits of truth which fell from the hasty reapers 
who preceded him. Philip Schaff has said of bchleiermacher, "The 
sublime speculation of Plato, the calm pantheism of opinoza, the 
keen criticism of Kant, the subjective idealism of .Kiehte, the 
romantic poetry of Tieck and Schlegel, the bold neology of Vernier, 
the sentimental piety of Zinzendorf, the stern supralapsarianism 
of Ualvin, were all mastered by him."-'- But it is just this 
eclecticism that has given ochleiermacher his place in modern theo- 
logy. It is so broad, and in many points so vague, that it has 
been able to open its arms to all subsequent theologians. Its 
inconsistency has been the guarantee of its permanent influence, 
and although he denied the relevancy of the Old Testament and 
treated with indifference the doctrines of the Virgin Birth, the 
Resurrection and Ascension of Uhrist, he was regarded as a ijod-send 
by those who longed for a defender of the faith.
In separating himself from the Kantian morality, Sehleter- 
macher made religion a thing sui generis. Religion is a response 
of a definite part of human personality, what Schleiermacher called 
the/
1. Philip Schaff, Uermany: its Universities, Theology, and 
Religion, p.154.
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the schlechthiniges Abhangigkeitsgefuhl, the feeling of absolute 
dependence. Religion is placed on a feeling, or psychological, 
basis; not a moral basis as in the Kantian philosophy or an in- 
tellectual basis as in the Hegelian philosophy. "I maintain," 
says Schleiermacher in the Reden, "that in all better souls piety 
springs necessarily by itself; that a province of its own in the 
mind belongs to it, in which it has unlimited sway." 1 "The true 
nature of religion," he said, "is ....immediate consciousness of 
the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world."^ Man 
is thus born, as it were, with a religious capacity which in essence 
is the feeling of dependence on God. In the Jiipilogue to the 
Reden he concluded to the "cultured despisers of religion," to 
whom he addressed the speeches, "in the very type of religion, 
which in Christianity you so often despise, you are rooted with 
your whole knowing, doing, and being. You would see that you 
cannot get away from it, and that you seek in vain to imagine its 
destruction without the annihilation of all that you hold dearest 
and holiest in the world - your whole culture and mode of life, 
your art and science."^ While it is true that Schleiermacher did 
not fully develop his theory of absolute dependence in the Reden, 
the germ was there, as we can see by the above quotations. In the 
Q-laubenslehre, he stated as a preliminary proposition that piety 
is neither knowing or doing but a feeling which in essence is the 
"consciousness/
1. Reden, E.T. by John Oman, p.21.
2. " , p.101.
3. " , p.267.
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"consciousness of our absolute dependence, or which is the same 
thing, of our relation to God."
Schleiermacher never rose to very great spiritual heights 
when he dealt with the conception of God. In the Re den G-od is 
spoken of as the Universe, the Infinite, the world-All; G-od is 
never described as a person. ichleiermacher laboured under the 
doctrine of Spinoza that "omnis determinatio est negatio." He 
felt that he could not ascribe to God any attributes, for to do so 
would be to limit Him. As a person, God is unknowable; all that 
we can say is that He is the cause of all things and the force 
which motivates all things. In this respect ochleiermacher never 
departed in his thinking from Kant. It has been said of Schleier- 
macher that he had no G-od but Christ and this is, in a sense, true. 
It is Jesus Uhrist that commanded his attention in the Glaubenslehie, 
and in concentrating upon Him he neglected the doctrine of G-od.
Where Schleiermacher definitely transcended Kant was in 
refusing to accept the principle that man can redeem himself. The 
Radical Evil which infests men's souls is to be expunged, according 
to Kant, by his own efforts as he accepts the G-ood Principle which 
eventually effects his salvation. Schleiermacher referred re- 
demption to an act of God which is a supernatural miracle like 
creation. In the final analysis it would seem that Schleiermacher 
conceived of man, as sinful just in order that he might be redeemed.
In the G-laubenslehre we come face to face with the Person 
of/
1. Glaubenslehre, E.T. sees. 3, 4.
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of Christ. The Reden had reserved a revered and respected place 
for Christ as a mediator but not as the Mediator. The Glaubenslehre 
marks a decided advance over Schleiermacher 1 s previous writings, 
and here we find that Christianity is not merely the manifestation 
of an eternal idea, as in the Reden, but is "a monotheistic faith 
of the teleological type, and is essentially distinguished from 
other such faiths by the fact that everything in it is related to 
the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth."^- In this un- 
equivocable language Jesus is regarded as the only Mediator and 
redemption is indissolubly connected with His Person.
Beginning with the Christian consciousness of redemption 
Schleiermacher worked backwards until he arrived at Jesus Christ, 
the agent of redemption, and from whom there issues the vitalizing 
power to overcome the world. Christ's efficacy lies ultimately 
in His sinlessness. He who was perfectly holy and free from sin 
was enabled to become perfectly G-od-conscious. But this sinless 
Christ is also the historic Jesus. Thus He is both an ideal and 
a Person. He is the Urbild, the Archetype, in which history and 
Person are combined. Jesus stands in God's mind as the terminus 
ad quern for humanity and as such He is human, but by His sinless- 
ness He is also the Redeemer who saves humanity. Jesus Christ, 
then, is a man, but He is also Man in its entirety and perfection.
In so far as Christ is sinless, perfect, and the Urbild 
of humanity, He has power to raise all men to His level. This 
is/
1. Q-laubenslehre , se c. 11.
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is redemption. By becoming one of us, we become like Him. This 
is the secret of His Redeemership. Jesus's perfection has been 
communicated to us, "His consciousness having become," says Fair- 
bairn, "as it were, communicable, transmissible, heritable. His 
character therefore is archetypal, the original of a type He not 
only created, but perpetuates." Vifhen we expedience redemption 
through union with Christ, the religious feeling becomes the guid- 
ing principle of life. "The Redeemer assumes believers into the 
power of His God-consciousness, and this is His redemptive activ- 
ity." 2
The abiding influence of Schleiermacher's Christology 
was due to two emphases: the declaration that Jesus was the Re- 
deemer without whom there would be no redemption, and the pro- 
clamation that Jesus Christ, historic as well as divine, was the 
centre of Christianity. These two conclusions had a revolutionary 
effect upon Christological thought in the nineteenth century. They 
were the foci of the long debate which was carried on by subsequent 
thinkers concerning the Person of Christ and the principle of Re- 
demption. For although Schleiermacher spoke with finality about 
Christ the Redeemer, he raised more questions than he solved. Is 
Christ alive in the world to-day? Or is it merely His spirit 
that redeems? Is redemption a present or future experience? Has 
Christ any significance for the individual or is His redemption to 
be referred to humanity as a whole? These questions were left 
by/
1. A.M. Fairbairn, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology, p.£27.
2. Grlaubenslehre , sec. 100.
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by Schleiermacher for others to answer. His main task was fin- 
ished when he ordered theology to right-about-face and stand at 
attention before the Person of Christ.
The influence of Schleiermacher and Hegel found fertile 
soil in David Friedrich Strauss and the Tubingen School of critic- 
ism. It must be remembered that Schleiermacher and Hegel were 
contemporaries. While the one centred his theology around the 
Person of Christ, the other constructed a speculative philosophy 
which in theological terms had very little to do with the Person 
of Christ but had much to say about the idea of Christianity. 
Although he never ceased to be an Hegelian, Strauss became inter- 
ested in Sehleiermacher 1 s lectures on the life of Christ and the 
central place given Him in the G-laubenslehre. This interest gave 
Strauss the impulse to write a Leben Jesu of his own. bo tre- 
mendous was the impact of this life of Jesus on the theology of the 
day that Strauss devoted the rest of his life to further editions 
and elaborations of his so-called "mythical" theory.
The word "mythical" is not to be confused with what is 
false or untrue. It is a spiritual term used by Strauss in oppos- 
ition to historical fact. The Leben Jesu took as its starting- 
point the theory that the records of the U-ospels are the exaggerated 
wish-projections of Jesus's followers who thought they saw in Him 
the fulfilment of the Old Testament Msssianic Prophecies. This
does not mean that Jesus was a wilful impostor or that His dis- 
ciples were scheming forgers. Strauss, for a time at least, had
high/
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high regard for the moral character of Jesus and he even admitted 
that the New Testament, although "built on a mythical foundation, 
contains truths which have not only revolutionized society "but 
which are worthy of perpetuation. But this is not the place to 
discuss Strauss in detail. We will see in the next chapter how 
he developed his theory and the conclusions to which he came re- 
garding the Person of Christ and the doctrine of redemption. It 
is enough here to state his position and pass on to the historical 
influence of the mythical theory.
Strauss instituted the study of New Testament criticism. 
Rationalism and philosophical idealism had focused their attention 
upon the truth of Christianity. Schleiermacher had referred 
Christianity to its Founder. But no one so far had turned to the 
Bible itself. Strauss's mythical theory of the life of Jesus 
placed ^iblical history in doubt. ifen began to question its re- 
liability and authenticity. But Strauss did no more than to cast 
this doubt, he did not attempt to explain the sources of the G-ospel 
records. This was to be the task of the Tubingen School of theo- 
logians who supplemented the Leben Jesu with a minute criticism of 
the old and new Testament records.
Bruno Bauer of Tubingen was the forerunner of this school, 
Directly after the appearance of Strauss 1 s first Leben Jesu he 
published a life of Jesus himself which was in accord with the 
general position of Strauss but which set forth an entirely oppos- 
ite interpretation of the Gospel narratives. Strauss had declared 
that the New Testament was an exaggerated modification of the Old 
Testament/
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Testament superimposed upon the Person of Christ. Bauer insisted 
that the life of Jesus was the spontaneous invention of the evan- 
gelists. Bauer was not sure that Jesus even lived, and if He did, 
He was simply an ordinary man living in the reign of the ttmporor 
Hadrian. The teachings of Jesus were to him not at all original, 
they were not even reproductions of Old Testament precepts, they 
were common to all heathen religions. Christianity was not a 
development, according to Bauer, its inception was due to the 
spontaneous combustion of the inventive imagination of the Jtivan- 
gelists.
Bauer 1 s work would have received very little recognition, 
"because of its obvious break with historical facts, had there not 
appeared from the same school a more exacting scholar in the person 
of i?'.C. Baur who furthered the interests of the critical school 
and gave them both credence and popularity. This he did through 
a more elaborate scrutiny of the u-ospel records coupled with a 
philosophical insight into Hegelianism. following in the foot- 
steps of btrauss and Bauer he began with the life of Jesus, but 
he declared at the outset that the difficulty in constructing a 
picture of Jesus lay in the fact that there is no single portrait 
of Him in the l^iew Testament, there are,in fact,three. Jesus is 
a Jew, a Gentile, and a combination of the two. Matthew, James, 
Peter, and Jude conceive of Jesus as a Jewish moralist with super- 
natural ability. Luke and Paul think of Him as the Incarnate God. 
John attempts to reconcile the two views and make of Jesus a Jewish 
Son of God who has come to save the world. In this formula we 
can/ t^f '-»\
1. Kritifc der evangelischen cieschichte der Synoptiker, 
1841-42.
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can detect the influence of Hegel's dialectic.
.baur, however, did not give us a picture of Jesus. That, 
he claimed, is an impossible task. He gave his attention to the 
study of sources and tendencies in the New Testament and concluded
that Paul is more important for Christianity than Jesus. 
was followed by a host of theologians who carried on this criticism 
of the New Testament records. The study of biblical documents was 
the great contribution of this school. Beginning with Strauss' s 
Leben Jesu, or more accurately perhaps with Schleiermaeher who con- 
fused the ideal and Mstoric Jesus, these New Testament critics 
laboured hard and long in an attempt to segregate the Person of 
Christ from the superfluous encumbrances because of which the true 
Jesus had been hidden from sight. Although the Person of Christ 
was the centre of this Tubingen School, little was said about theo- 
logy proper or the systematic aspects of theology. .e'or the time 
the interest of the theological world was diverted from theology 
and dogmatic and was concentrated on the problem of the historicity 
of the Gospels and the life of Jesus.
As over against Strauss and the Tubingen School of 
criticism, there developed what has been called the Speculative 
School of Theology whose outstanding exponent was A.E. Biedermann 
of/
1. Ueber die sogenannten Pastoralbriefe des Apostels Paulus aufs 
neue kritisch untersucht, Stuttgart and Tubingen, 1835.
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of Zurich. Strauss had created a school of theological thought 
which found its point of departure in the systems of Hegel and 
Schleiermacher. Hegel had tried to reconcile Christianity with 
his philosophy. Schleiermacher made religion a thing in itself 
and related Christianity with the Person of Christ. Strauss and 
the Tubingen School stood within the gap but did not attempt a re- 
conciliation. They saw the value and truth of the Hegelian ideal- 
ism and they realized the importance of Jesus for Christianity, 
but in their study of sources they found it difficult to say any- 
thing positive about Jesus or Christianity.
Carl Daub, one of the speculative theologians who preceded 
Biedermann, was the first important disciple of Hegel who attempted 
to strengthen the bond between Christianity and philosophy. His 
passion was for objective truth and thus for him the speculative 
stand-point was the only legitimate view to take. G-od is revealed 
to us in our reason as the Idea. The Person of Christ plays but 
little part in the Hegelianism of Daub. He has no Christology to 
speak of because for him the religion which Jesus taught is of far 
greater significance than Jesus Himself.
Daub's vague style and confused thought prevented his 
works from being widely accepted, but in his disciple, Marheineke, 
his theology came to a fuller and clearer expression. Marheineke 
was an ardent Hegelian who had no use for Schleiermacher 1 s psycho- 
logical/
1. Die dogmatische 'I'heologie Jetziger Zeit Oder die Selbstsucht 
in der rtissenschaft des Q-laubens und seiner .artikel, Heidel- 
berg"T~1833.
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logical religion or for the reluctance of Strauss and the Tubingen 
School to associate their findings with Hegelianism. Marheineke's 
ambition was to demonstrate that the doctrines of the Church in all 
their fullness are in complete accord with the principles of negel- 
ianism. The historic Jesus is for Marheineke the realized idea 
of U-od in humanity. We see in His Person the union of divine and 
human, and so He shows us what redemption means. In attempting 
to abide by orthodox language and yet infuse the Hegelian termin- 
ology into his account, Marheineke constructed a hybrid Christianity 
which bore the characteristics of both but which was neither the 
one or the other.
Others followed Daub and Marheineke with various emphases 
and ramifications in the association of Hegelianism and Christian- 
ity. In the realm of Christology none applied himself with greater 
effort and forcefulness than -Biedermann of Zurich. i«e will look 
at Jiiedermann 1 s Christology in detail in another chapter; for the 
present it is sufficient to note that his system was reared on the 
separation of the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption. 
He followed Hegel in declaring the Absolute and the finite to be 
one, but he denied that philosophy and religion are the same thing. 
Unlike the Hegelians he insisted on taking account of the historic 
Jesus. -But the Church, he claimed, has wrongly predicated of Him 
what is true only of humanity. I'he Person of Christ, therefore, 
is not superfluous or unimportant, for in Him the principle of 
Christianity/
1. Die Urundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als missenschaft, 
Berlin, 1847.
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Christianity was first realized and given currency. Biedermann 
represented a peculiar inconsistency in the Hegelianism which, he 
adopted. He would like to have separated the historical Jesus 
from the idea of Christianity "but his own personal "belief kept 
creeping into his Hegelianism. In later life he showed evidences 
of "breaking with his former principles and adopting a more orthodox 
explanation of Christianity.
Hegelianism did not stop with Biedermann, but its influ- 
ence was felt less and less as time went on. Sehleiermacher and 
the school of New Testament criticism increased in popularity as 
Hegelianism decreased. Thus we discover that in this stage of 
the theological development of the nineteenth century philosophy 
and theology "begin to part company. The great philosophical 
movement in Kant, Fichte, and Hegel was never forgotten, to "be 
sure, but theology began to stand on its own feet once again.
It is impossible to treat of the theology of the nine- 
teenth century without mention of Dorner and Thomasius. Among 
other reasons we place these two theologians together because they 
were both influenced by Sehleiermacher and Hegel and both felt the 
need of developing and improving ecclesiastical doctrines. Dorner 
inclined toward Sehleiermacher and Thomasius toward Hegel. Dorner 
spoke on behalf of the Union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches 
in Germany; Thomasius was the spokesman of the Lutheran Church. 
Dorner represented what is called the Yermittlungstheologie, or 
Mediating/
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Mediating Theology; Thomasius's Christology was called the Kenotic 
theory. .both contributed to the Christologieal thought of the 
century.
Dorner "began his Christology with the familiar declara- 
tion that man is imperfect and that perfect manhood is found only 
in Christ. He unites in His Person the essence of all men. This 
He is a"ble to do "because God and man are not mutually exclusive but 
reciprocal in their relationship. Such "being the case it is only 
logical and necessary that there "be a God-man who is not only the 
perfection of this union in thought but also in history. But Just 
because Jesus is an historical individual He was subject to growth 
and development. It must be assumed, argued Dorner, that His con- 
sciousness of His relation to God was therefore the culmination of 
growth in that direction. The Incarnation does not exhibit Christ 
as the oon of u-od in a completed or final sense. It is rather to 
be thought of as a continuous, accumulative-process. The Logos, 
according to Dorner was bestowed on Jesus, as Pfleiderer says, 
"in evergrowing measure." *  This idea of a developing Christ who 
is nevertheless the Son of God and the Redeemer of men was a new 
departure for theology. It had been the practice to conceive of 
Christ as being perfectly God-conscious from His birth, but Corner's 
view found a measure of evidence in the Gospel records.^
Thomasius cet about to emphasize Christ's manhood, what- 
ever the Gospels show of Jesus, they show us a man among men. 
How/
1. Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology in Germany- since Kant, 
p.156.
2. System der christlichen Glaubenslehre, 2 vols. -berlin, 1879-81.
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How then, Thomasius asked, can this "be explained in the light of 
His Divinity? The Logos, he said, at the Incarnation laid aside 
or "emptied" Himself of His Divinity in order to become man. 
Thomasius made a clear-cut distinction "between the "relative" and 
"essential" attributes of G-od. The "relative" attributes, such 
as omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience, were limited in the 
historical manifestation of the Logos; but the "essential" attri- 
butes, such as love, truth, and holiness, were incarnated in Him 
from the beginning. This distinction he used to answer Doraer's 
criticism that the Kenotic theology negated the Divine Immutability. 
The corollary proposition which Thomasius wished to proclaim was 
that in this self-limitation of the Logos we see the greatness of 
the Divine Sacrifice in the Person of Christ in whom the Logos re- 
linquished His perfectability so that redemption is made possible 
through the assumption of the world's sin upon this Person. The 
historic person who lived among men and died for men is not to be 
confused with the Pre-existent Christ or the Exalted Christ. Thus, 
like Dorner, Thomasius conceived that from the time of His appear- 
ance on earth until the resumption of His former exalted state 
Jesus underwent a human growth and development.-^-
Both Dorner and Thomasius attempted to answer a question 
which Schleiermacher had suggested but which he had not adequately 
treated/
1. Christi Person und Werk, Darstellung der evangelisch-lutheran- 
ischen'Dogmatik vom Miftelpunkte der Ghristologie aus, 2 vols. 
Erlangen, 1853-55.
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treated, the question, How does uod become man? Dorner answered 
that Uhrist was the human form of the Logos. Although the historic 
Jesus which we see in the Gospels presents to us a picture of a 
developing man, still the Logos had imbued perfectability into His 
human nature at the moment of His appearance on earth. Jesus was 
not perfect all at once, but He was perfect from stage to stage in 
His development toward complete perfection. iiihomasius refused to 
believe with Dorner that the historic Jesus was the same person as 
the Pre-existing Uhrist or the Jilxalted Christ. If it were so, he 
asked, what significance would the Incarnation have? The emphasis 
of Thomasius is on the Divine Sacrifice which, he argued, necessi- 
tated the giving up of something, as the word sacrifice suggests. 
i'he Incarnation, therefore, marks the postponement of Christ's 
essential union with the father in order that He may humble Himself 
among men, raising them up through His sacrifice, after which He 
returns once again to the throne of His G-lory.
Liext to Schleiermacher, the greatest name in the theo- 
logical history of the nineteenth century is Ritschl. The impetus 
which bchleiermacher gave to theology in placing the Person of 
Christ at the centre of Christianity lay at the back of all Uhrist- 
ological thinking up until the time of Hitschl. In Hitschl this 
impetus was gathered up and sent forth again with renewed pov/er. 
Whereas the Person of Christ was for bchleiermacher the point of 
immediate contact in Christianity, the mork of Uhrist, especially 
redemption/
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redemption, was Ritschl's chief concern. The very title of his 
main work, Reohtfertigung und Versohnung, 1 suggests this. m''hile 
^ehleiermacher's influence was profound, it was not immediate or 
exhaustive. Those, like Dorner and Thomasius, who wished to carry 
on ^>chleiermacher T s unfinished work never followed his footsteps 
unswervingly. There was always an urge to graft the fruits of 
sehleiermacher 1 s theology with the sober principles of Jiegelianism. 
Although Schleiermacher did much to separate theology and philoso- 
phy, his followers could not forego the appeal of Jiegelianism as 
the final test for Christian truth. It is not until we come to 
Ritschl that we find an attempt, like Schleiermacher's, to describe 
the Person of Christ without recourse to metaphysical patterns.
kHe must not think of Ritschl, however, as a mere throw- 
back to the theology of Sehleiermacher. The school of New Testa- 
ment criticism intervened between the two, and as it was the 
outgrowth of the one, it influenced the other. The religious 
sentiment which played such an important part in bchleiermacher's 
theology is utterly lacking in Ritschl. Piety and sentiment were 
as much out of place in his thought as metaphysic. sehleiermacher's 
emphasis on "feeling" was regarded by Hitschl as Romantic subjectiv- 
ism. ,<hile Rationalism and the speculative philosophy remained 
outside the sphere of Christianity simply because they refused to 
deal with such subjects as prayer and worship, subjects most surely 
important to the believer, the subjectivism of Schleiermacher 
ignored/
1. jpie christliche iiehre von der Rechtfertigung und versohnung, 
3 vols. Bonn, 1870,1874.
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ignored the rooting of Christianity in history. .both natural 
theology and mysticism go by the board for Hitschl for neither are 
concerned with history or with morality. Neither give power, and 
this is what Hitschl found at the centre of Christianity. If we 
would know what Christianity is, we must go to the Christian be- 
liever. He, not the philosopher, can tell us what it means to be 
saved.
In his definition of Christianity, Kitschl noted two 
items: first, that Christianity is based upon redemption offered 
in Jesus Christ, and second, it is an ethical religion concerned 
primarily in establishing the Kingdom of Uod. The two are not 
distinctly separated in Hitachi's thought for his conception of 
Jesus's "vocation," a favourite Hitschlian word, is to found the 
Kingdom of G-od and with it to bring redemption to men. His de- 
finition of Christianity is given in a simile: "But Christianity, 
so to speak, resembles not a circle described from a single centre, 
but an ellipse which is determined by two foci (i.e. the religious 
conception of redemption, and the ethical conception of the King- 
dom of Crod)."^- This definition reminds us of Schleiermacher, but 
Ritschl went beyond Schleiermacher especially in the ethical emphas- 
is.
Hitschl affirmed at the start that Christianity is a 
social religion. The Kingdom of God is social. tfor Schleier- 
macher the individual was of primary importance, but for Sitschl 
it/
1. Rechtfertigung und Versohnung, III. p.11; fi.T. p.11.
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it is society. Just so did ochleiermacher fail, said Ritschl, in 
giving the doctrines of justification and reconciliation their 
true bearing. These doctrines are to be conceived in relation to 
society in both a religious and an ethical way. Ritschl 1 s theory 
of redemption was the outcome of this relationship. J'or Schleier- 
macher redemption consisted in a relationship between ttod and man, 
but for Kitschl redemption was defined in terms of the Kingdom of 
uod.
Ritschl based his consideration of the Person of Christ 
on what he calls flierthurteile, or value-judgments. Knowledge, he 
said, is of two kinds, fact-judgments and value-judgments. Science 
is concerned with the former; religion with the latter. tfacts 
are the result of examination and investigation. Values are the 
result of appreciation. The Christian thinks of Christ in terms 
of value-judgments. we are not interested in how Christ came into 
the world, but we are interested in His significance for us. AS 
Professor jyiackintosh says of Ritschl's Christology, "We see the 
divine quality of Christ's person in the Divine character of His 
work." 1 Such problems as the two-natures of Christ and the Virgin 
Birth have no significance in value-judgments. His Person can 
only be understood in the light of His Work. The Work of Christ 
is confined to the Kingdom of G-od. In perfecting the Kingdom of 
G-od, He not only reveals the Father but redeems man. Because of 
His/
1. H.R. Mackintosh, The Person of Christ, p.279.
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His V/ork, therefore, the Person of Christ has the religious value 
of G-od and we are justified in speaking of Him as Divine.
Our knowledge of what Christ can do for man is derived 
from the experience of the Church. In the society of believers 
we enter into a relationship with Christ. Redemption is not 
mediated through the exercise of the intellect. »Ve can never 
discover what salvation is, Ritschl declared, unless we live in 
the Christian community. He was not referring here to the Roman 
doctrine of the Church, but of how it comes about that we experi- 
ence saving grace. The statements which Jesus made in regard to 
the forgiveness of sins are "completely intelligible only when we 
see how they are reflected in the consciousness of those who be- 
lieve in Him, and how the members of the Christian community trace 
back their consciousness of pardon to the person and action and 
passion of Jesus."-*-
The last important development in the theology of the 
nineteenth century is represented by Ernst Troeltsch and the 
Religio-historical School. The history of theological thought 
following upon Ritschl is similar in many respects to the history 
following Schleiermacher. The Ritschlian School is largely re- 
sponsible for our present day theology and yet the disciples of 
Ritschl are so varied that they group themselves into what seem 
to/
1. Rechtfertigung und Versohnung, III, pp.1-3; E.T. pp.1-3.
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to be contradictory movements. Like Schleiermacher, Kitschl 1 s 
great contribution was the stimulus which he gave to his followers. 
By opening up new problems the scope of theology was expanded. 
Those who still clung to the speculative theology were forced to 
take account of their principles anew. Those who rested com- 
placently in the shelter of ecclesiasticism were compelled to give 
a restatement of their faith.
From Ritschl there flowed, as from a common source, two 
streams of theological thought. Starting with the emphasis laid 
down by Ritschl on the Person of Christ and the Kingdom of God 
these two tendencies were at first in agreement. In time, how- 
ever, one tendency inclined toward the Person of Christ putting 
all its strength into a proclamation of Christianity's absolute- 
ness and uniqueness; while the other found its touchstone in the 
Kingdom of God, declaring Christianity to be the best religion but 
not necessarily the final or absolute religion. To this second 
school of thought belonged Troeltsch. He was the leading ex- 
ponent of the left wing Ritschlianism which was called the religions- 
geschichtliche Schule, or the Religio-historical School. As the 
title of this school suggests the main concern of thinkers like 
Troeltsch was the study of the history of religions. This field 
had been neglected by Ritschl but ought not to be neglected any 
longer, they claimed. At a later stage we are to look more closely 
at the Christological position of Troeltsch, at present we can only 
note the main drift of his thought.
Troeltsch attached himself to Schleiermacher and Hegel 
and/
-64-
and thus reverted back once more to the attempted mediation of 
the Speculative School which tried to reconcile Christianity with 
Hegelianism. Troeltsch, however, is not unmindful of Ritsehl and 
hence his return to Hegelianism is modified and mollified by the 
theology of Ritsehl. Just as Ritschl returns to Schleiermacher 
taking with him the thought of the intervening years, so Troeltsch 
goes back to Schleiermacher and Hegel with the added influence of 
the Speculative School and Ritschl.
The scientific method had a strong appeal for Troeltsch 
and it is this method which he used in considering Christianity. 
We must begin, he said, with the realization that Christianity is 
a religion among many religions. Christianity is not the only 
religion, nor does it contain the only revelation. Revelation 
is a universal affair not confined to one religion or to one person 
but to all religions. Because of this, Christianity takes its 
place among the religions of the world in a relative and not in 
a unique way. It may be the highest religion possible, it may 
be the final religion, but this is to assume too much, we cannot 
say more than that it is the highest religion we know to date. 
Time and tide alone have the answer to its finality. But this is 
not to depreciate Christianity, Troeltsch argued, it is sufficient 
for our needs to-day and this is all we need to know.
Troeltsch had a deep and warm affection for Jesus Christ, 
but his faith was never expressed in his theology. The Person of 
Christ is always defined by him in the terms of religious hero and 
genius. Jesus was a great religious personality. He was a pro- 
phet/
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phet and a revealer of G-od, but He is relative in so far as Chris- 
tianity is relative. Nevertheless we are to think of Him as 
sufficient for our time. Faith in Him is the unifying "bond of 
the Christian community. He is the centre of Christian worship 
and as such commands our faith in Him. What the future will "bring 
is a mystery. Perhaps a new prophet will appear and render the 
revelation of Christ of no account.1
Vte have followed the thread of theological thought from 
Schleiermacher to Troeltsch with a specific problem and purpose 
in view. The relation "between the Person of Christ and the prin- 
ciple of redemption is the main concern of this thesis. For that 
reason certain prominent names in the history of nineteenth century 
thought have "been eliminated simply "because they have little or no 
"bearing on our problem. And in as much as we are concerned es- 
pecially with Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, such schools of 
thought as the English theology of the Atonement have no connection 
in this historical survey.
The purpose in giving an historical sketch of theology 
has been to show the leading trends of Christological thought in 
the century which form the background of the particular systems we 
are about to examine.
All those who dealt with Christology in the nineteenth 
century were bent upon answering one question, "What think ye of 
Christ?"/
1. Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, 1911.
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Christ?" The century is an important one in the history of 
Christology just "because it did think. It was not a sterile age, 
nowhere was there the spirit of lethargy or apathy that character- 
ized the seventeenth century. Theology "became gradually more and 
more dissatisfied with the dogmas of the Person of Christ and re- 
demption. The impact of philosophy forced theology to rethink 
its doctrines. The authority of the Church ceased to be final 
in matters of theology. Theologians were not content with the 
old formalism. "What do these things mean?" , was the question 
in the minds of all, and it was the question which theology had to 
face. In the field of Christology we note the outcome of this 
renewed vitality. We begin to hear about the Jesus of history in 
contrast to the doctrine of Christ. The study of the Bible is 
stimulated and from that study is reaped a deeper understanding of 
the Gospel which Jesus taught. The Fatherhood of God, the King- 
dom of God, the meaning of sacrifice become the bywords of theo- 
logy. It was not enough to say that Jesus is the only Son of God, 
the Redeemer of the world. Theology was forced to explain what 
is meant by these and kindred phrases.
In general we can see two tendencies in this century 
around which all thinking on the problem of the Person of Christ 
and His relation to redemption was focused. The one assigned to 
the Person of Christ, as the Redeemer, a uniqueness and absolute- 
ness not to be confused or associated with other religions. The 
other tended to subtract from the Person of Christ a principle of 
redemption which in its own way is unique and absolute but which 
is/
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is nevertheless a principle and not a person. It is this second 
tendency in which we are primarily interested, and in Strauss, 
Biedermann, and Troeltsch we will see how this position was main- 
tained and developed.
CHAPTER III
THE CHRISTOLOGICAL POSITION OF DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS
David .Friedrich Strauss was "born at Ludwigsburg, tfurttem- 
"berg, on January 27th., 1808. His father, a merchantman of moder- 
ate ability, held to an exacting orthodoxy in religion which 
resulted in an estrangement from his son after the publication of 
the famous Leben Jesu. This separation from his father caused 
Strauss considerable pain and anxiety.^ In his mother, however, 
he had a loving and sympathetic friend. She was a devout, simple- 
hearted woman whose religion was centred not in external forms, as 
was her husband's, but in a humble piety and an ardent love of
nature. 2 "I am only half her son," said Strauss, "and only half
2 her worth."
The two opposite types of religion represented in his 
father and mother, in the one religion was separated from morality 
and in the other morality from religion, created a problem for 
Strauss, and he sought for a solution in the study of theology for 
which he showed an early aptitude. In 1821 he entered the lower 
seminary at Blaubeuren where he spent the next four years in ele- 
mentary training in preparation for the university. Here he had 
as/
it.
1. Ausgewahlte Briefe, p.100 on the death of his father.
2. "Zum Andenken an meine gute loitter," in G-esammelte n'erke, Bd.I.
3. Auagewahlte Briefe, p.87; see also Zeller, D.ff. Strauss in 
his Life and Writings, p.8.
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as one of his teachers F.C. Baur v/ho shortly was to "become known 
as the leader of the Tubingen School of I\iew Testament Criticism. 
We can gather from his letters to his friend and school-mate, 
Christian Marklin, something of the atmosphere of these early school 
days. The two "boys were kindred spirits. They disliked the 
stern discipline and lack of freedom and were glad when the course 
at Blaubeuren was concluded.
In 1825 Strauss entered the theological department, known 
as the Stift, at the University of Tubingen. Here he spent five 
years, two in philosophy and philology and three in theology. 
During the first years Strauss and his friend Marklin were thrilled 
and enraptured with the philosophy of Schelling. Instead of par- 
ticipating in the usual Kneipes and student clubs they formed a 
literary circle where they discussed the poets and philosophers. 
During this romantic phase of his education, Strauss became inter- 
ested for a short time in mesmerism and clairvoyancy. In the 
nearby hills there were tales of shepherds who had the power to 
heal the sick and divine the future. At the village of neinsperg 
there lived the famous seeress of Prevorst and to her Strauss and 
l£arklin once paid a visit. But the interest in spiritualism was 
short-lived and while he was yet at the university he wrote a paper 
proving that there was nothing in it which could not be explained 
in/




 ./hen he finished the university course, otrauss was for 
a period of nine months an assistant pastor in the village of 
Klein-Ingersheim. 2 Here he not only ministered to the congregation 
"but taught in the local school. His preaching gave him consider- 
able anxiety of mind for he had become a Hegelian pantheist and, 
accordingly, he was disturbed to know what to preach. In his 
correspondence with Marklin he revealed his distress but claimed to 
have found a solution by emphasizing the intellectual content of
the Bible in his sermons and ignoring as far as possible the his-
2 torical husk in which the kernel of truth was wrapped.
Strauss/
1. Kritik der verschiedenen Ansichten uber die Greistererscheinun- 
gen der Seherin von Prevorst. In Mathilde Blind 's "Ifemoir," 
The Old and the Eew Faith,""p.xvii, there is the story that a 
friend of Strauss asked the seeress what she thought of Strausste 
belief to which she answered, "it never could turn to unbelief." 
In later years Strauss held the prophecy up to his friend and 
said, "Either then I am not an unbeliever even to this day, or 
if I am, then it follows that your oracle was but a sham." 
See also Ziegler, D.F. Strauss, p.46, who suggests that this 
interest in spiritualism permanently influenced Strauss as is 
seen for example in his criticism of ochleiermacher 1 s religious 
feeling as a theological apparition (ttrscheinung); Also Zeller 
p.20 who describes the interest of btrauss in mesmerism as 
"one of the many pupa-changes through which thought passes."
2. Zeller p.29-
3. On this short ministry and the. question of Begriff and v or s tell- 
ungen in preaching see Ausgewahlte Briefe, pp.3,6,7; Ziegler 
p.70; Zeller p.35; cf. also in i>er alte und der neue u-laube, 
p.89; E.T. p.102, where ^trauss declares that such subjects as 
the ascension and resurrection, miracles, healing, raising of 
the dead, casting out devils, are to be preached "symbolically" 
with a view to their moral application. But he decries this 
"beating around the bush" (diese Umwege) and suggests that the 
moral application can be best taught by "going straight at it."
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Strauss was not happy in his first and only charge be- 
cause his chief interest at this time was in the philosophy of 
Hegel. He resigned his post and travelled to .Berlin where Hegel 
was lectiiring at the University. ooon after he arrived, Hegel 
died. btrauss heard the news as he was visiting ochleiermacher 
who was also lecturing at .Berlin. It was a severe blow to Strauss 
for as he said to Schleiermacher, "It was on his account that I cane 
to Berlin." Schleiermacher and ^trauss were not well suited as 
teacher and pupil. However, Strauss stayed in .Berlin for a time 
and heard bchleiermacher's lectures. The lectures on the life of 
Jesus interested him immensely, but he felt that Schleiermacher had 
only gone half way in his treatment and he resolved to return to 
Tubingen, where he had been appointed a Repetent at the Stift, to 
"write a life of Jesus according to my own idea." But this am- 
bition was postponed for a time. uvhen Strauss returned to Tubin- 
gen, he began to lecture on Hegel, and he was so successful that 
he would have relinquished his theological studies to join the 
philosophical faculty, but the combined opposition of "both the 
philosophical and theological faculties drove him back to theology 
again. This turn of events induced him to reconsider his plan 
for a life of Jesus and within one year, 1835, at the age of twenty-
rr
seven, he published his epoch-making £eben Jesu. 
The/
1. "Urn seinetwillen war ich hierher gekommen." Schweitzer, The 
Quest of the Historical Jesus, p.70 says, "a certain want of 
tact, considering who his informant was." See also teller 
p.33; Ziegler p.94.
2. Ziegler, p.102.
3. Das .beben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, 2 vols. , 1835.
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The year 1835, says Otto Pfleiderer, marked "an era in our 
scientific knowledge of the .biblical foundations of Christianity." 
The appearance of btrauss's Leben Jesii was followed by i'.C. Baur's 
work on Paul, Ueber die sogennanten Pastoralbriefe des Apostels 
Paulus and wilhelm Vatke's work on the Old Testament, Die Religion 
des Alten Testamentes nach den kanonischen Buchern entwickelt, all 
of which contained "the germs of the researches of our own day into 
the Old and New i'estament writings." Strauss's life of Jesus 
was constructed on an original idea. The Rationalists and the 
supranaturalists had written their lives of Jesus according to their 
different standards. otrauss took up an independent position and 
applied the idea of "myth" to the whole of the Hew Testament. The 
Person of Jesus, he argued, had been adorned by the loving fancy 
of .tiis followers with the Old Testament prophecies and promises of 
the Messiah. With the mythical theory at hand otrauss succeeded 
in destroying all traces of the supernatural in the New Testament 
record of the life of Jesus.
The effect which the appearance of the Leben Jesu had 
upon theology was tremendous. Strauss became the most talked of 
writer of the day, but his success turned against him and he was 
removed from his position at Tubingen never again to occupy a chair 
in a university. He accepted for a short term a lectureship at 
the Lyceum in Ludwigsburg where he devoted his time in an effort 
to stem the ever-growing tide of criticism and ridicule that was 
poured/
1. Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology in Germany since 
Kant, p.200.
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poured forth upon him from all directions. 'i'he direct result of 
the Leben Jesu was chaos. Utterly unexpected, the mythical theory 
took the theological world "by storm. No one was a"ble to contra- 
dict otrauss with any real conviction. AS Schweitzer says, "The 
fertilising rain "brought up a crop of toad-stools." 1 The three 
points at which Strauss was most bitterly attacked were in regard 
to the relation of myth to miracle, the Person of CJhrist, and the 
relation of John's Gospel to the Synoptics. Of these three the 
problem of the relation of myth to miracle attracted most attention. 
Three writers of the time contented themselves with satirical works
on the lives of iiuther, Napoleon, and Strauss himself showing how
o 
in a thousand years the history of these men would be but myths.
When it seemed to Strauss that he was destined to theo- 
logical ostracism, there came an invitation from the radical theo- 
logical group of the University of Zurich asking him to take the 
chair of ecclesiastical History and Dogmatics. Strauss accepted 
immediately but never set foot in a class-room. ihe conservatives 
of Zurich launched a campaign with the rallying cry, "Religion in 
danger," and a petition signed by 40,000 citizens was instrumental 
in urging the University to rescind the invitation. i'hey granted 
Strauss an annual pension of 1000 francs for a position he never 
filled. Dtrauss harboured no bad feelings but was sorely annoyed 
at/
1. Schweitzer, The ^uest of the Historical Jesus. p.97.
2. " , p.lllSn i'he writer of the mythical life of
Luther signed himself "Dr. Gasuar" which is the G-erman word 
for "cassowary," "Strauss" being in trerman the word for 
"ostrich."
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at "being represented to the people as the arch-heretic of all 
time. 1
At the time of this Zuriputsch in 1839 Strauss was busy 
defending his Leben Jesu. The storm of criticism which "broke 
over his head gave him pause to take stock of his position and in 
the second and third editions of the Le"ben Jesu he made a few im- 
portant concessions to his antagonists chiefly in acknowledging 
the moral and spiritual perfection of the character of Jesus.^ 
"He was in those days," says jb'airbairn, "caustically compared to 
a physician who rushed from his house, sword in hand, and assailed 
the people passing along the street; but who, taking fright at 
seeing so many done almost to death, retreated within doors, though 
only to rally forth the next moment, bandages in hand, to bind up 
his victims." In the fourth edition, however, he removed all 
these concessions and held firmly to his original position. n lSy 
labour in this new edition," he said, "has chiefly consisted in 
whetting, as it were, my good sword, to free it from the notches
made in it rather by my own grinding, than by the blows of my
4 enemies.
In 1840 Strauss published his u-laubenslehre or system of 
dogmatics/
1. Ausgewahlte .briefe. p.80,81; Ziegler p.288; teller p.66.
2. In the hope of re-establishing his prestige he wrote the 
pamphlet, urei Streitschriften zur Vertheidigung meiner 
Schrif-fc uber das Leben Jesu und zur uharakteristik der 
gegenwartigen Theologie, 1838.
3. Fairbairn, The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Theology, p.253.
4. Preface to the 4th. ed. of Leben Jesu.
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dogmatics, the full title of which was Die christliche Glaubens- 
lehre in ihrer ge schich11 ichen .flntwicklung und im Kampfe mit der 
modernen Wissenschaft dargestellt. Originally the Leben Jesu 
was designed "by Strauss to serve as a prologue for this work, "but 
it developed so much as a treatise in its own right that he aban- 
donned the Glaubenslehre for five years.^ 'i'he theme of this work 
is that the history of dogma is the best criticism of dogma. 2 By 
showing the historical development of the doctrines of the Church 
from their biblical foundations to their downfall at the hands of 
modern philosophy, Strauss reinterpreted the ecclesiastical for- 
mulas in terms of intellectual concepts. The G-laubenslehre t
however, was eclipsed by the romantic appeal of the Leben Jesu
3 and was never taken very seriously.
lie arly /
1. Schweitzer p.70; teller p.36.
2. Glaubenslehre, 1840, i.x.71.
3. For a few months in the year 1848 Strauss entered the politi- 
cal ring at Frankfurt. But like most of his ventures this 
too ended in disaster. The cry "Religion in Danger" was 
raised again and otrauss v/as forced to resign. strangely 
enough he changed from a radical to a conservative in politi- 
cal matters and thus received the censure of both parties. 
Mathilde Blind 's "Memoir," p.xliv, contains an interesting 
quotation from a conversation of Strauss. "I felt oppressed," 
he said, "at seeing nearly every nation in Europe chained down 
by allied despotism of prince and priest. I studied long the 
nature of this oppression, and came to the conclusion that the 
chain which fettered mankind was rather inward than outward, 
and that without inward thraldom the outward would soon rust 
away. The inward chain I perceived to be superstition, and 
the form in which it binds the people of Europe is Christian 
Supernatural!sm. So long as we accept religious control not 
based on reason, they will accept political control not based 
on reason." On Strauss's political views see also Lichten- 
berger, History of Q-erman Theology in the nineteenth century, 
p.336; and Zeller p.87.
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Nearly thirty years after the appearance of the Leben 
Jesii Strauss published in 1864 a new life of Jesus. In the mean- 
time Renan' s Vie de JeViE had appeared and due to its popular appeal 
had received signal success in France. what Renan did for the 
.e'rench people, Strauss wished to do for the G-erman people, and so 
the new life of Jesus was titled, Das Leben Jesu. Fur das deutsche 
Volk bearbeitet. In this work btrauss claimed for himself the 
role of reformer. He centred his attention on the formation of 
the G-ospel narratives. The result is a vague picture of Jesus who 
is a kind of Socrates blending the Hellenic and Jewish culture in 
His Person. The ultimate fact which the New Testament reveals, 
Strauss concluded, is an ideal Uhrist who is the ideal of humanity/-
At the time of the publication of the new Leben Jesu the 
lectures of Schleiermacher on the life of Jesus appeared, forty 
years after they had been delivered. They had been withheld be- 
cause of the incisive blow dealt theology by Strauss. Schleier- 
macher according to Strauss had nothing new to add concerning the 
life of Jesus and certainly he had no balm to heal the wounds which
had already been made.^ 
T oward/
1. Zeller p. 116.
2. See his Der Christus des G-laubens und der Jesus der G-eschichte 
Eine Kritik des ScETeiermacher T scherHLebens Jesu, 1865.
the motto of Strauss given by Ziegler on the frontispiece of 
his biography, "Ich kann ftber niemand schreiben den ich nicht 
liebe." At this time Strauss delved into biographical writ- 
ing and produced several excellent monographs on liarklin, 
Schubert, Ulrich von Hutten, Reimarus, and Voltaire. These 
men were all more or less of a type bound together by a common 
aim - the freedom of thought and the supremacy of reason. The 
biographies lacked imaginative appreciation, however, and were 
often concerned more with ideas than personalities.
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Toward the end of his life in 1872 Strauss took his pen 
in hand to write a final theological work which he called .Per alte 
und der neue Glaube. gin Bekenntnis. Once more assuming the role 
of reformer, he declared that he was representing thousands of 
souls who like himself had done with the old faith and had entered 
a new faith. The book set forth Strauss's final position in re- 
gard to theology and we see him here definitely swung over to phil- 
osophy, even to materialism. In 1874, two years after the appear- 
ance of this last work, strauss died at Ludwigsburg, his native 
city.
The Leben Je su, the book which made Strauss famous, was 
published in 1835. We are not concerned here with a minute or 
detailed examination of the contents or method of this book. That 
has already been done with skill and erudition so that another sur- 
vey would be both presumptuous and supererogatory. In so far as 
the Leben Je su, however, bears upon our problem of the relation of 
the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption some account, 
however summary, is in order. Our interest lies in the main tenets 
laid down by btrauss and not in the detailed working out of his 
theory. With this in mind, therefore, we will proceed to set forth 
those/
1. References to the Leben Jesu will be from the 3rd. German 
edition in 2 vols. and the English Translation in one volume 
of the 4th. G-erman edition.
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those elements of the Leben Jesu which have specific significance 
for our problem.
In the preface to the first edition which appeared in 
1835, Strauss announced the aim and purpose of the book. It is 
time, he suggested, to put forth a new method for examining the 
iM'ew Testament records of the life of Jesus. The Rationalists and 
supranaturalists have worked exhaustively in this field but they 
have worked at cross purposes. The Ancient Church held that the 
Hew Testament contained a history and that this history was super- 
natural. The Rationalists emphasized the historical aspect of the 
New Testament to the exclusion of its supernatural character while 
the reverse has been the case with the Supranaturalists. It is 
time, therefore, to dispense with these biased and one-sided 
approaches and consider the "mythical" theory of the life of Jesus. 
Whereas the Rationalists and Supranaturalists conducted their dis- 
cussions according to the premises of their theological prejudices, 
Strauss claimed that he liberated his mind from religious and dog- 
matical presuppositions by means of his philosophical outlook. We 
are offered in the Leben Jesu an unbiased, unprejudiced, and thor- 
oughly original examination of the life of Jesus as contained in 
the i\Tew Testament.
otrauss acknowledged that in some of his predecessors, 
mainly in Eichhorn, Paulus, Semler, Uabler, Schelling, and -riauer, 
the mythical theory had been employed before but chiefly in con- 
nection with the Old Testament. ^hat they attempted in part, he 
attempted in whole by expanding the province of myth to include 
the/
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the Uew Testament as well as the Old. He followed the general 
definition of myth as "the representation of an event or of an 
idea in a form which is historical, "but, at the same time, char- 
acterized "by the rich pictorial and imaginative mode of thought 
and expression of the primitive ages."'1' But the phrase "of the 
primitive ages" (des Alterthums) was too limiting for btrauss. 
There are myths in the !New Testament as well as in the Old. So in 
the New Testament, declared Strauss, we have the "evangelical mythus" 
which is a narrative dealing with Jesus disclosing not an historical 
fact but an idea. riuch myths are due to two sources: the Old 
Testament promises and prophecies concerning the coining Messiah, 
and the belief among His followers that Jesus Himself was that 
Messiah. Upon these two propositions Strauss undertook to examine 
the Gospel narratives of the life of Jesus.^
The mythical theory of the life of Jesus begins with John 
the Baptist. "We stand here," said Strauss, "upon purely mythical- 
poetical ground; the only historical reality which we can hold fast 
as positive matter of fact being this:- the impression made by 
John the Baptist, by virtue of his ministry and his relation to 
Jesus, was so powerful as to lead to the subsequent glorification 
of his birth in connection with the birth of the Liessiah in the 
Christian/
1. Leben Jesu, I. p.34; E.T. p.53.
2. " " , I. p.113; E.T. p.86.
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Christian legend." 1
When we come to the narratives of the "birth of Jesus, we 
find a similar treatment based upon the Old Testament hope of a 
Messiah. The genealogies of the Gospels reveal no historical data 
"but only the fact that Jesus's followers were so impressed with 
their Master that they did not hesitate to ascribe to Him the attri- 
butes of the Llessiah who, according to the Old Testament, would be 
of Davidic descent.
The visit of Jesus to the Temple at the age of twelve 
years, His baptism, His relation to John the Baptist, and the tempt- 
ation incident are all encrusted with myth.^ If we look to the 
Old Testament, Strauss held, we will discover with what accuracy 
and completeness the Messianic prophecies were interpreted by the 
early Christians as applying to Jesus Himself. In every instance 
the historical fades into the mythical. What remains is the con- 
viction in the minds of the evangelists that Jesus was the Messiah. 
Strauss did not accuse the writers of the Gospels of wilful forgery, 
nor did he denounce Jesus as a conscious impostor. It is one of 
the characteristics of a myth, which distinguishes it from a fable 
and a parable, that it is created in good faith.
Jesus/
1. Leben Jesu, I. p.155; E.T. p.107, strauss refers to Gen.
18:11;15:8; Exod. 6:23, etc. to show how the early Christian 
writers invested their narratives with Old Testament ideas. 
1'he account of John the Baptist given by the .Fourth Evangelist 
is discredited by Strauss who attributed the narratives of the 
Baptist, as also the narratives of Jesus, to the genius of the 
writer, Part II, Chap.l, sec.46.
2. Leben Jesu, I, p.180; E.T. p.118.
3. " " , I, pp.342-489; E.T. pp.191-263.
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Jesus "became conscious of His Messiahship gradually and 
by degrees, according to Strauss. His use of the phrases "Son of 
Man" and "Son of G-od" were full of Messianic content and were used 
by Jesus as He "became conscious of the fact that He was regarded 
as the Messiah "by others. He "began to interpret His mission and 
authority in terms of the Messianic hope. The prophecies of the 
Messiah's powers were transferred to Him. Strauss was quite 
ready to admit the greatness of many of Jesus 1 s sayings. The Ser- 
mon on the Mount is an instance of His moral greatness, but the 
Jarwangelists have played fast and loose with the original setting 
of the Sermon and transformed it according to their own convenience.^
As to the Hew Testament records of the miracles which 
Jesus performed, Strauss found no difficulty in confining them to 
the expected prowess of the coming Messiah. It was not only 
determined in the Old Testament that the Messiah would work miracles, 
it was even known what sort of miracles He would perform. Curing 
diseases, raising the dead, feeding multitudes, were all part and 
parcel of the miraculous mission of the Messiah, and it was to the 
Christian writers, therefore, no act of irreverence to ascribe such 
feats to Jesus. But Jesus was not only represented as performing 
miracles for others, He was Himself the object of some of the mir- 
acles. The Transfiguration, the Resurrection, and the Ascension, 
are also miracles invested with myth. It is only by means of the 
mythical/
1- i»eben Jesu, I, p.537; jjj.T. p.291.
2. " n , I, p.652; E.T. p.342.
3. " " ,11, p.l; il.T. p.413.
-82-
mythical method, said btrauss, that these miracles can mean any- 
thing to us. The Rationalists, like Paulus, who endeavoured to 
explain the miracles rationally and historically, deprived them of 
their inward spiritual truths. The Supranaturalists, too, con- 
fused truth with fact. Only the mythical/theory can reveal the 
intrinsic significance of a miracle.-1-
The Gospel narratives of the Death and Resurrection of 
Jesus suggest that Jesus Himself was conscious of His fate and wil- 
fully set Himself to face the Cross as an expiatory sacrifice and 
offering. .But, Strauss argued, these narratives were written after 
the death of Jesus and so give us no historical evidence for de- 
claring His foreknowledge of His Death and Resurrection. 5Jhe writers 
of the Hew Testament were blinded to the facts by their hopes. "As 
he who has looked at the sun," wrote Strauss, "long sees its image 
wherever he may turn his gaze; so they, blinded by their enthusiasm 
for the Messiah, saw him on every page of the only book they read, 
the Old Testament, and in the conviction that Jesus was the Messiah, 
founded in the genuine feeling that he had satisfied their deepest 
need - a conviction and a feeling which we also still honour - they 
laid hold on supports which have long been broken, and which can no 
longer be made tenable by the most zealous efforts of an exegesis 
which is behind the age." 2
In such fashion did otrauss deal with the life of Jesus. 
From the birth of Jesus to His Death and Resurrection the mythical 
criticism/
1. Leben Jesu, II, p.291; E.T. p.546.
2. " " II, p.362; E.T. p.582.
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criticism laid bare the poetic and imaginative folklore with which 
loving fancy had crowned the Person of Jesus. 'i'he mythopoeic in- 
stinct of the Christian writers is revealed on every page of the 
jtfew Testament. The central figure of the Uospels, whom we thought 
was so well known, is but a shadowy phantom whose reality is, at 
most, questionable. The Leben Jesu is not a life of Jesus, we 
are left with no picture or portrait of the liaster, it is a criti- 
cism of the life of Jesus which nearly succeeds in destroying that 
life altogether.
itrauss was not unconscious of the result of his Leben 
Jesu. There is no note in his criticism of joy at overturning 
the traditional tables of history. He is the arch-iconoclast 
critically, but he would also claim to be a reformer dogmatically. 
Thus it is that in an appendix to the Leben Jesu he attempts "to 
re-establish dogmatically that which has been destroyed eritieaLTy."1 
If the Leben Jesu is a negative work, this conclusive dogmatic 
statement is Strauss's positive contribution to Uhristological 
thought.
Neither the Supranaturalists nor the Rationalists gave 
anything positive in Uhristology, claimed Strauss. The one pro- 
duced a blind faith unfounded on demonstration or criticism; the 
other, a reasoned faith which offered no basis for its origin or 
continuance. Wor did bchleiermacher succeed in his attempt to 
combine and transcend these two schools. His Ghristology was 
a/
1. Leben Jesu, II, p.718; E.T. p.757.
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a beautiful effort of thought, (Gewiss ist diese Christologie eine 
sehr schone Entwicklung), but he neither, on the one hand, left the 
doctrines of the Church intact, nor, on the other, did he face up 
to modern science.^ Schleiermacher did not regard the Resurrec- 
tion or the Ascension as essential parts of the Christian faith 
and for this omission he deserved the censure of the orthodox 
Church. Science branded him for associating the idea of humanity 
in its perfection with the Person of Christ.
The Christology of the Kantian philosophy must suffer 
the fate of the Rationalists, Supranaturalists, and Jchleiermacher. 
It was Kant who wished to interpret the doctrines of the Church 
symbolically. "It is humanity, or the rational part of this sys- 
tem of things, in its entire moral perfection, that could alone 
make a world the object of divine Providence, and the end of crea- 
tion. This idea of a humanity well-pleasing to G-od, has existed 
in u-od from all eternity." 2 This too was the view of Spinoza and 
De Wette who claimed the reality of the idea of humanity without 
reference to experience. £ut to the Church this view is empty 
and lifeless, "instead of the riches of divine reality which faith 
discovers in the history of Christ, it palmed upon us a collection 
of empty ideas and ideals."2 Science too has a word to say to 
Kant, and it is this: to "convert ideas simply into an obligatory 
possibility, to which no reality corresponds, is in fact to 
annihilate/
1. Leben Jesu, II, p.746; E.T. p.770-
2.  n   *" II, p.754; jjj.T. p.774.
3. " " II, p.760; jU.T. p.776.
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annihilate them."
In the face of these contradictory and insufficient 
systems of Christology, otrauss took his stand with the speculative 
position of Hegel. Only in the Hegelian philosophy, he concluded, 
can we satisfy the requirements both of the CJhurch and of science. 
Hegel had said that God and man are essentially one. This "being 
so, it followed that, since man realizes himself to "be divine and 
that the Infinite is man, this truth must "be expressed in an in- 
telligible way, that is, "there must appear a human individual who 
is recognized as the visible God." 2 This is the God-man who, as 
far as He is God, is a worker of miracles and who, so far as He is 
a man, is subject to suffering and temptation and earthly existence. 
In dying upon the cross the u-od-man reveals His divine character 
because death is swallowed up in victory. His death is man's 
victory and in the cross man sees that God is reconciled to the 
world and that we are reconciled to God. The death of the God- 
man terminates His existence among men after which He becomes one 
with the Father, thus follow the Resurrection and Ascension. But 
having passed from view, the spirit of the God-man becomes common 
property and enters into the common consciousness of mankind.
In this fashion Strauss interpreted Christianity. £y 
realizing the reciprocal relation between God amd man, the con- 
clusions of the Rationalists or bupranaturalists or of Sehleier- 
macher are made of no account for here at last is firm ground, the 
ground/
1. Leben Jesu, II, p.760; E.T. p.777.
2. « " II, p.763; E.T. p.778.
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ground upon which both the Church and science stand. The Hegelian 
approach to orthodoxy, hov/ever, unlike the Supranaturalists, did 
not rest upon the historicity of the Gospel records "but upon the 
truths which they contain. In the preface of the first edition of 
the Leben Jesu Strauss said, "The author is aware that the essence 
(den inneren Kern) of the Christian faith is perfectly independent 
of his criticism. The supernatural birth of Christ, His miracles, 
His Resurrection and Ascension, remain eternal truths, whatever 
doubts may be cast on their reality as historical facts." These 
"eternal truths" (ewige Wahrheiten) make up the essence of Chris- 
tianity and criticism has no dealing with them, but only with the 
covering in which they are represented. -but this is not the same 
thing that Kant talked about for his "ideas" which existed as moral 
imperatives had no reference to reality.
The idea of the unity of the divine and human can have 
reality, suggested Strauss, without actually being manifested in 
a single historical person. ^or, as he says in an oft-quoted 
sentence, "This is indeed not the mode in which the Idea realizes 
itself; it is not want to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar, 
and be niggardly toward all others - to express itself perfectly 
in that one individual, and imperfectly in all the rest: it rather 
loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars 
which reciprocally complete each other - in the alternate appear- 
ance and suppression of a series of individuals." Thus, one man 
is/
1. Leben Jesu, I, p.ix; E.T. p.xxx.
2. » " II, p.766; E.T. p.779.
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is not the realization of the idea of the union of the divine and 
human, "but mankind. Surely, Strauss thought, mankind is more real 
than a single individual and eternal incarnation is a truer idea 
than an incarnation limited in time.
In mankind Strauss found the key to the problem of Chris- 
tology. irtiat the Church had "been accustomed to predicate of an 
individual, Strauss predicated of an idea, mankind, but an idea 
which was rooted in reality. "In an individual, a u-od-man, the 
properties and functions which the Church ascribes to Christ con- 
tradict themselves; in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree. 
Humanity (Die Menschheit) is the union of the two natures.....It 
is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven."1 Faith, 
therefore, in this Christ leads to redemption just because the in- 
dividual realizes that in participating in the divine life of hum- 
anity he is redeemed from the natural and sensuous life to the life 
of spirit. The historical form of Uhristology which represents 
the union of the divine and human in a single individual is an 
early stage of thought which is superseded by the stage which real- 
izes that the historical form is but the presentation of the idea, 
and for this reason "the object of faith is completely changed; 
instead of a sensible, empirical fact, it has become a spiritual 
and divine idea, which has its confirmation no longer in history
o
but in philosophy." The Christological need of the age, accord- 
ing to otrauss, is the realization of the idea contained in the 
fact/
1. Leben Jesu, II, p.767; E.T. p.780.
2. " " II, p.769; ti.T. p.780.
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faet. "A theology which, in its doctrines on the Christ, stops 
short at him as an individual, is not properly a theology, but a 
homily." 1
In the conclusion to this dogmatic appendix, Strauss 
asked the question, How can a minister versed in the critical and 
speculative theology remain a minister and not be considered a hy- 
pocrite either by himself or by his congregation? There are four 
courses open to such a minister. .tJ'irst, he can try to elevate 
the Church to his own position; but this is well-nigh impossible, 
second, he can descend to the level of the Church; but here he 
must be a hypocrite. Third, he can forsake the ministry alto- 
gether; but this is a desperate and negative course of action, 
fourth, he can preach in such a way as to lead his people from the 
historical to the spiritual; this is the only positive position 
to take.
,<e need not elaborate on btrauss's Ghristology as con- 
tained in the Leben Jesu. It is self-explanatory. i'he histori- 
cal Jesus at the mercy of the mythical method is rendered unhis-
x 
torical and unimportant as an individual, but the eternal truths
which are embedded and expressed in His life are untouched by 
criticism, - they are the principles of Christianity. The con- 
clusion to which Strauss came in his Leben Jesu is the Hegelian 
conclusion which asserts that Christianity conforms in principle 
with philosophy. If according to the ±iegelian philosophy, history 
is/
1. Leben Jesu, II, p.770 - "eine Dogmatik, welche im Locus von 
Christo bei ihm als Individuum stehen bleibt, 1st keine Dog- 
matik, sondern eine Predigt;" E.T. p.781.
2. Leben Jesu, E.T. pp.781 ff. This concluding section does not 
occur in the 3rd. u-erman edition.
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is an ever-moving process from the finite to the Infinite, from 
nature to spirit, from the individual to the ^bsolute, then it is 
quite unreasonable to suppose, as does the Uhurch, that in the 
person of a single individual the perfection and culmination of 
this slowly moving process was fully expressed. Perfection must 
come at the end of the process and not in the middle. Humanity 
is the uod-man, not Jesus, the Nazarene.
Strauss's G-laubeiislehre appeared in 1840. In his 
student days he had formulated a plan for a system of dogmatic 
which he hoped to carry out at a later date. It was to "be his 
life work. His interpretation of the Christian faith was to "be 
based upon the Hegelian philosophy which was for him in his younger 
days the final test of theology. »<hile he was in .Berlin, he "be- 
came interested in bchleiermacher's lectures on the life of Jesus 
and determined to return to 1'ubingen to write for himself a life 
of Jesus which would go "beyond the conclusions reached by ochleier- 
macher. I'he result of this ambition was the Leben Jesu of 1835 
which we have just examined. Originally, however, the Jjeben Jesu 
was not meant by atrauss to appear separately as an individual 
work, but was to have formed the preface or foreword to the G-lau- 
benslehre. That it did not so appear was due to the fact that 
the Leben Jesu became such an absorbing study in itself that it 
soon/
1. Die christliche Q-laubenslehre in ihrer geschiohtlichen 
Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft 
dargesteTIt, 2 voTs., 1840-41.
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soon grew outside the bounds of a preface and appeared finally in 
two volumes. For the time Strauss was so engrossed in meeting 
the criticism directed against the Leben Jesu that he had neither 
the time nor the inclination to write the G-laubenslehre .
Zurich affair in 1839, however, acted as the impetus which set in 
motion the plan for the systematic theology which had long been in 
his mind. Strauss must have felt that theology had been his main 
antagonist at Zurich. At any rate the G-laubenslehre , which 
followed directly upon his failure at Zurich, was more negative and 
polemical, more vehement and aggressive than anything he had written 
so far. If theology had unseated him at Zurich, he now meant to 
unseat theology.
Just as the Leben Jesu had been a criticism of the narra- 
tives of the life of Jesus, the Q-laubenslehre purported to be a 
criticism of the doctrines of the Christian faith. 1'he method 
upon which Strauss proposed to examine the doctrines of the Church 
was a purely historical one. "The true criticism of dogma," he 
said, "is its history." 1 Hence, we find that the Glaubenslehre 
is more history than dogmatic. A survey of the historical develop- 
ment of the Christian doctrines, he held, would indicate the 
strength and weakness of the doctrines. Such a procedure is in 
line with pure objective criticism. "The subjective criticism of 
the individual," he said, "is a water-pipe which any lad can stop 
for a time; but criticism carried out in an objective way and with 
regard to the course of centuries rushes along like a torrent 
against/
1. "Die wahre Kritik des Dogmas ist seine G-eschichte," I, x.71.
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against which all dams and sluices are of no account."
In the preface to the G-laubenslehre Strauss set forth 
his aim and purpose. He hoped to render to dogmatic theology a 
IDalanee-sheet as an accounting house renders a financial report to 
a merchant. This "balance-sheet will contain a survey of the con- 
dition and state of Dogmatic property. Such an account is of 
utmost importance, according to Strauss, "because the theologians 
of his day were apt to disregard the intricacies of their systems. 
It had "been the ha"bit of theologians to estimate too lightly the 
critical and polemical deductions of theology for the past two cen- 
turies, and they had estimated too highly the results of the sen- 
timental and romantic theology. These new departures had been 
regarded as unworked veins of gold in newly discovered mines, but 
Strauss warned that if these mines delude the expectations of those 
who mortgage their theology on their content, then the result for 
theology would "be "an unavoidable bankruptcy" (ein Palliment unver- 
meidlich). This caveat which Strauss merely suggested in the pre- 
face became an actuality in the work itself.
The G-laubenslehre is divided into two unequal parts. The 
smaller part, the Apologetic, contains a critical discussion of the 
formal concepts of the Christian faith and the contradiction between 
faith and knowledge, religion and science. The larger part, the 
Dogmatic, contains the discussion of the essence of Christianity 
as contained in the Christian doctrines. If we place the Leben 
Jesu as a foreword to the G-laubenslehre, as it was originally 
intended/
1. Q-laubenslehre, I, x.71.
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intended, we see that the whole would thus be divided into three 
parts, a traditional, a critical, and a dogmatic. Although this 
three-part plan was abandonned, it was retained in the Dogmatic 
section of the G-laubenslehre. According to the scheme and pro- 
cedure of Protestant Dogmatic, Strauss took up one "by one the 
following doctrines: existence, triune essence, the attributes of 
G-od, creation and the creatures, original sin and redemption, Pro- 
vidence and evil, sin and grace, the means of grace and the Church, 
eschatology and immortality. Each of these doctrines is discussed 
according to the three categories of the original plan. The tra- 
ditional part deals with each doctrine according to its "biblical 
formulation and its ecclesiastical statement in Patristic and 
Scholastic thought. The critical part demonstrates the dissolu- 
tion of the ecclesiastical doctrines at the hands of Nationalism 
and Supranaturalism. The conclusion of this section forms the 
transition to the third part and contains the recast of the dogmas 
in the Glaubenslehre of Schleiermacher. i'he final or dogmatic 
part traces the speculative thinking in regard to the doctrines of 
the Church in their development from Kant to Hegel.
Doubtless the original plan of Strauss 1 s Q-laubenslehre 
was to conclude with a positive statement of Dogmatic based on the 
Hegelian assertion that Christianity is in harmony with the philo- 
sophy of the Absolute. But during the years that lay between the 
original plan and the actual book Strauss had modified somewhat his 
Hegelian standpoint. The reconciliation between Christianity and 
philosophy (G-lauben und Wissen) which once appealed to Strauss was 
abandonned/
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abandonned as inadequate. He was convinced, he said, that no 
reconciliation could be made. The man of faith must allow the 
philosopher to go his own way quietly. There must "be no inter- 
ference .
The positive result of the >laubenslehre is the insist- 
ence upon philosophy and the modern Weltanschauung as the only 
guides to truth. Philosophy can give the mind and heart the same 
satisfaction that faith can. In regard to the conception of God, 
for example, this philosophical approach deprives God of person- 
ality in the sense that He is a single personality. We must think 
of Him as the Allpersonlichkeit. We must not try to personify the 
Absolute, we must conceive of it as it personifies itself. Thus 
the theistic conception of Uod is supplemented by a pantheistic 
view. The proper nouns of theology, &od, Jesus Christ, the sinner, 
the Believer, must make way for the common nouns, law, the human 
race, mankind.
When we come to the section on Christology in the Glau- 
benslehre, we find that Strauss repeated in word and thought what 
he concluded in the dogmatic appendix of the Leben Je.su. In the 
interim, however, between the two works Strauss had published a
little essay on the transitory and abiding features of Christian-
2 ity. In this essay he made two statements about the Person of
Jesus which were in contradiction to the conclusion of the Leben 
Jesu./
1. Glaubenslehre, I, p.356. Dtrauss adds, "If the over-pious 
should succeed in excluding us from the Church we shall con- 
sider this to our advantage."
2. Vergangliches und Bleibendes 1m Christenthum. 1838.
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Jesii. First, "Jesiis represents," he said, "the highest point 
"beyond which posterity cannot go;" and second, "Without His pres- 
ence in the soul, no perfect piety is possible." In the G-laubens- 
lehre these two concessions to the importance of the historical 
Jesus are rescinded. How can Jesus "be the most perfect and exalted 
"being in the whole of history? How can any one compare Him with 
every other person or hope to prophesy for the future? If such 
statements are based on the Hew Testament it must be remembered 
with what purposes the writers there glorified the Person of Jesus. 
It is the usual rule that there appears after the death of a pioneer 
a group of followers who carry on what they have inherited to a 
purer and more perfect realization. As to the consideration that 
Jesus is important for our piety, Strauss returned to the philoso- 
phical explanation of such incidents as the Passion and Death of 
Jesus to show that the historical fact can always be regarded as 
important and significant for us although we interest ourselves 
primarily with the eternal truths contained therein.
The G-laubenslehre reiterated in Christology what the 
Leben Jesu had affirmed five years before. The Christological 
problem is concerned not with the Jesus of Ihistory but with the 
Christ of faith. The attempt of Schleiermacher to postulate a 
sinless and absolutely perfect Christ is regarded by btrauss as an 
edifice built on the sand which cannot stand the daily erosion of 
criticism. The incarnation of Urod is involved in the idea of the 
G-od-man but not as a single individual. The G-od-man is not im- 
portant as an historical occurrence (Vorgang). Mankind is the 
important thing in the Christian doctrine of the Person of Christ.
'" Could/
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"Could the species "be realized fully in a single person," Strauss 
argued, "it would not "bother to break itself up into a plurality 
of individuals, and to run through a course of development in time; 
"but rather it would exist only in identity with that individual as 
a generic individual."1 The Church has predicated of the Person 
of Christ what was meant only for mankind, for, and here Strauss 
repeated his Leben Jesu, it is not the fashion for the Idea in 
manifesting itself to exhaust itself on one exemplar and be sparing 
with all others, to be perfectly revealed in one individual and to 
be imperfectly revealed in all the rest.
i'he attributes which the Church ascribed to Jesus con- 
tradict in a single individual, but they harmonize perfectly in the 
race. Humanity is the union of the two natures. *'or this reason 
we can say, said Strauss, that Humanity is the child of the visible 
mother, nature, and the invisible .bather, Spirit. It performs 
miracles because it is always becoming more and more Spirit and 
less and less confined by the limits of nature. It is without 
sin for its development in its entirety is pure and unsullied by 
the sins of individuals. It dies, rises, and ascends to heaven 
in so far as it is a process from nature to Spirit. 2
That Humanity is the trod-man was not only Strauss 1 s per- 
sonal conviction, but he believed it to be the logical and legiti- 
mate conclusion of the Hegelian philosophy. The Glaubenslehre 
made no advance on the Leben Jesu in the matter of Christology and 
that/
1. Glaubenslehre, sec. 66.
2. " II, p.740.
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that is why, perhaps, it created very little comment in Germany 
when it appeared. Strauss v/as content in the u-laubenslehre to 
repeat the uhristology of the Leben Jesu against which he claimed 
no one had yet spoken an intelligent word of criticism.
Twenty-nine years after the publication of the life of 
Jesus, which put Strauss in the theological forefront, there 
appeared under his name a new life of Jesus especially written for 
the uerman people. In the Leben Jesu of 1835 he had acknowledged 
that his work was intended only for trained minds, it was not meant 
for laymen but for theologians. Reeling the need of supplying the 
people with a popular, easily understandable edition, Strauss set 
to work to re-edit and revise his original life of Jesus adding to 
it the fruit of the years 1 researches.
A few months "before the new Leben Jesu appeared, the 
-b'renchman, Ernest rtenan had startled and charmed his countrymen 
with a Vie de Jesus on a popular plan. Strauss welcomed this 
"book, and although he was not in accord with many of its statements, 
he felt it to be worthy in its general principles and timely in 
offering to the French people a readable life of Jesus not based 
upon/
1. The Glaubenslehre was doomed to oblivion simply because it was 
overshadowed by the appeal of the Leben Jesu. Another con- 
tributing factor was the appearance at the same time of Ludwig 
Feuerbach's Das We sen des Christenthums, 1841, which was mcJre, 
popular and radical than Strauss's Glaubenslehre 
2. Das Leben Jesu. j'ur das deutsche Volk bearbeitet, 1864. 
(Authorized imglish trans., 2 vols., 1864).
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iipon the stereotyped scheme of orthodox theology. In the preface 
to the new life of Jesus, Strauss explained his wish to write a 
"book as suitable for Germany as Heiian's was for France.
Strauss dedicated this new work to his "brother who died 
some time before the "book appeared. 2 In this dedication he paid 
high tribute to his brother's stedfastness in time of physical 
pain and financial discouragement and his independent frame of mind 
which balked at organized religion. As such, his brother may be 
taken as a typical example of the U-erman people to whom otrauss 
addressed his book.
The advance which the new life of Jesus made over the 
Leben Jesu of 1835 lay in the appropriation of the development of 
new Testament criticism during that interval. The main contri- 
bution of the first life of Jesus was the impetus given to the 
study of the New Testament records. This was the work and abiding 
merit of the Tubingen School under the able leadership of i'.C. Baur, 
a former teacher of Strauss. Strauss claimed to have studied and 
examined the fruit of the Tubingen School of criticism and readily 
acknowledged his debt to its members, but the conclusion to which 
he came in regard to this school of thought was rather negative 
than positive. He was firmly convinced that "the Gospel criticism 
of the last twenty years has certainly somewhat run to seed."^ 
Taken/
1. Leben Jesu, p.xxi - "aber ein Bueh fur Deutsche geschrieben 
zu haben in dem vollen Sinne, wie er eines fur .franzosen 
geschrieben hat, ist Alles was ich wunsche;" 
E.T., I, p.xviii.
2. Renan, it may be noted, dedicated his book to a deceased sister.
3. Leben Jesu, p.xv; E.T., I. p.xi.
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Taken all in all, the Tubingen school had demonstrated not what 
the history of the u-ospels is, but what it is not. Whatever may 
be said of the Gospels, it was evident, Strauss maintained, that 
the elements of myth and unhistorical interpolations were many, 
and, if we would see the true history behind the Gospels, all 
supranaturalism must be excluded. The one point on which Strauss 
felt himself to be in agreement with Baur was on the date of the 
Fourth u-ospel which was placed in the middle of the second century. 
Substantially, however, the new life of Jesus is a reproduction of 
the original Leben Jesu with an expanded definition of the word 
myth to include not only unconscious fabrication of narrative but 
even wilful forgery.
Strauss was aware that his new book would bring forth 
adverse criticism, but he likened himself to the Apostle Paul who, 
when rejected by the Jews, took his message to the Uentiles.^- 
Strauss did not think himself a destroyer or a revolutionary. He 
considered his mission to be in line with the tenets of the Refor- 
mation which liberated the minds of the people from the tyranny of 
ecclesiasticism. If the Protestant Uhurch is to be made pure, the 
first step to be taken is the exclusion of miracle from religion.^ 
To distinguish between the eternal and transitory in Christianity - 
this was Strauss's aim, and the beginning was made by announcing 
that anything supernatural or mythical is transitory.
The plan of the book is quite simple. After an introductory 
chapter/
1. Leben Jesu, p.xii; Jii.T. I. p.viii.
2. " " p.xix, - "V/er die Pfaffen aus der Kirche schaffen 
will, der muss erst das Wunder aus der Heligion schaffen; 11 
E.T. I. p.xvi.
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chapter on the various lives of Jesus that have been written and 
a survey of the most recent discussions on New Testament criticism, 
we come to the first main part which offers an historical outline 
of the life of Jesus based upon the pure, unadulterated facts of 
the G-ospels. The second part .presents the mythical theory of the 
history of Jesus as a complement to the historical outline given 
in the first part and follows in substance the results of the earlier 
life of Jesus.
As to the historical outline of the life of Jesus, 
Strauss stated that the ITew Testament records give us only meagre 
facts as, for example, that Jesus was a man of G-alilee whose father 
was a carpenter belonging to the lower classes, whose mother out- 
lived him, and who had brothers and sisters. The records give us 
no more history than that about the origin of Jesus, anything fur- 
ther must be regarded as supranatural interpolations added by the 
over-zealous Evangelists. Jesus, we are told, was interested in 
the reports which he heard concerning the work of John the Baptist, 
and so it was only natural for Him to go to the Jordan where He 
submitted to the Baptism ceremony regarding it as a symbol of the 
confession of sins. Jesus and John are represented as kindred 
souls with a desire to make the Judaism of the day more vital. 
Strauss contended that Jesus 1 s self-consciousness of His liessiah- 
ship was not apparent to Himself until after the death of John.^
Strauss could find no historical basis for the Johannine 
portrait/
!  Leben Jesu, pp.191 ff; E.T. I, pp.258 ff. 
2. " " p-198; E.T. I, p.268.
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portrait of Jesus. Saturated with the Tubingen criticism, Strauss 
took every opportunity to disparage the Fourth Gospel. It would 
not be the characteristic of divinity, Strauss claimed, for Jesus 
to insist on His divine relationship with the Father. "*ftien an 
enthusiastic Christian calls his Master, supposed to have "been 
raised to heaven, the light of the world, when he says of him that 
he who has seen him has seen the Father, that is God himself, we 
excuse the faithful worshipper such extravagances. But when he 
goes so far as the fourth Evangelist, and puts the utterances of 
his own pious enthusiasm into the mouth of Jesus in the form of 
his own utterances about himself, he does him a very perilous ser- 
vice . " * 
The phrase "Son of Man" was regarded by Strauss as the 
title best describing the historical Jesus. "Son of G-od" was a 
phrase never used by Jesus Himself, although He accepted it on re- 
servations when used by others of Him. Strauss doubted that the 
phrase "Son of Man" had any reference to Messiahship but believed 
that Jesus used it simply because He regarded Himself as a mortal 
man in the service of God charged with exalted tasks. The fact 
that this phrase was not in current usage led Strauss to conclude 
that Jesus used the phrase simply because He was not yet conscious 
that He was the Messiah.
Strauss found the Gospel narratives which tell of Jesus's 
foreknowledge of His Death and Resurrection quite unhistorical 
and/
1. Leben Jesu, p.201; E.T., I. p.273.
2. » " p.225; E.T., I. p.307.
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and unreliable. It is inexplicable, he thought, to imagine that 
an intelligent man like Jesus, who knew the name of His "betrayer 
some time "before the arrest, would allow him to continue in his 
society. The narratives which tell of the Last Supper are not to 
be taken literally. While Jesus distributed bread and wine to 
His disciples, as was His custom, He may have had an image of the 
breaking of His own body at the hands of His enemies. "He might 
in a spirit of foreboding assert to his disciples that the same 
thing would soon be done to him that he was then doing to the bread 
and wine, and that they might, as often as they partook together 
of bread and wine, think of him and what he was then saying to 
them." From this foreboding Strauss suggested that it would be 
a simple step to imagining His Death a sacrificial offering for 
the sins of mankind.
The death on the cross was a real death, Strauss believed. 
It may be possible that Jesus did not die immediately but fell into 
a swoon from which He recovered in the cool cavern of the sepulchre, 
but Strauss was convinced of the real death of Jesus because there 
is no evidence for His resurrection! What the Gospels tell us of 
Jesus's appearances after death are wish-projections on the part of 
His followers, certainly they are not historical facts. So then
if there is no historical record of His resurrection, He must have
f) 
died on the cross since we hear no more of Him after that event.
Strauss was unwilling to accept the usual apologetic of theologians 
that/
1. Leben Jesu, p.282; E.T., I. p.389.
2. M " p.286; E.T., I. p.394.
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that unless the Resurrection "be regarded as fact, the rise of the 
Christian Church is unintelligible. Strauss admitted that the 
death of Jesus on the cross was a severe "blow to the early Chris- 
tians, but as they had conceived of Him as the Llessiah they were 
able to overcome their sorrow and disappointment by conceiving of 
the Resurrection. This they were able to do "by the instrumen- 
tality of the mind, the power of imagination, and nervous excite- 
ment.....His whole life was veiled in a shining cloud which continued 
to raise it more and more above the human element, but removed it 
in the same proportion from natural and historical truth."
The second part of Strauss 1 s new life of Jesus contained 
nothing new. The mythical history of the life of Jesus which he 
gives here is essentially a repetition of the Leben Jesu of 1835. 
As then, so now two considerations were responsible for the myths 
in the Gospel narratives: the promise of a kessiah and the con- 
viction that Jesus was that Llessiah. Around these two foci all 
the miraculous events of Jesus's life are swung so that there is 
left no trace of supranaturalism. This is done in a systematic 
way by dividing the life of Jesus into three parts: the early 
life, the public ministry, the passion and death. 3ach section 
is treated according to the myths contained in the -Gospels.
By cleaning away the mythical appendages to the life of 
Jesus, Strauss came to the conclusion that there is but little 
left toward an historical outline of His life. It is, in fact, 
a/
1. Leben Jesu, p.318 - "auf dem Wege des Gemuths, der .Sinbildungs- 
kraft und des aufgeregten Nervenlebens." E.T., I, p.440.
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a life shrouded in mystery and myth. There are few great men of 
whose history we have so unsatisfactory a knowledge as we have of 
that of Jesus. Even Socrates and Shakespeare have left us fuller 
accounts of their lives than Jesus.
Strauss, however, did not conclude the new life of Jesus 
without a constructive note. It is the note he had struck before 
in the Lei)en Jesu of 1835, it is the note that lies at the heart 
of the Q-laubenslehre. Although the historical Jesus fades into 
insignificance at the stroke of criticism, the eternal Christ re- 
mains as a timeless symbol of ideal humanity. Jesus as a person 
is of no historical value, but as an idea He is of the greatest 
value, for He is the exemplar of what is destined to be the goal 
of mankind. To have faith in the Jesus of the Gospels is to 
trust a figment of the imaginative genius of the Evangelists, but 
to have faith in the ideal Christ, this is the only true religion,
o
the religion of humanity. It is true that the Church and a large 
body of Christian believers hold this view to be nothing short of 
apostacy, a denial of all that Christianity has stood for through- 
out the ages, but Strauss contended that such a charge was due to 
a misunderstanding of the main principles of Christianity.
The idea of humanity, the ideal of human perfection, is 
an idea, according to Strauss, subject to development and evolution. 
At first it was but impurely and improperly conceived and only 
gradually has it become more intelligible. Jesus introduced new 
features/
1. Leben Jesu, p.621 j? "uber wenige grosse Manner der Geschichte 
so ungenugend wie uber Jesus;" E.T., II, p.431.
Jesu, p.625; E.T., II, p.436.
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features into this idea, and for His contributions mankind is ever 
in His debt, "but He was not the first to make it the guiding prin- 
ciple of life nor will He be the last. The position of Strauss, 
therefore, "refers mankind for salvation to the ideal Christ, to 
that moral pattern in which the historical Jesus did indeed first 
bring to light many principal features, but which as an elementary 
principle as much belongs to the general endowment of our kind, as 
its improvement and perfection can only be the problem and the 
work of mankind in general."
There is, therefore, no advance made in Christology in 
the new life of Jesus over Strauss T s previous works. The histori- 
cal Jesus is but one among many and His importance lies in the idea 
which He manifested. Redemption is not made effective through 
the Person of Christ but through the idea of perfect humanity which 
He illustrated.
When Strauss was sixty-four years of age, he wrote a book 
containing his final position in theology and philosophy. This 
book was called Der alte und der neue G-laube. £in Bekenntnis. It 
is a last will and testament and as such is his final utterance on 
the subjects which had compelled his life-long attention. At the 
time of writing he was suffering from a fatal disease and doubtless 
was well aware that his days were numbered. "I have attained, 
nay/
1. Leben Jesu, p.627; E.T., II, p.439.
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nay, overstepped the threshold of old age," he wrote. "Then it 
is that every earnest-minded man hears the whisper of an inner 
voice: T Give an account of thy stewardship, for thou mayest be no 
longer steward 1 ." Strauss was not particularly interested in 
defending his stewardship. He denied that he had been an unjust 
one, though it might well be, he admitted, that he had been an un- 
skilful one. His concern had never been to destroy the faith of 
any one, but to point the way to truth for those whose faith had 
already been destroyed.
Strauss delegated himself as the chairman of an oecumen- 
ical council of all those who had broken with the "old faith" of 
the Church and were seeking a "new faith" in a more cosmic-centred 
philosophy. In writing this "confession," therefore, he was 
writing not merely as an individual or giving mere personal opinions, 
he was acting as the spear-head of an innumerable multitude, Pro- 
testant and Catholic, who found the orthodox, and even the not-so- 
orthodox, theology irreconcilable with a philosophic view of life 
and the universe. This group was in the minority, Strauss was 
well aware, but it was an ever-growing movement and needed advice 
and encouragement. Strauss and his co-thinkers did not wish to 
establish a new Church, the time was not yet ripe for any concerted 
action like that, the present need was for clarification of the 
main principles upon which they took their stand.
The purpose of this book, then, was twofold: first, to 
consider in what respects Strauss and his followers were in disa- 
greement/
1. ger aj-te und der neue G-laube, p.9; E.T. p.8.
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greement with the old faith, and second, to set forth the prin- 
ciples of the new faith. These two divisions were further divided 
so that there were four considerations altogether to which Strauss 
devoted his attention. The first two dealt with the old faith 
and the last two with the new faith. The four considerations were 
put into interrogatory form, each one making a chapter of the "book: 
first, "Are we still Christians?"; second, "Have we still a re- 
ligion?"; third, "What is our conception of the universe?"; and 
fourth, "What is our rule of life?"
As to the first question, "Are we still Christians?", 
(Sind wir noch Christen?), Strauss answered with a categorical "No1.1 
If Christianity has to do with Hew Testament records, the Person of 
Christ, the doctrines of the Church, and the sacraments, then it 
was o"bvious to Strauss that since none of these items was of any 
moment to him, Christianity was likewise no concern of his and the 
only possible answer to the question which he had posed was, "Ho, 
we are not Christians." In taking up one by one the propositions 
of the Apostles' Creed and dealing with them critically, Strauss 
was able to destroy every reason for holding to them. The Trinity 
is a mathematical enigma beyond the scope of human intelligence 
for, try as we will, we cannot make three e<iual one or one three. 
The life of Jesus, circumscribed as it is with mythology and supra- 
naturalism, is unhistorical and hence unimportant. The Atonement 
and the Resurrection of Jesus are imaginative creations. The prin- 
ciple that one man must die for all is unjust and to believe that 
such a death was an expiatory offering is to read more into the 
fact/
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fact of Christ's Death than is in it. The Resurrection was a 
pure wish-projection and an hallucination on the part of the early 
Christians.
To the second question, "Have we still a religion?" 
(Haben wir noch Religion?), Strauss was not so unequivocal in his 
answer. It may "be, he thought, that we have a religion depending 
on what we mean by the word. Religion, so far as it is a matter 
of prayer, sacrifice, sacrament, directed toward a personal &od is 
an illusion. It is an early stage of human mentality, a foible 
of infantile intelligence, which eventually, as reason begins to 
command and guide, fades into obscurity altogether. The Christian 
idea of a personal G-od is transferred to a cosmic law upon which 
we are dependent. If any one wishes to think of this feeling of 
dependence as religious, he may as well do so, but Strauss per- 
sonally declined to do so. It may be possible to show the same 
religious piety of adoration toward the universe as a mechanism as 
the Christian shows toward a personal G-od. We may have a religion, 
but it is of a materialistic order, certainly it is not Christian- 
ity. 2
If the third question, "What is our conception of the 
universe?" (Yn'ie begreifen wir die Welt?) had been considered first, 
the two questions we have just considered would have been unnec- 
essary, for Strauss answered that his conception of the universe 
was pantheistic and materialistic and such a view of the universe 
is/
1. Der alte und der neue Glaube, pp. 13-94; E.T. pp.13-107.
2. " " Tl " " " pp. 95-147; E.T. pp.108-168.
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is hardly sustaining of any religion. Strauss had become enamoured 
of Darwin's theory of the struggle for existence. Upon the basis 
of this notion his view of the universe is described in terms of 
life, activity, development. Darwin was accepted by Strauss with 
open arms as a scientific colleague who, like himself, rejected 
miracle. I'he universe is devoid of anything like what the Christ- 
ian calls Spirit, it is only matter in motion.
i'he fourth question, "What is our rule of life?" (Wie 
ordnen wir unser Leben?), is answered in accordance with otrauss's 
previous discussions on humanity. The rule of life for the in- 
dividual is to live according to the ideal of the species. 'i'he 
essence of morality lies in the realization that man is human and 
not merely natural and that all men are alike in their needs and 
wants. The life purpose of every individual is to conquer the 
lower nature in him, struggling always toward a higher level of 
existence. Struggling is the characteristic of mankind and for 
that reason there will be wars and rumours of wars for years to 
come. Strangely enough, the only form of government which met 
with Strauss's approval was absolute monarchy. As he grew more
and more liberal and radical in his theological thinking, he be-
p 
came more and more conservative and orthodox in politics.
We have dispensed with these four questions of Strauss 
iii/
!  jDer alte und der neue Ulaube. pp.148-228; E.T. pp.169-38
(the" 2.T. of 1874 divides the book into two parts, the second 
of which begins a new pagination. i'his reference and the 
following one are the only ones to include the second part. 
Further pages refer to the first part).
2. Der alte und der neue (ilaube, pp.229-301; E.T. pp.39-123.
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in summary fashion, but we wish now to return to the first question 
and examine what Strauss has to say there more in detail for this 
section is the most important as showing the final position taken 
by Strauss in Christology.
In order to answer the question, "Are we still Chris- 
tians?", Strauss found it convenient to examine a succinct and 
comprehensive statement of what the Christian religion accepts as 
its guiding principles. He chose for his examination the Apostles 1 
Creed. The pattern of this creed is the Trinity, - Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit. This idea was immediately rejected by Strauss 
who saw in it nothing but mystery and pettifogging. "It would 
seem," he said, "as if the more ignorant those old Christians were 
of all the facts of nature, the more brainforce they possessed for 
such like transcendental subtleties; for these kind of claims on 
their reasoning faculties, which simply paralyze ours to recognize, 
such as conceiving of three as one and one as three, were a trifle 
to them, nay, a favourite pursuit." Even Calvin condemned a man 
to death because he held contrary opinions about the Trinity. The 
doctrine for Strauss is not worthy of further consideration, it 
defies the human reason.
The first confession in the Apostles' Creed is treated 
by direct reference to the early chapters of Genesis which tell of 
the creation of the world and the fall of man from the state of 
grace. These chapters are treated by Strauss in all literalness 
and/
1. Per aj-te und der neue Glgiibe, p. 14; E.T. p.14.
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and "because such a treatment reveals the inconsistency of the 
"biblical records with the surest postulates of science, there is 
nothing in the first phraae of the creed to warrant the attention 
of a modern thinking person.
As to the second section of the Apostles' Creed - con- 
cerning the Person of Christ - Strauss "began by saying that the 
words "the only begotten Son of G-od the Father" are quite unintelli- 
gible. That He was conceived by the Holy Spirit and born of a 
virgin can only be the results of the working of mythology. Strauss 
declared that similar myths in Greek literature "appear to us more 
felicitously invented than this Christian one." The historical 
statement that Jesus suffered under Pontius Pilate presented Strauss 
with no ground for complaint, but the descent into Hell after the 
crucifixion is not even mentioned by the Evangelists and therefore 
he found it to be thoroughly unhistorical. The concern of the 
G-ospel writers was in the Resurrection and yet even here we are not 
on sure ground for none of them was an eye-witness. The narratives 
of the Resurrection are "so impossible, in such direct antagonism
to every law of nature, that it would require a testimony of ten-
pfold reliability to be as much as discussed." The ascent into
Heaven is casually regarded by Strauss as impossible since the 
heavens contain not the throne of God but the constellations and 
planets. Future judgment of the world by Jesus is contrary to the 
day by day judgment which takes place in every individual. 
The/
1. Per alte und der neue Glaube, p.25; E.T. p.27. 
2f -TT- n » " " ii p .25; E.T. p.27.
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The Atonement, according to Strauss, harks back to the 
days of Jewish sacrificial offerings. From the sacrifice of humans 
the Jews had been gradually elevated to the sacrifice of animals. 
In the Atonement, however, human sacrifice is revived. The Cross 
was said to have had no mere moral effect, but its essential worth 
lay in the change which it made upon G-od who, because of the Cross, 
deigned to overlook man's past sinfulness and bestow upon him a 
saving mercy. Strauss called this idea of atonement "a propitia- 
tion by proxy" (einer stellvertretenden G-enugthuung). "To punish 
some one for another's transgression, to accept even the voluntary 
suffering of the innocent and let the guilty escape scathless in 
consequence, this, everybody admits now, is a barbarous action." 
Such a conclusion led Strauss to say that it makes no difference 
whether we think of Jesus as an ordinary man or as the Incarnation 
of G-od if the Atonement itself is an impossibility and a monstros- 
ity.
Strauss was quick to deal with the third section of the 
Apostles' Creed. The work of the Holy Spirit which transmits the 
redemption effected in Christ does so, according to the Church, on 
the basis of faith alone and without reference to good works. 
Strauss insisted that good works alone justify a man. The debate 
over the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist evidences the 
incomprehensibility of the sacrament. Baptism is all very well 
for those who can secure it, but what of the countless number of 
innocents/
1. Der alte und der neue G-laube, p.29; iJ.T. p.31.
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innocents to whom Baptism is not accessible? The resurrection of 
the "body has "been a stumbling-block even to orthodoxy.
The first major attack against the confessions of the 
ancient Church was led by Nationalism which offered a compromise 
between the ancient creed and the modern spirit. The creed of 
Rationalism declared that everything in the Bible is quite honest 
but everything can be explained quite naturally. Jesus was no 
"Son of God" to the Rationalists, as He was to the Ancient Church, 
but neither was He an impostor. He was a good, honourable man, 
full of love for God and His fellowman, and anxious to elevate the 
moral and religious thought of His day.
In Schleiermacher the nationalists' theory was supplanted 
for a view of Christ based largely on the fourth Gospel. Jesus 
is once again, in the language of the Ancient Church, the union 
of the divine and human but with a different emphasis. Christ is 
historically unique, but He is also the ideal and type of humanity 
and as such is perfectly sinless. Strauss cut Sehleierinacher's 
foundation from under him by pointing to the unreliable nature of 
the Fourth G-ospel and the contradiction involved in asserting that 
Jesus though human was yet without sin. schleiermacher 1 s phrase 
"God in Christ" was regarded by Strauss as no more than a phrase.
It was obvious, Strauss noted, that recent discussions 
of Christianity centred around the person of its founder. This 
was only natxiral and to be expected since religion depends upon 
its founder. If Jesus is no more than a mere man, or if He is 
an impostor, then Christianity loses its appeal. But this is 
just/
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just what happens according to Strauss. The G-ospels are so con- 
tradictory and so obviously saturated with myth and wilful forgery 
that we find difficulty in salvaging even the most insignificant 
facts concerning the life of Jesus. "We cannot make sure," Strauss 
said, "of the sayings and teachings of Christ on any one point, 
whether we really have his own words and thoughts "before us, or 
only such as later times found it convenient to ascribe to him."^
The Gospel account of the Resurrection was "no case of 
pious deception, "but all the more of self-deception. ... .I'aken his- 
torically, i.e., comparing the immense effect of this belief with
its absolute baselessness, the story of the resurrection of Jesus
P can only be called a world-wide deception." How then, Strauss
asked, can this person continue to demand and command our respect 
and adoration? "A being of which I can only catch fitful glimpses, 
which remains obscure to me in essential respects, may, it is true, 
interest me as a problem for scientific investigation, but it must 
remain ineffectual as regards practical influence on my life..... 
a problem cannot be an object of worship, or a pattern by which to
rz
shape our lives." In fact, Jesus was really an enthusiast who 
was misled and deceived in His own plans and who, if we were to 
follow Him, would surely misdirect our lives. And even if we 
could overlook this aspect of the case, v/e cannot fail to discover 
that His greatest teachings were not peculiar to Him alone but find 
their/
1. Der alte und der neue Ulaube, p.58; E.T. p.66.
2. "World-wide deception" is the mollified English translation
of the U-erman "ein welthistorischer Humbug," p.73; E.T. p.82. 
3- Der alte und der neue (ilaube, p.79; E.T. p.90.
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their parallels in many other religions.
If, then, we were to carry these conclusions into a Pro- 
testant Uhurch and conduct a service in accordance with them, what 
would we have? The sermon would fearlessly denounce the "birth, 
life, and death of Jesus as myths. Jesus would be neither Son of 
God or Redeemer. If from the sermon we turned to prayer, our 
petitions must not be directed toward Uhrist since He is a man and 
no more. The sacrament of .baptism will have no meaning for us 
since v/e would have our children be men and not set aside as some- 
thing special. The Lord's Supper might well remain as a fraternal 
banquet, but blood would be the last thing we should drink. In 
such manner Strauss illustrated the absurdity of Christianity. "l/Jy 
conviction, therefore, is, " he concluded, "if we would not evade 
difficulties or put forced constructions upon them, if we would 
have our yea yea, and our nay nay, - in short, if we would speak 
as honest, upright men, we must acknowledge we are no longer Chris- 
tians." 1
</e have here to set forth in a few words the relation in 
which strauss stood to our problem of the principle and Person in 
redemption. In placing under review his most important works we 
have endeavoured to indicate his Uhristologieal position as it 
developed from the Leben Jesu to Per alte und der neue G-laube, so 
that/
1. Per alte und der neue Ulaube, p.93; E.T. p.107.
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that here all that is needed is a gathering up of what has already 
"been said.
Prom the very first Strauss separated the Person of 
Christ from redemption. The Christological implications of the 
Leben Jesu are obvious enough. !By means of the mythical method of 
criticism he removed not only the miraculous and supernatural ele- 
ments from the G-ospel narratives, but even the Person of Jesus 
Christ Himself. If miracle is held to be untenable by the modern 
mind, then Christ, who is the greatest miracle of all, is likewise 
deprecated. But we must remember Strauss's positive statement in 
the appendix to the Leben Jesu where he attempted to re-establish 
the doctrines of Christianity on a dogmatic basis. This was done 
by accepting the Hegelian philosophy which identified the eternal 
truths of Christianity with the guiding principles of idealistic 
philosophy. TO destroy the u-ospel life of Jesus is not to destroy 
Christianity, for Hegelian philosophy does not need the guarantee 
of history. The greatest single truth which Christianity pro- 
fesses is the idea of the union of the divine and the human. 
Whereas the liew Testament stresses this union in the Person of 
Jesus Himself, Strauss in following his Hegelian inheritance em- 
phasized the "idea" of the union not in a single individual, for 
the idea would not so reveal itself, but in humanity at large. 
The Church has wrongly predicated of Jesus what is true only of 
divine humanity. It is humanity and not Christ who is the Re- 
deemer. Redemption has nothing to do with the Person of Christ 
but with man's realization that he is participating in the life of 
the/
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the race. The object of faith is the idea and not Jesus Christ. 
Perhaps in the person of uhrist the idea of the union of the divine 
and the human first came into clear focus, "but His contribution 
stops there. Jesus is the vehicle of the idea, not the idea it- 
self. The principle of redemption remains an eternal truth, a 
philosophic idea, an abstract conception, not purely mental, as in 
the Kantian system, "but rooted in the reality of humanity.
In the G-laubenslehre Strauss changed his premises "but not 
his conclusions. The Hegelian reconciliation of theology and 
philosophy, of belief and knowledge, of religion and science, which 
formed the basis for his positive conclusion in the appendix of the 
Leben Jesu is rejected as untenable and inadequate. The eternal 
truths of Christianity upon which he laid the basis for a philoso- 
phic faith are of no value in themselves but only in so far as they 
are in accord with philosophy. Philosophy and theology are two 
distinct fields of enquiry, they must not interfere with one anothec 
This deviation from the Hegelian standpoint, however, did not affect 
Strauss 1 s Christology, and we find him repeating in the UlaubensMire 
his maxims concerning the idea of divine humanity. In the Leben 
Jesu the principles of Christianity are placed in parallel with 
the propositions of Hegelianism and are thus given their worth and 
standing. In the Q-laubenslehre the eternal truths of Christianity 
are worthy of our attention in so far as they are philosophical. 
If philosophy and theology are distinct and irreconcilable, as 
btrauss believed them to be, and if it is true that only in phil- 
osophy can man find the guiding principles of life, as Strauss 
firmly/
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firmly held, then it follows that whatever is philosophical in 
Christianity is true and whatever is historical in Christianity is 
of no account. The idea of divine humanity is Christianity's 
greatest philosophical truth. 1'he JPerson of Christ, as an his- 
torical Hedeemer, fades into unimportance in the light of the idea 
of the union of the divine and the human. Christologically speak- 
ing otrauss did not change in the lilaubenslehre from his original 
position in separating the Person of Christ from the principle of 
redemption.
The Leben Jesu of 1864 was no more than a popular edition 
of the first Leben Jesu with the added weapon of the 'Tubingen 
School of criticism which Jtrauss used v/ith disastrous effect upon 
the historical life of Jesus. Jesus emerged a figure of no his- 
torical importance whatsoever. His life is encrusted with such 
a covering of myth, both the intentional and unintentional fabri- 
cations of the Evangelists, that it is quite impossible to say who 
or what He was. Here again as in the Leben Jesu and the G-lau- 
benslehre Strauss found his constructive policy in the idea of a 
divine humanity. Redemption is accomplished through the eternal 
Christ, not the historical Person.
In D.er alte und der neue U-laube Strauss rejected the 
role of Christian reformer which he had claimed for himself hereto- 
fore. The very title of the book suggests that he has a new faith 
and has done with the old. It is true that he had long since 
abandonned the faith of the orthodox Church, but he persisted in 
holding to the principles of Christianity. Now he released his 
hold/
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hold on everything that had "been his support and stretched out his 
arms, frail and weak with age and with the cynicism "born of rebuke, 
toward a new faith. This new faith finds its object not in the 
eternal truths of Christianity, not even in the idea of divine hum- 
anity, but in the biological and physical laws at work in the uni- 
verse. The cycle is now complete. Strauss began as a liberal 
theologian, changed to a speculative philosopher, and ended as a 
materialistic scientist. The idea of humanity, the principle of 
redemption, the eternal truths of Christianity, are forgotten in 
the Darwinian law of the struggle for existence and the interplay 
of cosmic forces. lj-'o the question, "Are we still Christians'.'", 
Strauss can only answer an emphatic "Ho". The whole life of Jesus 
is a "world-wide deception," "ein welthistorischer Humbug." Jesus 
is not merely the unassuming prophet who was crowned with the ex- 
pectations of the Jews, He was an ardent and arrant enthusiast, 
both self-deceived and deceiving. Keligion is a puerile stage of 
intelligence which soon passes away when the cosmic significance of 
the universe breaks in upon man's consciousness. We can hardly 
ask Strauss what Christology he holds in his last book. There is 
none to speak of. Having passed from theology to philosophy, from 
idealism to materialism, he has passed from the realm of Christo- 
logical considerations. Pantheistic materialism was the goal to 
which itrauss's thinking led him, and as he became more and more 
the scientist, he was less and less the theologian.
CHAPTER IV
THE CHRISTOLOGICAL POSITION OF ALOIS EMANUEL BIKDERMANN
Biedermann was born on llarch 2, 1819 at Oberrieden, near 
Zurich, Switzerland. His father was a soldier who served with 
distinction in the Russian and English campaign against Napoleon. 
The father 1 s physical courage, enthusiastic patriotism, his trust 
in God, and his love for his fellow men became the covetted in- 
heritance of the son. Strauss, we remember, was deeply attached 
to his mother and wrote a little essay in her memory; Biedermann 
was ever mindful of his good father and in later life wrote a memoir 
"On the life of my father." In this essay he reviewed the various 
political activities of his father in Switzerland, Italy, and at 
»Vaterloo. "All who knew him," he wrote, "have borne him witness
that he carried his name with dignity and honour, and this is the
o
most precious legacy that he has left behind for me."
In 1837 Biedermann entered the University of Basle. His 
chief interest lay in theology. "So far as I can retrace my 
thoughts to my younger days," he wrote in his reminiscences, "I knew 
nothing other than to wish to study theology. It was not so much 
the pulpit that attracted me as the early impulse to search for the 
essence of religion (die Dinge der Religion), and with my reason 
to/
1. Aus dem Leben meines Vaters, 1884. f| n
2. J. Kradolfer, A.E. Biedermann, Ausgewahlte Vartrage und 
Aufaatze, p.377.
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to bring it into clarity." 1 This ambitious frame of mind soon 
found its affinity in the Rationalism of the day. Later in his 
life as he looked "back upon his early theological interests, he 
admitted that he was a "prosaic Rationalist." 2
Biedermann was not content to remain a Rationalist, and, 
as a young student is wont to do, he "began to pick and choose his 
theological teachers at random. bchleiermacher interested him 
greatly at first, but he felt that ochleiermacher did not give him 
what he wanted. Studies in literature and art took him to the 
works of Beyschlag, "but he abandonned him soon for the study of 
philosophy. A crisis in his theological wanderings came when he 
read Strauss 1 s Leben Jesu. Strauss acted as the liberator of his 
pent up energies, and as Hume had awakened Kant out of his dogmatic 
slumber, so Strauss roused Medermann from his Rationalism and 
started him off on his speculative theology.
In a rectoral address in 1875 on the subject, "Strauss 
and his importance for theology," Biedermann said, "From the begin- 
ning of my theological studies I have been indebted to Strauss 
before all others for inspiration and guidance, and I have felt 
from the first that none of my teachers or examples was so deeply 
and intimately connected with me as he." The influence of Strauss 
on/
1. "Erinnerungen," p.382 in Vortrage und Aufsatze.
2. " p.390. "Rationalism," he said, p.383, 'Vas in 
my blood."
3. Biedermann said that his introduction to Strauss 1 s writings 
was, "wie ein erfrischendes Bajj.," "Erinnerungen," p.387.
4. "Strauss und seine Bedeutung fur die Theologie," p.212 in 
Vortrage und Aufsatze.
-121-
on Biedermann was twofold: he opened Biedermann's eyes in regard 
to exegetical-historical research, and, more impersonally, Strauss 
was the bridge over which jbiedermann travelled to the Hegelian 
philosophy. The genius of Strauss, accord to Biedermann, lay in 
his critical faculty. Although his own thinking led him beyond 
Strauss, Biedermann was ever grateful for Strauss's influence and 
insisted that any form of liberal theology must enter into the 
critical inheritance bequeathed by Strauss before attempting to 
discharge the obligations v/hich he left behind.
The professor in Basle who had an early influence on 
Biedermann's thinking was De Wette whose acute scholarship in the 
field of historical criticism complemented ^iedermann T s interest 
in Strauss. But De Wette 1 s dogmatic system was regarded by Bie- 
dermann as unsatisfactory. "His theory of religion," he said, 
"which makes it possible for the soul to loiow divine truth, as it 
reveals itself in pious emotion, only in recourse to symbols and 
not also with the understanding, appears to me to place theology 
on a quite feeble and vague footing." To meet this dogmatic 
deficiency in the theology of De »<rette, Biedermann went to Berlin 
in 1839 to develop his idea of a theology which would take account 
of the understanding. In Berlin the Hegelian philosophy soon 
attracted him and he found in it the key to a speculative system 





Although Biedermann is generally regarded as an Hegelian, 
he was nevertheless dissatisfied with the a priori dialectic of 
Hegelianism which seemed to him to lead to a sort of philosophic 
mythology. Only as philosophy is rooted in experience, Biedermann 
held, can there be a satisfactory theory of knowledge. Experience, 
psychologically determined, contains the true essence of philoso- 
phical knowledge, and likewise experience offers the correct re- 
conciliation between Rationalism and Suprajiaturalism, between 
speculation and religion. However, Biedermann was essentially an 
Hegelian in the sense that whatever is real is rational, and in his 
own works, especially in his earlier contributions, he acknowledged 
his debt to Hegel by suggesting that his own position and that of 
Hegel in regard to religion are the same.
Among his teachers at Berlin, Wilhelm Vatke influenced 
Biedermann most. The temper rather than the content of Vatke's 
thinking was what interested Biedermann. Vatke's book on the re- 
ligion of the Old Testament2 did for the Old Testament what Strauss's 
Leben Jesu had done for the Hew Testament, it was the harbinger of 
a long and fruitful period of historical criticism. And like 
Strauss, Vatke was versed in the Hegelian ideology. It was the 
Hegelian approach toward the study of the Old Testament that endeared 
Biedermann/
1. "Erinnerungen," p.398f, see also the Pogmatik 1st ed. p.yiii f., 
and 2nd ed. I, p.x; also his first essay Ueber die Personlich- 
keit Gottes, 1842, in which he used Hegelian terminology
2. Die Religion des Alten Testamentes nach den kanonischen Buehern 
entwickelt, 1835.
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Biedermann to Vatke. Vatke acted as a fitting supplement to Bie- 
dermann's interest in Strauss, and after he left Berlin he kept in 
touch with his teacher confessing in a letter to him that, "Strauss 
has ploughed up the field of my theological consciousness, "but 
because of this there has been a new sowing which is bringing forth 
more abundant fruit, so that I thank him for it and will always 
confess my debt to him aloud." 1 In grateful recognition of his 
teaching Biedermann dedicated his first important book to Vatke.
When he returned to Switzerland in 1843, Biedermann took 
a small church at Monchenstein where he preached with considerable 
success. His ministry, however, was abandonned after the publica- 
tion and warm reception of the book which he had dedicated to Vatte, 
Die freie Theologie oder Philosophic und Christenthum in Streit und 
.g'rieden, 1844. In this work Biedermann followed the formula of 
the younger Hegelian school in attempting a reconciliation between 
speculative philosophy and Christian theology. In making the 
human consciousness the only real, universal, and absolute Being, 
Biedermann came very near to the illusionary theory of religion 
held by Jj'euerbach. But Biedermann hoped to show how religion and 
doctrine might become essential in this philosophy and so, in accord 
with Vatke, he translated the essence of religion from the theo- 
retical to the practical defining religion as "the practical self-
P consciousness of the Absolute."^ By stressing the practical aspect
of/
1. Benecke, Wilhelm Vatke, 1883, p.410, quoted in the article on 
"Biedermann" in the itealencyklopadie fur pratestantische 
Theologie und Kirche.
2. Die freie Theologie, p.41.
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of consciousness he thought he had laid hold of a means of justify- 
ing an intellectual freedom in theology. The ffreie Theologie 
occasioned a bitter fight in the owiss Church among conservative 
groups against which .Biedermann stood his ground as the exponent 
of the liberal movement.
In order to propagate his liberal views on ecclesiastical 
freedom in theology, .Biedermann, together with a few colleagues, 
edited a periodical, Die Kirche der Gegenwart, which contained 
articles of a liberal and speculative nature. i'he critical ten- 
dency in Switzerland had heretofore been sporadic and unorganized, 
now it centred around this publication of .Biedermann and directed 
its attack with greater vehemence and consistency. The following 
titles among the many papers which .Biedermann himself contributed 
give an indication of the tone and temper of his views: "Esoteric 
and J£coteric, or the Accommodation," "The G-host of Pantheism," 
"This world and the world beyond. 1 * In all these essays £ieder- 
mann's aim was to answer the usual theological reproaches cast 
against pantheism. His positive reconstruction of the pantheistic 
principles attempted to establish the doctrine of G-od and the im- 
mortality of the soul. Pantheism, he held, was misunderstood when 
it was objected that it negated a doctrine of u-od or immortality. 
Of great significance in view of his later dogmatic position was 
another paper on the problem of the life of Jesus which appeared 
in/
1. "Esoterisch und exoterisch oder die Akkomodation," (I,243ff); 
"Das Gespenst des Pantheismus," (I,261ff); "Dieseits und 
jenseits," (III,155ff).
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in Biedermann 1 s periodical. In this essay Biedermann sought to 
show the inadequacy of the conclusions to which Strauss came in 
his critical examination of the New Testament records. What Strauss 
failed to do was to excavate deep enough with his critical instru- 
ments. What Biedermann essayed to do was to indicate the "un- 
touched principal" (der Grundstock des Kapitals) of the life of 
Jesus. As a banking house safeguards its loans and investments 
by means of a ''capital" sum which is kept in reserve, so the life 
of Jesus is but the "interest" drawn and accumulated out of this 
11 capital" which remains unaffected by the extravagance of criticism. 
This ultimate "capital" contains the eternal truths, the very 
essence of religion and Christianity.
In 1850 Biedermann was called to a theological chair in 
the University of Zurich where he taught Theological Encyklopaedia 
and Hew Testament Introduction and succeeded in introducing into 
these subjects his views on dogmatic proper with which he was 
especially concerned and interested. At the same time he was in- 
structor of religion in the upper classes of the G-ymnasium and to 
justify/
1. "Die Frage des Lebens Jesu," (II, 25ff; VI 8Iff).
2. Other essays appearing in -biedermann' s periodical were: "Unsere 
junghegelsche Weltanschauung oder der sog. neueste Pantheismus," 
which appeared separately in 1849; a response to a work of 
Homang directed against the speculative school and entitled, 
"Der neueste Pantheismus oder die junghegelsche Weltanschauung 
nach ihren theoretischen G-rundlagen und praktischen Konsequen- 
zen," in which .Bjedermann furthered his pantheistic reconstruc- 
tion begun in the ii'reie Theologie on the theory that speculative 
conceptions and Christian conceptions of immortality and sal- 
vation are in essential harmony.
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justify his methods and opinions in the face of a charge made 
against him, he wrote a little pamphlet setting forth his stand.
At this time also, JBiederrnann devoted much of his time 
to the religious press and wrote several articles some in a pole- 
mical vein and others of a literary nature. whether his subject 
had to do with the problem of philosophy and theology or with the 
religious novel, Uiedermann executed his task with a no"ble style 
and a gracious tolerance which made his name respected in all sorts 
of cultural circles. His interest in education never slackened 
and for a number of years he belonged to the -Board of Education in 
Zurich, the largest in Switzerland. Although his interest in theo- 
logy was centred more in speculation than in pastoral duties, he 
retained to his death a willingness and eagerness to preach,espec- 
ially in the country villages where the congregations were small 
and untutored.
In 1869 Biederroann published his .Uogmatik. the scientific 
masterpiece of his life by which he is known to-day. 2 It was a 
systematic construction of Christian theology built upon the Hegel- 
ian philosophy. Agreeing in principle with the Hegelian distinc- 
tions, Medermann, however, did not admit that religion and the 
religious idea are one and the same. This identification was to 
him the failing point of both the Hegelian and the Straussian specu- 
lation, iiill and emotion must play a part in religion, .biedermann 
argued, and so he defined religion as a mutual relation between G-od 
and/
1. Leitfaden fur den Religionsunterri cht an hoheren ^ymnasien.
2. Christliche Dogmatik, 1869.
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and man in which there is apparent "both divine revelation and human 
faith. In Christianity this mutual relationship is expressed his- 
torically in the Person of Christ, this is what i3iedermann called 
the "principle of Christianity." The Dogmatik is the most per- 
fected expression of the speculative school of theology. It contains 
apologetic, "biblical theology, history of dogma, symbolic, and 
doctrine. In denying the historicity of the U-ospels with a crit- 
ical acumen equalled only "by Strauss, he held to the eternal truths 
which the Gospels illustrate and attempted to give the Christian 
doctrines eternal significance by emphasizing their intrinsic truths. 
Although the Dogmatik consumed -Biedermann 1 s attention for 
the rest of his life (in 1884 he revised and re-edited it in two 
volumes), he found time to devote himself to the Swiss Reformed 
Church. although he was the leading exponent of the speculative 
theology, he was intensely concerned with the practical exposition 
of theology in the Church as is shown by his frequent stands in 
village pulpits. When he first read Strauss's Per alte und der 
neue Glaube he was so disappointed and disgusted with the conclusions 
reached therein that he wrote to his friend Vatke, "I would give 
a finger of my right hand, if Strauss had not published that menac- 
ing book." This statement shows the strange mixture in .Biedermann 
of a speculative turn of mind coupled v/ith a deep disgust for 
rationalistic or materialistic theology. In a little essay on 
Heinrich/
1. Benecke, Milhelm Vatke, p.608, quoted in the Kealencyklopadie 
fur protestanische Theologie und Kirche.
-128-
Heinrich Lang, a prominent pastor of the Swiss Church, Biedermann 
praised the work of the Swiss Church in preaching an historical 
Christianity in keeping with the best interests of a liberal theo- 
logy. One of the most important of his short publications at this
time was a speech made before the Swiss Society for Free Protes-
p
tantism on the subject, Unsere Stellung zu Christus. 1882.
The second edition of the Dogmatik. published in two vol- 
umes in 1884, marked not only a revision of the original text but 
reorganized the schema of the contents. The original single volume 
contained three parts, a principal part on the problem of the 
essence of religion, an historical part on the doctrines of the 
Church, and a speculative part or the reconstruction of Christian 
theology. The second edition contained only two parts, the second 
of which contained the second and third parts of the first edition. 
In content the Dogmatik of 1884 did not differ radically from its 
predecessor although the conclusion to which Biedermann finally 
comes is a distinct step away from the speculative theology in the 
direction of the traditional Christian experience.
Shortly after the appearance of the first volume of the 
revised Dogmatik, Biedermann was stricken ill and died very suddenly 
on the 25th. of January, 1885. He counteracted the pain of his 
last hours by quoting long passages of scripture and singing the 
hymns/
1. Leben Langs, 1876.
2. Other writings of the same character: Die dringendsten Aufga- 
ben der protestantischen Apologetik in der Uegenwart, 1876; 
Richtungen und Parteien, 1880; essays on Lipsius, 1877; 
Pfleiderer, 1878, and iiartmanq., 1882; and a final essay, aine 
Ehrenrettung, 1884.
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hymns of Paul Gerhardt. He repeated again and again the last 
words of jesus on the cross. A friend who stayed with him to the 
end read him the words from the Jipistle to the Romans, "for none 
of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself, for whether 
we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto 
the Lord: whether we live therefore, or die, we are the Lord's." 
Biedermann answered with great joyfulness, "Yes, that is fully and 
entirely my conviction."
Biedermann is best known for his Dogmatik. but before 
looking at that work we must consider first, quite briefly, one or 
two other publications which indicate the direction of his thought
and lay the basis for his chief work. The Freie Theologie beckons
2 our attention first.
Biedermann referred to his ffreie Theologie in later life 
as a "rocket" (eine Rakete) which announced to the world the begin- 
ning of a new mode of theological thinking which was to be known as
2 the speculative Theology. By this he did not mean that he had
set forth something altogether new, for he freely acknowledged his 
debt to both Hegel and Strauss, but the theological tendency of 
which it was,the herald was new. In this little book Biedermann 
sought/
n1. Rom.14: 7-8; Oeri, Personliche Erinnerungen an ^iedermann,3J366, 
quoted in the Realencyklopadie fur pro test ant i sche Theologie
und Kirche.
2. Die freie Theologie Oder Philosophic und Christenthum in
Streit und Frieden"7 1844.
3. "Erinnerungen," p.382.
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sought to demonstrate the compatibility of the speculative philoso- 
phy of Hegel with Christian theology by indicating the sphere and 
scope of each.
Philosophy is the relation of the thinker to thought, or 
of the Ego to the non-Ego. Religion too is the relation of the 
Ego to its universal being, but in religion it is the individual 
practical Ego and not the universal or absolute Ego. Religion, 
thus, is a sort of mirror which reflects the practical Ego to the 
Absolute and in turn reflects the Absolute to the finite subject. 
Religion is, said Biedermann, the "practical self-consciousness of 
the Absolute." This means that religion, like philosophy, con- 
tains a theoretical aspect in so far as it is the consciousness of 
the Absolute, but this alone does not characterize religion, it 
must be/referred to the practical self-consciousness. Further, the 
theoretical aspect of religion is idea not thought. But the mode 
in which religious ideas are represented is not religion. Religion 
at heart, its kernel, is a relationship the same as is philosophy. 
So Christianity is not any particular view of the world (this is 
a mode of the idea), but it is a relationship between the Infinite 
and finite in which man comes to realize his divinity and in which 
God assumes humanity. This relationship is set forth in the ^od- 
man, Jesus Christ, who as a mode of the religious idea is subject 
to history and criticism but whose religious kernel is universal 
and absolute. Thus, philosophy and theology, in so far as both 
contain a theoretical universal are in essential harmony.
This/
1. Die freie Theologie, p.41.
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This notion of religion as a "spiritual relationship in 
which the finite subject stands in regard to another subject, as 
to an Infinite which is called divine," 1 led many to associate Bie- 
dermann with Feuerbach who took as his starting-point the definition, 
"Imagination is the essential organ of religion." 2 Both, it was 
felt, reduced the object of religion to the purely human level. 
But while this reduction led Feuerbach to an illusionary theory of 
religion, Biedermann was led toward establishing the Church as the 
essential fulfilment of his concept of religion. But in intro- 
ducing the doctrines of the Church into religion, Biedermann ac- 
claimed a free exercise of speculation as a guiding hand to hold 
them in check. In the final two chapters, therefore, on "Theology" 
and the "Church" an unlimited freedom of conscience is set up in 
regard to dogma and belief. Neither symbol nor the Bible, nor 
even the self-consciousness of Jesus, is allowed to stand over 
against the essence or kernel of religion which is known by specu- 
lative thinking alone.
For the most part the terminology and phraseology of the 
Freie Theologie is extremely difficult and is at times almost un- 
intelligible. We need not bother here, however, with a detailed 
analysis of its content as its central principle is clear and it 
is that which has a bearing upon our problem. Although Biedermann 
has not much to say of the Person of Christ, he intimated the posi- 
tion which he developed fully in the Dogmatik, namely, that the 
Person/
1. Die freie Theologie, p.30.
2. Ludwig Feuerbach, samtliche 't/erke, 1903, Ed.VII, p.244.
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Person of Christ is an historical illustration of the definition 
of religion. As an historical individual, He is subject to such 
criticism as Strauss, for example, could bring against Him, but 
this is not to invalidate His significance. The kernel of re- 
ligion (das innere »»esen der Religion) cannot "be touched by criti- 
cism and since Jesus Christ represents this kernel neither can He 
be touched by criticism. There are then in Biedermann 1 s early 
thinking two ways of looking at the God-man, as an historical in- 
dividual and as a universal idea. It is a distinction that was 
already popular in nineteenth century theology. Hegel and Strauss 
had built their Christological thought upon it. Biedermann, it 
must be remembered, was only twenty-five years old when he wrote 
the Freie Theologie and at the time was wholly under the influence 
of Hegel and Strauss. It is not surprising, therefore, to find 
him in complete accord with their position in regard to the Person 
of Christ. It was not until he wrote the Dogmatik that his posi- 
tion was sufficiently unique to be distinguished from those of 
Hegel and Strauss.
Between the years 1850 and 1884 Biedermann issued a series 
of essays and lectures which had a wide theological influence.1 
These/
1. A.E. Eiedermann, ausgewahlte Yortrage und Aufsatze, edited 
by J. Kradolfer. This selection contains 13 essays, one of 
which, "Unsere Stellung zu Christus," we will consider separ- 
ately in the next section.
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These "occasional" papers represent certain aspects of Ms thinking 
from the time of the Freie Theologie to the second edition of the 
Dogmatik, "but they are an altogether different kind of writing than 
his two main dogmatic works. In the Freie Theologie and the 
Dogmatik Biedermann was always the cool, pondering, speculative 
thinker submerged in his metaphysical abstractions. He was always 
impersonal and formal. It is quite otherwise with these essays. 
Here we come into touch not only with Biedermann the philosopher, 
"but with Biedermann the man. Instead of the stilted Hegelian ter- 
minology we are met with an informal style which frequently borders 
on conversation.
The first of the essays, "The Position and Problem of 
Philosophy in Theology," set out to develop three points: first, 
the relation of theology and philosophy to each other; second, the 
influence of philosophy upon theology; and third, the influence of 
the philosophical consciousness upon the theological personality. 
If, as Biedermann suggested, philosophy is the purest science and 
includes all thought, then theology too is a department of philo- 
sophy. "The science of religion," he said, "takes its stand quite
P
within philosophy, but as its kernel and crown." The starting- 
point (der Ausgangspunkt) for historical theology is the Person of 
Christ. All that went before Him in biblical theology and in the 
general history of religion becomes meaningful only as an historical 
preparation./
1. "Stellung und Aufgabe der Philosophic in der Theologie," 1850.
2. n « it " " M it ii p. 4.
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preparation. The Christian Church based its foundation on faith 
in Him as the personal source of revelation. However, there is 
also the knowledge of (das Yfissen) the Person of Christ which is 
also an historical starting-point for theology. But to gain this 
knowledge of the Christ such processes as historical research mast 
"be fully utilized. We cannot know Christ by merely accepting the 
picture of Him as given by the Evangelists, we must examine this 
picture carefully and critically in order to derive from it the 
essence which it contains. This is the great philosophical- 
theological task.
AS the Person of Christ is the starting-point for his- 
torical theology, the system of Christian faith and life marte its 
logical conclusion (der Endpunkt). And as the Person of Christ 
necessarily becomes a philosophical problem, so too the theological 
doctrine of faith is philosophical through and through. If faith 
is the devotion of a finite personality to the eternal goal of life 
(Lebenswahrheit), which in Christ has been shown to be a redeeming 
fact, then it is philosophy which shows the way to this faith. It 
may be that a half-philosophy leads one away from U-od, but a whole- 
philosophy leads one to U-od, to a faith which carries within itself 
the power to overcome all doubts.
The greatest privilege and responsibility for the specu- 
lative theologian, according to .Biedermann, is so to preach and 
teach that the youth of the day may be guided toward this philoso- 
phical faith. If any man faiJs to do this, let not philosophy be 
blamed/
1. "Stellung und Aufgabe der Philosophic in der Theologie," p.18.
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"blamed, let it suffice to say that he has failed in his task, 
.biedermann concluded this essay with the Pauline text, "He that is 
spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man."1 
The second essay, "The Unseen uorld of Primitive Peoples,"2 
is interesting in so far as it shows how wide was the scope of 
iiiedermann's interests. He quoted from and alluded to the various 
religions of the world, Chinese, Hindu, American Indian, Roman, 
Greek, and referred frequently to the works of Homer, Hesiod, and 
Plato. His conclusions were three: first, that all primitive 
peoples conceived of a future life although it was always fashioned 
according to their own wishes and desires; second, the common view 
of a future world underlying the thought of all primitive peoples 
is that of a dream picture (ein Traumtild) which is primarily con- 
cerned with ghosts and shades; third, Christians derive their 
knowledge of the unseen world from the revelation of trod in spirit.
Two essays, "The Religious Novel" and "The Religious
3 Drama," indicate the cultural appreciation of Biedermann. In the
latter he suggested that the theme "fate" which appears in so many 
dramas, especially the Greek, is really God or Providence, and for 
that reason the drama is at its very roots religious. "If the 
fundamental problem of the drama is a religious one, the form of 
religious processes is a dramatic one, and the goal of "both re- 





4. "Das religiose Drama," p.87.
 der Naturvolker," 1851.
e Roman," 1867; "Das religiose Drama," 1869.
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Three "biographical essays on Baur, Schleiermaeher, and 
strauss are literary achievements, but indicate also Biedermann 1 s 
deep regard for each of his well-known predecessors. The essay 
on Baur was written a year after his death and contains a rather 
complete exposition of his views. The absence of criticism would 
indicate that Biedermann was in accord with the main principles of 
the founder of the Tubingen School of criticism. The essay on 
Schleiermaeher was written on his one hundredth birthday. Here
too Biedermann paid homage to "the regenerator of modern theology"
P as he called dchleiermacher. Biedermann acknowledged from the
very first his debt to Strauss. What he admired most in Strauss 
was his critical ability, for the conclusions of the Leben Jesu 
seemed to him to be inadequate.
An essay, "The Problems of Apologetic for the Present,"^ 
began with the question, "What shall be defended by Apologetic?" 
The ready answer was, "the Evangel of Christian salvation." But 
this answer, according to Biedermann, has a double connotation. 
Does it mean that Christianity is the salvation-truth (die Heils- 
wahrheit), or that the truth of Christianity is salvation? Is it 
the whole historical form of Christianity in doctrine and life, or 
its essence? Is it Christianity as the one universal Christian 
Church, or as the Protestant Church according to the old standards? 
It/
1. "P.O. Baur," 1861: "F. Schleiermaeher," 1868; "Strauss und 
seine Bedeutung fur die Theologie," 1875.
2. "F. Sehleiermacher," p.188.
3. "Welches sind die dringendsten Aufgaben der Apologetik in der 
ttegenwart," 1874.
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It is obvious to Medermann that Apologetic can have no place in 
a Christianity in which faith decides its own content. "Apologetic 
has to clarify the essence of the Christian religion in the form 
of the religious principle which has teen exemplified in mankind 
and for mankind in the religious personality of Jesus."^ The most 
urgent need of Apologetic is to concentrate all theological opinions 
upon the kernel of Christianity. What is this kernel? The ker- 
nel of Christianity is the relationship between the Infinite and 
the finite, "between God and the world, a spiritual fact revealed
in the religious personality of Jesus in whom the religious life
2 of mankind is exemplified.
This essay on Apologetic was originally a lecture de- 
livered to the annual assembly of the Swiss Reformed Preachers 1 
Society of Zurich and so .Biedermann 1 s audience was composed of 
Rationalists, Supranaturalists, and .Mediating theologians. If we 
are to have unity in the Church, spoke Biedermann, vie must all con- 
centrate on the kernel of religion (auf den Kern der Religion). 
Thus Apologetic will "be an instrument in welding the different 
opinions of the Church into a unity. The two main divisive move- 
ments in the Church which Apologetic must meet are first, secular- 
ism and materialism, and second positivism and mythology. In 
conclusion Biedermann offered three caveats: first to concentrate 
on the kernel of religion; second, truthful and trustful appreciation 
of/
1. "Die Aufgaben der Apologetik," p.254.
2. Biedermann called this relationship, "das Uotteskindschafts- 
verh'altniss," p.266.
-138-
of those who hold different points of view; and third, just treat- 
ment for anti-Christian theories through the realization that they 
may contain a "bit of the truth.
These essays indicate the drift and tendency of .Bieder- 
mann's thought. We see that he was always in earnest. His passion 
for truth, his zeal for unity, his tolerant sympathy of those who 
opposed him in word and in thought are evident on every page, lie 
find in him the strange co-mingling of a speculative theology and 
a warm Christian devotion.
In regard to the problem of redemption, it is evident 
that he had a much deeper realization of what redemption is than 
had Strauss. He was not satisfied with the critical conclusions 
of mythology any more than he could accept the principles of mater- 
ialism. Redemption for iiiedermann was no mere speculative ab- 
straction, no mere moral obligation, it lay at the very heart of 
Christianity and was intelligible only through the Person of Christ. 
His speculative turn of mind, however, v/ould not let him rest with 
a bland acceptance of the orthodox Christology. He felt that the 
acknowledgment of the Person of Christ as the Redeemer was not 
enough, knowledge of what He was and what He stood for determines 
Christianity. So the principle, or essence, or kernel, of the 
Person of Christ is ultimately the significant thing in Christian- 
ity, but this cannot exist without the historical Person. He shall 
see in the Dogmatik how Jiiedermann attempted to reconcile this 




A lecture given by Biedermann in 188E at a meeting of 
the Swiss Society for Liberal protestantism entitled Unsere Stellung 
zu Ghristus, 1 indicates in an abbreviated form his Christologieal 
position. We give here a running paraphrase of the pertinent 
parts of the lecture.
Our position in regard to Christ, said Biedermann, is the 
most genuine touch-stone (der echteste Prufstein) upon which 
opposite theological opinions may be brought together, and thus it 
is a fitting theme for a Church Assembly since unity is the Church's 
fondest ideal. Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ - that is the orig- 
inal creed of the Christian community. But Christ at that time 
meant simply the fulfiller of the Jewish messianic prophecies. 
Through Christ, G-od would fulfil his promises to the children of 
Israel and a new Kingdom of God would be ushered in as the final 
goaJ. for all men. That in the Person of Jesus this salvation and 
highest good were revealed for the world and really unlocked for 
mankind - this is the kernel of all Christian belief. But what 
this Jesus was as an historical personality, how He was the Christ, 
and wherein, therefore, this salvation and highest good were in 
Him, - all these considerations are more subtle than the mere state- 
ment that in the Person of Jesus there is redemption. He who sees 
Jesus/
1. Printed separately by u-. Reimar, Berlin, from which references 
are here made.
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Jesus as the Christ, as far as he knows what that means, however 
scanty or however full of content his faith may be, has a right to 
be called a Christian. The judgment whether or not he belongs to 
the true congregation of Christ, the Kingdom of God on earth, what 
our ancestors called the 'Invisible Church,' that we shall leave 
to uod who judges both more severely and more mildly, more justly 
and more graciously, than we judge one another.
Biederinann made it plain that he was speaking of the 
Church in its narrow and special sense as an historically determined 
community concerned with the cultivation of Christian belief in 
communal, devotional, and educational life. What is the bond of 
unity that holds this Church together and at the same time makes 
for freedom of conscience? It is our position in regard to Christ. 
But "Christ" is not merely a title of honour, or an external link 
that binds Christians together, it is the name given to One in whom 
there is true religion. In His life the true relation between 
U-od and man is revealed as a fact. In Him redemption becomes the 
highest good for the whole of mankind. This is no meagre residue 
of religion, as is held by those (like Strauss) who completely 
abandon religion. It is an affirmative appreciation in abbreviated 
form of those things wherein true religion consists. This appre- 
ciation is based on the religious life which was exemplified in 
the Jesus of history. In this way the kernel of religion is tied 
up v;ith its historical representation. But just how true religion 
makes/
1. Unsere Stellung zu Christus, pp.3-11.
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makes use of the historical person is a question of theory con- 
cerning which research is necessary and thus a diversity of opin- 
ions is possible. And this necessary diversity of opinions is 
also the essential freedom which is allowed any one who acknow- 
ledges the fact that Jesus is the Christ. 1
There are two main opinions of the Person of Christ. 
The one is the orthodox or positive opinion which regards Jesus 
as the very bon of U-od. The other is the liberal opinion which 
sees in Jesus the fulfiller and revealer of tfod's word. The 
liberal view acknowledges that Jesus is the Christ in this way: 
He reveals actually in Mis Person the divine determination of man- 
kind, the true life that comes from G-od, the victory over the 
v/orld, and therewith He has opened up for mankind the Kingdom of 
God v/hich is made mankind's highest good. The orthodox view, 
however, claims that it alone recognizes that Jesus is the Christ, 
the Redeemer of the world. The liberal view, those of the ortho- 
dox hold, has only shown the way at the end of which, perhaps, the 
goal may lie, but now, as before, mankind remains severed from 
this goal by a gulf which it cannot itself bridge. To make of 
Jesus merely a prototype (Vorbild) is not to call Him Christ. 
The liberal view, on the other hand, holds that the orthodox view 
of redemption is a phantasy-drama whose beginning, middle, and end 
have meaning only as a picture of spiritual truth. Bow then, 
Biedermann asked, in the face of these two apparently contradictory 
views/
1. Unsere Stellung zu Christus, pp.11-12
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views can there be a religious community with any sort of internal 
unity? 1
Formerly theologians liked to draw the fundamental con- 
trast "between the orthodox and the liberal Christologies "by using 
the catchwords (Stiekwbrter) historical Christ 1 and 'Ideal Christ.1 
The true contrast, however, is deeper than this distinction. Is 
the Person of Christ the one who unlocks for mankind the secret of 
divinity and thus "brings redemption? Or is the religion of Jesus, 
the inner life relationship in which Jesus stands to G-od, the re- 
velation of God? Is Jesus Himself the G-od of our belief, He whom 
the doctrine of the Church has made really a divine Person trans- 
forming a human son of G-od (G-ottessohn) into a God-Son (G-ott-Sohn), 
is this One the revealed God of the Christian faith? Or is the 
one eternal G-od, as Jesus 1 s personal religion reveals Him, the G-od 
of our belief, but thereby the Christ who in His religious life
has opened up redemption for mankind? This is the true contrast
p between orthodox and liberal. Where can they be united?
Orthodox and liberal come together not merely in an his- 
torical fact apart from its religious meaning, and not merely in 
a religious idea apart from whether or not the fact ever happened, 
but in the fact of the religious life of Jesus as the human re- 
velation-source of divine life. (Jesus als des menschlichen Offen- 
barungsquells der gottlichen Lebenswahrheit fur die Welt.) The 
orthodox who wishes to be true to the inheritance which has been 
given/
1. Unsere Stellung zu Ghristus, pp.14-17.
2. »« " " pp.18-20.
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given him by his fathers, and the liberal whose creed is "based on 
the Kingdom of God in the world as it has been revealed by Jesus, 
the Christ - both come together and stand hand in hand on the re- 
ligious life of-Jesus. 1
How the orthodox view can reconcile the old miracle pic- 
ture (Yifunderbild) of Jesus with the modern Weltanschauung is a 
problem for its followers, added Biedermann. «Vhat really separ- 
ates the orthodox and the liberal is not an ecclesiastical problem 
but a difference of opinion in regard to science and history. If 
the orthodox view discharges its duties it will not only preach 
the G-ospel of Jesus, the Christ, according to its standards, but
it will honestly appreciate the efforts and the justification of
2 the liberal view which works by its side.
rfhat we all need, Biedermann concluded, - liberals as 
well as orthodox - is to ponder the commandments contained in the 
old aphorism, 'in necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omni- 
bus charitas. 1 In the early Christian Church some said, 'I am of 
Paul, 1 others 'I am of Apollos, 1 but it is to be hoped that ortho-
rr
dox and liberal may say with one voice, ' I am of Jesus Christ. 1
Biedermann 1 s main theological work was the Dogmatik. 
The relation between the Preie Theologie and the Dogmatik is in 
some/
1. Unsere Stellung zu Ghristus, pp.21-23.
2. " " " " pp.24-33.
3. " " " " pp.34-36.
4. Christliche Dogmatik, 1869; 2nd. edition in two vols. 
appeared in 1884.
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some respects like the relation "between Sehleiermacher 1 s Re den 
and his G-laubenslehre. Both the Dogmatik and the G-laubenslehre 
are the fruit of long years of thought, and, as in the Ulaubens- 
lehre Sehleiermacher has "broken with the Romanticism which Char- 
acterized the Reden, Biedermann in the Dogmatik showed little 
relation to Feuerbach with whose system his j'reie Theologie was 
compared.
The Dogmatik is a systematic theology which takes as its 
starting-point the Hegelian dialectic and the Straussian criticism. 
The very structure of the "book, even its table of contents, in- 
dicates its Hegelian character, for theoretical and philosophical 
considerations precede the sections on religion and theology. The 
sections dealing with the Gospel records of the life of Christ are 
reminiscent of Strauss's criticism. But Biedermann announced in 
the preface that although he fully acknowledged his de"bt to "both 
Hegel and Strauss, he was not in the Dogmatik merely reproducing 
their findings. In agreement with Hegel that the Infinite and 
finite are essentially one, Biedermann nevertheless denied that 
religion was no more than a lower level of philosophy. To show 
that religious faith possesses a rightful province of its own was 
the appendix which Biedermann wished to add to the dialectical 
formalism of the Hegelian system. If Hegel had only verged upon 
the true distinctions of philosophy and religion, Strauss had only 
gone half way with his critical method. Thus Biedermann claimed 
as/
1. Odenwald, A.E. Biedermann in der neuren Theologie, p.21.
2. Dogmatik, 1869, p.viii.
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as his task in the Dogmatik the completing of the Hegelian dia- 
lectic and the Straussian criticism.
The second edition of the Dogmatik included nearly the 
whole of the first edition, some sections as in Christology, for 
example, "being left unchanged, but a philosophical section on the 
theory of knowledge was added and given an introductory place. 
Biedermann 1 s theory of knowledge stands somewhere "between Hegel 1 s 
logical idealism and Spinoza's monistic parallelism. Biedermann 
distinguished sharply "between ideal being and material being but 
insisted that the antithesis was nevertheless a unity. Whether 
Biedermann 1 s theory of knowledge succeeded in laying a surer basis 
for the understanding of such problems as mind and matter, God 
and the world, we need not here enquire, for it suffices for our 
present purpose to notice that in the metaphysical introduction of 
the Dogmatik Biedermann tried to distinguish form from matter and 
yet maintain their essential unity, a metaphysical feat which he 
repeated again in the Christological section.
Biedermann hoped by means of the speculative theology 
to escape from the pantheism of Hegel, in whose system philosophy 
and theology were embraced as one, and from the dualism of Strauss 
who used philosophy to destroy theology. Biedermann 1 s definitions, 
therefore/
On Biedermann 1 s theory of knowledge, Dogmatik 1884, I, pp.51-173, 
see Lipsius, Philosophie und Religion, 1885,pp.59ff who charges 
Biedermann with panlogism; also Pfleiderer,'^The Philosophy of 
Religion, 1887, vol.11, p.270ff, and The Development of Theo- 
logy inO-er many since Kant, 1890, p.138.
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therefore, are usually double-edged; one part dealing with phil- 
osophy, the other with theology. I'o define the two so as to 
indicate their difference and yet to show their unity, was Bieder- 
mann' s aim. Christianity is, therefore, to "be defined with these 
two considerations in mind. On the one hand, it is to "be re- 
ferred to the Person of Jesus and, on the other hand, to the 
religious personality which was illustrated in Jesus. Biedermann 
was insistent, however, in maintaining that these two aspects were 
inseparable. "Christianity," he said, "is the religion of the 
divine Sonship (G-otteskindschaft) which has "been actually revealed 
for mankind in Jesus, and at the same time (damit) it is the re- 
ligion of the Kingdom of G-od as the divine purpose of humanity
2 which has "been realized in this divine Sonship." The important
word in that definition for Biedermann is the damit. Christianity 
is "both person and principle, and although it is the principle 
that denotes the essence of Christianity, it must not, nor can it 
"be, separated from its historical expression.
Christian dogma, consequently, is the form which the 
principle of Christianity has assumed in its historical development. 
No single doctrine of the Christian Church contains the principle
rj>
in toto, it is revealed only in the whole history of dogma. There- 
fore Biedermann turned to the history of Christian dogma to examine 
it in the light of the Christian principle. First passing under 
review/
1. Dogmatik, 1884, I, p.331.
2.    " I, p.333.
3. " I, p.334.
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review "biblical theology and then the historical development of 
Christian doctrines, he came finally to the concluding section of 
the Dogmatik where he reconstructed the Christian doctrines on a 
speculative basis setting forth the principle of Christianity as 
well as its historical formulation. As this final section con- 
tains ±>iedermann T s constructive Christological thought, we will 
turn to that now and present his leading declarations.
The historical development of Christian theology, he 
wrote, has shown the form which the religious faith of mankind has 
taken throughout the ages. This faith had its object in the re- 
ligious personality of Jesus. How it must be shown in a critical- 
speculative way what constitutes the kernel or principle of 
Christianity underlying the historical dogmas. The religious 
principle which lay in the background of all Christian doctrines 
had its original historical expression in the Uod-Son relationship 
expressed in the religious personality of Jesus. In His Person 
the full revelation of God for mankind was disclosed. This re- 
velation enabled a man, who lived in disharmony with U-od on account 
of sin, to eliminate the barrier between himself and redemption. 
The doctrines of the Christian Church are, accordingly, the attempts
of Christians in every age to account for and express in language
2 their religious faith in the Person of Christ.
Where the Church fell into error in the matter of Chris- 
tology was in identifying too closely the Christian principle with 
the/
1. Dogmatik, II, p.395.
2. " II, p.403.
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the personality of Jesus whose life was the revelation of this 
principle in history, "but who was not the principle itself. The 
law of identification was the stumbling-block of doctrinal Chris- 
tianity. A spiritual principle was described as a person. The 
historical result of this colossal error has led to two contra- 
dictory viewpoints: the one lays hold of the Person and Work of 
Christ as the main dogma of Christianity, and the other looks for 
the kernel of Christian faith in a principle which Christ illus- 
trated. The former view leads to Rationalism and the latter to 
a speculative theology. Taking Kant as an exponent of the 
Rationalist 1 s view, Biedermann denied that 'humanity, the ideal of 
moral perfection well-pleasing to G-od 1 was the same thing as the 
specific Christian principle contained in Christian dogma. But 
if Rationalism failed to discover the Christian principle, specu- 
lative Christologies thus far were also in error in identifying 
the essential relation of God to man with the religious problem 
found in Christology. The direct identification of the logical- 
metaphysical problem of the relation of divine and human essence
with the specific religious problem of Christology is the funda-
2 mental error of all speculative Christology.
Strauss had said that an idea, not a person, was the 
subject of Christology, not a Kantian unreality, but a concrete 
Idea of mankind as G-od-mankind. But, argued Biedermann, this Idea 
in Strauss's hands fluctuated between an abstract conception of the 
general/
1. Dogmatik, II, p.425, 432.
2. " II, p.433.
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general essence of man and the concrete conception of the collec- 
tion of all men, and the problem escaped from out of his hands. 
Strauss substituted God-mankind for God-man "but that is no more 
than a 'neat rhetorical device. 1 To forget that there is in the 
Christological problem a distinct and specific "religious" Idea is 
to miss the real problem.
The doctrines of the Church are clearly dissolved, not 
solved, by both Rationalism and the usual form of speculative theo- 
logy as is seen in Strauss. Schleiermacher, Biederraann pointed 
out, attempted to stand between the extremes of Christologieal 
thought in his day, but he concluded that Christology was primarily 
personal and only secondarily a principle. Biedermann dismissed 
achleiermacher with an analogy describing him as a bridge over 
which theologians passed from Rationalism to orthodoxy and who,
having reached the old familiar banks again, destroyed the bridge
f) 
behind them.
The expression T principle ! , Biedermann insisted, is not 
meant to express an abstract subjective idea divorced from reality 
or manufactured by our own thinking, but rather it is in contrast 
to the ecclesiastical practice in Christology of identifying the 
Person of Christ with religious faith. The Christian principle 
must be regarded not as an abstraction but as essentially religious 
in content. The error of all previous speculative Christologies 
which/
1. Dogmatik, II, pp.454-437.
2. " II, pp.438-442.
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which emphasize the Idea of Christ's Person as it develops in human 
history has "been this, that they do not see this Idea as a speci- 
fically religious one whose content is composed of the very essence 
of the religious personality of Jesus. They are accustomed to 
view the content of this Idea as a general metaphysical truth con- 
cerning the relation "between the Absolute and the finite, or as a 
relation "between the .Divine and the human. All this is not the 
Ghristologieal Idea itself for it has a specifically religious 
character. In order to see the Christian principle in its true 
light, the religious personality of Jesus must "be accounted for. 
Thus, concluded Medermann, we do not separate the principle from 
the Person nor do we identify them as does the Church.
The Christian principle revealed in the religious per- 
sonality of Jesus is the underlying union "between U-od and man. 
Llan's self-conscious union with Absolute Spirit is the real union 
of divine and human. Absolute religious self-consciousness, 
therefore, is the only real G-od-mankind and is expressed in the 
communion of love betv/een God and as fatherhood on the side of G-od 
(die Vatersehaft G-ottes) and as childhood on the side of man (die 
Kindschaft des Menschen). The essence of love is the life of one 
within another, and in the absolute religious self-consciousness 
this love results in new life, it is the principle of redemption 
(das Erlosungsprincip), the causa efficiens, the elimination of the 
natural discord in which man finds himself and out of which he 
cannot/
1. Dogmatilc, II, pp.581-583.
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cannot extricate himself "by his own power. The absolute religious 
self-consciousness in religious thinlcing brings about a transition 
from the carnal self-consciousness to the true spiritual self- 
consciousness. In religious feeling it culminates in reconcilia- 
tion. In religious willing it results in freedom. 1
The absolute religious self-consciousness finds its his- 
torical guarantee in the religious personality of Jesus. In Him 
we see His self-consciousness of the Kingdom of G-od as a relation- 
ship of love between G-od and man and as the aim and goal of all 
men. We see His messianic self-consciousness as He fulfilled the 
Old Testament prophecies. We see the creation of absolute ethical 
commandments out of His own self-consciousness as a member of G-od's 
Kingdom. We see His self-consciousness of the absolute worth of 
the Ego over against all the things of the world and of the re- 
lative worth of the latter. We see His self-consciousness of the 
love of the i'ather fulfilled in Him as the sin-redeeming grace of 
G-od for repentant sinners. We see His self-consciousness of His
sacrificial death and absolute devotion of His being and life to
2 G-od in founding the Kingdom of Divine Grace in the world.
The relation of the historical Person of Jesus to the 
efficacy of the Christian principle, which has entered history 
with Him and depends historically upon Him, indeed the very sig- 
nificance of Jesus for the whole of Christianity, is no external 
and accidental relation but an inner and permanent one. Accid- 
ental and external it would be if this principle had stood merely 
in/
1. Dogmatik, II, pp.583-588.
2. " II, pp.588-591.
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in a doctrine newly "brought forth by Jesus, or if its coming into 
history had received merely its indirect impulse from the Person 
of Jesus.- But Jesus 1 s personal religious life is the first in- 
stance of a principle realizing itself in a world-historical 
personality, and this fact is the key which unlocks for mankind the 
efficacy of the principle. Jesus - as the historical revelation 
of the principle of redemption - is the historical Redeemer. 
Therefore, the Person of Jesus is for all time the wo rid -historically 
guaranteed proto-type (das welthistorisch gewahrleistende Vorbild) 
of the efficacy of the principle of redemption.
The knowledge which we have of Jesus's revelation of 
Himself must be expressed in the form of declarations about Him, 
but not about His life which is an historical accident, but with 
regard to the principle of divine Sonship (das Princip der G-ottes- 
kindschaft) revealed in Him. Only when ecclesiastical Christology 
is brought into accord with the Christian principle which is re- 
vealed in Jesus - but which is not to be confused with Jesus Him- 
self - will it be correctly formulated. Hot the historical per- 
sonality as such, but the principle revealed in the personality is 
the main thing. J'or it is evident, Biedermann held, that there 
is truth in the orthodox phraseology. For example, the emphasis 
of the old Christologies on the divinity of Christ is a crude ex- 
pression of the truth that the absoluteness of the spirit revealed 
in the self-consciousness of divine Sonship is the revelation of 
the/
1. Dogmatik, II, pp.592-593.
-153-
the essence of Absolute Spirit. And the desire of the Church to 
emphasize the true manhood of Christ is an expression of the truth 
that the absolute religious self-consciousness of divine Sonship 
is nothing other than the true and full working out of the human 
essence. Thus the Chalcedon insistence on the insepara"bleness 
and unmixed unity of both natures in one man is the expression of 
the truth that in the absolute religious self-consciousness the 
absoluteness of Spirit and the finiteness of the individual are 
both quite distinguished and yet joined as one in the life-process 
of the self-consciousness.
Moreover, Biedermann granted that the Church doctrine of 
the ,<ork of Christ illustrates the efficacy of the Christian prin- 
ciple. J?'or example, the doctrine of the munus propheticum of 
Christ is an expression of the truth that in the absoluteness of 
the religious self-consciousness there is given the principle of 
all true religious knowledge for all future development, and indeed 
in such a way that the historical personality of Jesus in its de- 
finite historical setting is the exemplary illustration of this 
truth. The furtherance of the munus prophetieum through the Holy 
Spirit in the Apostles and in the Christian community is the ex- 
pression of the truth that the unfolding of religious knowledge 
from the Christian principle goes forth in no definitely historical 
form but in a continuous process of which only the principle itself
o
is the absolute standard. 
The/
1. Dogmatik, II, pp.595-595.
2. " II, p.597.
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The essence of the ecclesiastical doctrine of Christ's 
munus sacerdotale is the expression of the truth that the absolute- 
ness of Spirit, at the same time as it "becomes the religious self- 
consciousness of man, reveals itself as the power to remove the 
contradiction "between man and his final goal. The historical 
sacrificial death of Jesus was the occasion for the rise of this 
religious impulse.
1'he doctrine of Christ's munus regium is the expression 
of the truth that the absoluteness of Spirit, revealing itself 
within the human self-consciousness, is the effective principle of 
the continuous domination of nature, and therewith of the glori- 
fication of humanity to a Kingdom of G-od. Of this the Person of 
Christ is the individual guaranteeing example, and Christianity 
is the general realization of this glorification as it fulfils 
itself "by degrees in the Li story of the world.
On the one hand, J3iedermann concluded, if we centre every- 
thing in Jesus Christ as an historical person, there is lacking to 
this conception a very important thing - the very nerve of Chris- 
tianity - the union of the divine and the human, the principle of 
redemption. To leave this out of consideration results in empty 
and inexact phrases which have currency only in the old formulations 
of Church doctrine. On the other hand, if we regard Christianity 
as an Idea only, then we have a Christianity devoid of personality 
and/
1. Dogmatik, II, pp.597-598-
2. » II, p.598.
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and history,which is no more than the Old Testament legal religion, 
or we have a pantheistic view of the human spiritual process.
It is with this alternative proposition that Biedermann 
concluded his discussion of Christology in the -Uogmatik. The 
fact that it is an alternative is indicative of his thinking on 
the subject, for he did not escape the inconsistency of trying to 
separate and yet unite the Person of Christ and the principle of 
redemption. On the one hand, he said, the Person of Christ, and 
on the other, the principle of redemption - the two alternatives 
are distinct, tut, apart from each other, they lose their signi- 
ficance .
Strauss and Biedermann were "both Hegelians. They started 
from the same preliminary suppositions and their systems were con- 
sistently Hegelian throughout. But there is this great difference, 
Strauss became less and less interested in Christianity and more 
and more concerned with materialistic philosophy, while the reverse 
is true of Biedermann. V/e see Biedermann struggling away from 
the pantheistic implications of Hegelianism toward a theistic 
Christianity. Biedermann wrote no last will or testimony, no 
Bekenntnis, as did Strauss, in order to answer negatively the ques- 
tion, "Are we still Christians?" His chief concern was to con- 
struct a system of theology which would "be in accord with the faith 
of/
1. Dogmatik, II, pp.599-600.
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of the Christian believer.
There is a thread of development to be seen in -bieder- 
mann from his first publication to his last. i?'or example, in the 
Freie 'i'heologie he defined religion as "the spiritual relationship 
in which the finite subject stands in regard to another subject as 
to an Infinite which is called Divine." This early definition 
in the terminology of .E'euerbach was developed further in the essay 
on "The Position and problem of Philosophy in Theology" where he 
said, "Religion in its form and content, as in its "belief and creed, 
does not reach outside the circle of human "beings and therefore is 
comprehended by the self-conscious activity of the spirit. But 
religion claims for its content the character of supernaturalness 
for in it only can man raise himself from mere physical being to 
Spirit." 2 The first part of this definition might be from .b'euer- 
bach but not the second part which suggests a relationship to an 
unseen power, an elevation to something beyond and outside of man. 
In "The Unseen world of Primitive Peoples," Biedermann defined re- 
ligion as "chiefly a mutual relationship "between man and a some- 
thing beyond."3 In the first edition of the Dogmatik, "Religion 
is a relation of man to G-od." In the essay on "Apologetic," 
Biedermann wrote, "In the spiritual life of man there stands a 
relationship/
1. Die freie Theologie, p.30-
2. 1TST;ellung und Aufgabe der Philosophie in der Theologie, 11 p.3.
3. "Das Jenseits der Haturvollcer," p.24.
4. Dogmatic, 1869, p.23.
-157-
relationship between finiteness and Infiniteness." 1 Finally, in 
the second edition of the Dogmatik, "Religion is a personal eleva- 
tion of the human T I T to God." 2 Although all these definitions 
are unmistakably influenced "by Hegelianism, Biedermann was evidently 
groping his way from philosophical abstractions to Christian theism. 
In Christology we see the same movement away from specu- 
lation in the direction of faith. In the Preie Theologie Jesus 
Christ is a double entity, an historical man and a philosophical 
idea. There is nothing here to distinguish Biedermann from Strauss. 
In the essay on "The Position and Problem of Philosophy in Theo- 
logy" the distinction between Person and principle is modified by 
asserting that in Jesus the principle had its historical expression, 
and, therefore, He is regarded as the starting-point for an under- 
standing of the principle- In the first edition of the Dogmatik, 
in the essay on "Apologetic", in the essay on "Our Position in 
regard to Christ," and in the second edition of the Dogmatik, Bie- 
dermann emphasized the religious personality of Jesus as the ex- 
pression of the Christian principle. Thus, it can be seen, 
Biedermann began with the explicit distinction between Person and 
principle but concluded by trying to unite them into a living re- 
lationship. Although the principle is the important concern of 
Christianity for speculative theology, the Person of Christ is the 
concrete form which the principle assumes in the faith-conscious- 
ness of the Christian, and for that reason the principle is 
unintelligible/
1. "Welches sind die dringendsten Aufgaben der protestantischen 
Apologetik," p.265.
2. Dograatik. 1884, I, p.193.
-158-
unintelligi"ble and meaningless without the Person. To think of 
Christianity solely in terms of the Person of Christ is to neglect 
the principle of redemption, a vital nerve of Christianity; whereas 
to consider Christianity as a principle without a personal expres- 
sion is to land in Judaistic legalism or pantheism.
Biedermann's task was a difficult one. He wished to 
separate Person and principle and yet he wished to unite them. Such 
a program did not lend itself readily to speculative theology. 
Dr. H.R. Mackintosh has said of Medermann that he was like an 
acquaintance of Dr. Samuel Johnson who said, "Doctor, I too might 
have "been a philosopher but somehow cheerfulness was always "break- 
ing in!" Biedermann might have "been a philosopher, "but Christian- 
ity was always breaking in 1.
CHAPTER V
THE CHRISTQLQGICAL POSITION OF ERHST TROEI/TSCH,
Ernst Peter -vilhelm Troeltsch was "born on February 17th, 
1865 in a little village near Augsburg, Germany. In the Gymna- 
sium Troeltsoh received the customary classical education and 
early made up his mind to study theology. He entered the Univer- 
sity of Erlangen in 1885 and, in accordance with the custom 
prevalent among German students, he took part of his course also 
at Gottingen and at Berlin. The professors who interested him 
most were Prank, Ritschl, and Paul de Lagarde, and of these Ritschl 
had the most permanent effect upon his thought although he reacted 
against Ritschl 1 s position later in life. Paul de Lagarde was 
perhaps the "best liked of the three for it was to him that Troeltsch 
dedicated the second volume of his collected works.
In 1888 Troeltsch served for a short time as an assistant 
minister in a Lutheran church in Minich. The interest which his 
later writings indicate in Church affairs, practical, ecclesias- 
tical, and theoretical, would suggest that this early pastorate 
made a profound impression upon him and one that remained with him 
throughout/
1. A. von Harnaek, "Rede am Sarge Ernst T roe It sens," Berliner 
Tageblatt, 6 Feb., 1923, reprinted in Die Ghristliche Welt, 




Troeltsch 1 s academic career included four German uni- 
versities. In 1891 he was made a lecturer (Privatdozent) at 
GBttingen where he had "been a student a few years previously. In 
1892 he "became Professor Extraordinary at Bonn. The next year 
the University of Heidelberg invited him to accept a full pro- 
fessorship in systematic theology. Here he remained for twenty- 
one years lecturing and writing. Ivlost of his works were published 
during his Heidelberg professorship and it is ^uite natural that 
he is often referred to simply as "Troeltsch of Heidelberg." In 
1915 Troeltseh accepted a call to Berlin in the department of 
philosophy, a chair occupied not long "before "by Otto Pfleiderer. 
While at Berlin, Troeltsch lectured on the Philosophy of Religion, 
Ethics, Philosophy of Civilization, Introduction to Philosophy, 
History of Modern Philosophy, and Philosophy of History. On Feb.l, 
1923 while in the midst of his work Troeltsch died. 2
Baron von Hugel, an intimate friend of Troeltsch for 
twenty-two years, tells on more than one occasion how deep and real 
was Troeltsch 1 s personal religion. In a letter to von Hugel in- 
forming him of the birth of a son, Troeltsch said, "It is impossible 
to express how deep are the thanks I owe to G-od for this happiness. 
We/
1. Consider for example such essays as, "Gewissensfreiheit," and 
"Die llission in der modernen nelt," Bd. II, Gesammelte 
Schriften.
2. See the "Introduction" to Troeltsch 1 s Christian Thought by 
Baron von Hugel, p.xii f.; also Sleigh, The Sufficiency of
Christianity, pp.21 ff.
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We have indeed to take all things from His hand, even the heaviest, 
and can demand nothing, not even what may "be most essential to our 
life. But when, after trouble, the free gift of Uod reaches the 
soul and tarries within it, it is easier to resign oneself thus 
fully into His hands." 1 Troeltsch, however, had a way of hiding 
his personal feelings, and it is only occasionally that an ex- 
pression of his own faith strikes the printed page like a "bolt from 
the blue in its suddenness and unexpectedness. In the preface to 
Protestantism and Progress he said that he had not attempted to 
set forth his religious convictions but had reserved their ex- 
pression for another time. The occasion, however, never seemed
to present itself, and Troeltsch's works remain for the most part
o 
objective and sometimes even skeptical.
Those who knew Troeltsch as a teacher are emphatic in 
their praise of his method, vivacity, and originality. His breadth 
of scholarship and his v/ide outlook on life were so compelling 
that Kaftan could say that he represented an "epoch." Troeltseh 
gathered up all the loose threads of theological and philosophical 
thinking and wove them all together into his own eclectic and some- 
times, it would seem, desultory thinking. In reflecting several 
of the tendencies of his age he was necessarily many-sided and even 
at times inconsistent. One of his own students tells how in the 
course of a lecture Troeltsch would suddenly stop and point out 
his/
1. Quoted by Sleigh, The Sufficiency of Christianity, p.23.
2. Baron von Hugel, "Ernst Troeltsch," in The Times Literary 
Supplement, 29 Idarch, 1923; Troeltsch, Protestantism and 
Progress, p.x; von Hugel 1 s "Introduction" to Troeltsch 1 s 
Christian Thought.
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his own errors and then reversing his field, "begin all over again. 
It has sometimes "been said of Schleiermacher that he took both 
sides to every question, and the same might "be said of 1'roeltsch. 1 
But it was not only in Germany that Troeltseh was regarded with 
esteem and admiration. A mutual respect was reciprocated "between 
Troeltsch and theologians in both America and Britain. Returning 
from a visit to America in 1904 he wrote of his gracious reception 
and of his appreciative impressions. The fact that he was asked 
to deliver a series of lectures in England and Scotland shows the 
high place in which he was held in Britain, and there was a feeling 
of profound loss when his death prevented the personal delivery of 
the lectures. It is also worthy of mention that a protestant
French scholar wrote an appreciative little essay on Troeltsch
3 shortly before his death.
One reason for the warm affection in which Troeltsch 
was held by other lands than his own was his almost utter lack of 
the typical G-erman spirit of nationalism. This was not due to 
an indifferent ism to politics or a lack of patriotism, for Troeltsch 
had/
1. George Wunsch, "Zum G-edHchtnis an Ernst Troeltsch," in Die 
Christliche .felt, 22 i'eb. 1923; Theodor Kaftan, Ernst 
Troeltsch, eine kritische Zeitstudie, 1912, p.l; Albert 
Dieterich," Ernst Troeltsch," in Archiv fur Politik und 
G-eschichte, llarch, 1923.
2« gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p.70f; see also Josiah Royce, 
The Pro"5Te"m of Christianity, vol.1, p. 196 f.
3. Vermeil, La PEilosophie religieuse d T Ernst Troeltsch, 1921; 
it is interesting to note that Troeltsch had many friends 
among the Roman Catholics, e.g. von Hugel; Emil Spiess (Die 
Religionstheorie von Ernst Troeltsch, 1927); and Erich 
Przywara ("Ernst Troeltsch," in Stimmender Zeit, 1923, Heft 
105).
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had served both at Heidelberg and at Berlin on public boards. It 
was the Vfar and its aftermath that tempered I'roeltsch's nationalism 
but made him at the same time somewhat melancholy. The shock of 
the War was responsible for the untimely deaths of his mother and 
father, and a brother-in-law had been killed after two weeks ser- 
vice on the western front. With this loss in mind he wrote, "The 
man is to be accounted happy whom death has released from the mad- 
ness of this world." 1 Von Hugel tells us that 'i'roeltseh felt 
keenly the isolation of his country from the rest of the world and
remarked pathetically, "Man, thank G-od, possesses a second ^ather-
pland from which no one can cast him out."
Troeltsch possessed an encyclopaedic mind. Like many 
of his compatriots he was constantly writing and publishing books, 
pamphlets, lectures. It may be that he wrote too much, and the 
mere bulk of his books may account for the fact that 'i'roeltsch is 
seldom read in Germany to-day. He was equipped and ready to write 
on theology, philosophy, and history, or on any combination of the 
three. His thinking, however, seemed to drift away from theology 
toward philosophy and we find that nearly all his theological works 
were published before 1915, the year he went to Berlin to teach 
philosophy. But there is really no dividing line between theo- 
logical and philosophical interests in i'roeltsch for even when he 
was/
1. Quoted by Sleigh, The Sufficiency of Christianity, p.23.
2. "Introduction" to TroeltscF's Christian Thought, p.xvi; as
an example of Troeltsch 1 s international outlook cf. his essay 
"Die Mission in der modernen Welt, 11 G-esammelte Schriften. 
Bd. II, p.783 ff. where his contrast of English and German 
missionary activities is decidedly in favour of the former.
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was concerned with, theology his thinking led him to philosophy and 
history.
AS a philosopher Troeltsch exhibits the traits of 
eclecticism and inconsistency which characterize all his works. 
Reared in the Ritschlian mould he at once proclaimed the independ- 
ence of philosophy and religion, but though they are very separate 
fields of enquiry, he held, their goals are the same, and so when 
the philosopher speaks of the Absolute he means the same thing by 
it as the theologian means by G-od. Troeltsch did not take up a 
definite stand with any one philosopher or school. He was always 
the eclectic, gathering here and there, ready to turn from one to 
another. At first he seemed to be in line with Kant who offered, 
he felt, the only metaphysics on which the Christian faith might 
be based. But he was never a pure Kantian. Modifications of 
the Kantian epistemology in the philosophy of Lotze and Leibniz 
attracted him and he attempted to embrace what he needed from all 
three in order to establish the superiority of Christianity. 
Troeltsch vacillated in his philosophical tendencies from Ritschl
back to Hegel and Schleiermacher and then the neo-Kantians, Hickert
2 and ndndelband, commanded his attention.
Troeltsch 1 s abiding interest was history. In philoso- 
phy and theology and in the philosophy of religion it was the 
historical/
1. Der Historismus und seine Probleme, p.210; "Die belbstandig- 
keit der ReligionTfr in Die Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, 
1895.
2. Gresammelte Schriften, Bd. II, p.479; art. on "Kant" in
Hasting 1 s Encyclopaedia of Religion and JSthics; Gesammelte 
Schriften, Bd. IV, p.3 where he says he never had a system of
philosophy.
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Mstorieal approach and method for which he strove. von Harnack 
called 1'roeltsch the greatest philosopher of history in Germany 
since Hegel, and Troeltsch himself tells us that he studied theo- 
logy as a student simply "because, for one thing, it presented ex- 
citing historical problems. This absorbing interest in history 
soon led Troeltsch to dissatisfaction with Ritschlianism. Ritschl, 
he felt, was in error on two points: in excluding metaphysics from 
theology, and in creating a wide gulf between Christianity and the 
world. Troeltsch's historical bias swung him away from Ritschl
toward Schleiermaeher "by way of the historical methodology of Paul
P de Lagarde.^ The more Troeltsch reacted against Ritschl the more
he turned toward ochleiermacher, and it is not surprising, there- 
fore, to find that Troeltsch modelled his Q-laubenslehre to a cer-
2 tain extent after schleiermacher 1 s. Troeltseh and Schleiermaeher
were alike in this, that they both attempted to construct a system 
of theology from the Christian consciousness, but the subjectivism 
to which Schleiermaeher was prone, which 1'roeltsch regarded as the 
ultimate defect of his system, was modified in Troeltsch by his 
historical outlook.
Troeltsch finally found his place as the leading exponent 
of the so-called religi onsge schi chtli che S chule, or the Religio- 
Historical School. Actually this was not a school in the usual 
sense but was the name ascribed to a certain group of thinkers, 
including/
1. Yon Harnack, "Rede am barge Ernst Troeltschs," 22 Feb., 1923; 
Gesamiaelte Schriften, Bd. IV, p.3.
2. " " Bd. II, "Vorwort."
3. G-laubenslehre , p. 130.
-166-
including such names as Bousset and Gunkel, who were primarily 
interested in the relation of Christianity to the other religions 
and whose aim was to demonstrate the relative truth of all re- 
ligions as the incomplete expression of the absolute truth toward 
which all religions are striving. Ritschl had neglected this 
historical approach and his neglect was one of the reasons why 
Troeltsch "broke with him. In the new movement i'roeltsch felt 
that he had found a way of correcting Ritschl's short-comings. 
This way was the relative and historical approach to religion. 
i'hus, Christianity becomes one of the religions. To regard the 
Christian revelation as stopping with the death of Jesus of Nazar- 
eth was to Troeltsch the greatest heresy. What must "be discerned
in the Christian revelation is its unending progressiveness in
p which normative trends alone are revealed.
Baron von Hugel notes with evident disappointment that 
Troeltsch's tendency was ever more and more away from established 
Christianity toward a relativism which i'roeltsch himself admitted 
was "more radical" than anything he had previously held. "The 
change," says von Hugel, "has been mostly away from what . . .. .we 
had in common - from the reality, helpfulness, indeed necessity 
of at least some tradition; from recognition that various spiri- 
tual facts exist and are apprehensible by us, before our act and 
habit/
1. "Die Dogmatik der religionsgeschichtlichen sehule," Gasammelte 
Schriften, Bd. II, p.500.
2. G-esammelte schriften, Bd. II, the essay "Was heisst 'Wesen 
des Uhristenthums'?" p.386; V/.A. Brown, The Essence of 
Christianity, p.273.
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hatit of faith; and from the perception that the fruits v/hich 
follow and justify our act and haMt of faith are, in part, visible 
to others, not to ourselves alone." 1
We hear in Troeltseh a strange, and even pathetic, dis- 
cord arising from his natural piety and his theological relativism. 
"This faith in U-od and the ceaseless sense of the Spirit of Jesus," 
says von Hugel of Troeltsch, "evidently sprang from the very ear- 
liest impressions v/hich a Christian home and an unusually gifted
mother could not fail to produce in so reverent and hungry a soul
<p
as was his own." The last lectures which he wrote for his pro- 
posed trip to .Britain exhibit this dualism. Unlike Strauss who 
"broke completely with his early faith, and unlike Biedermann who 
tried in his later years to unite his speculative theology with 
his Christian experience, Troeltsch found no solution to the con- 
tradictions between his faith and his philosophy. His sudden 
death terminated his efforts toward a harmonious system with the 
result that his works give the impression of incompleteness.
Troeltsch 1 s genius lay in the field of historical in- 
vestigation. History was for him the starting-point and the final 
authority/
1. Von Hugel T s "Introduction" to Troeltsch 1 s Christian 1'hought, 
p.xv; see also T. Kaftan, Ernst Troeltsch, eine kritische 
Zeitstudie, 1912, p.55, who declares that Troeltsch was no 
theologian "but rather a philosopher and an historian.
2. Von Hugel in "Introduction" to Troeltsch's Christian Thought, 
p.xvii.
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aiithority in theological matters. The single work "by which he is 
"best known and which shows him at his "best is the Soziallehren 
where he develops his theory of history in treating of the develop- 
ment of the social teachings of the Christian Church from ftew 
Testament times down to the present day.
Troeltsch 1 s philosophy of history is contained in Per 
Historismus und seine Probleme, 1922, the third volume of his 
collected works, which he published a few months "before his death. 
In this work Troeltsch discussed the transition of history from 
science to philosophy. As a science history is comparable to 
other humanistic sciences such as anthropology, sociology, and 
ethnology. The science of history is concerned with the life and 
activities of man, "both as an individual and as a group, as they 
are represented in the past, the present, and, in so far as they 
are predictable, in the future. Such a science is, therefore, 
not exact or precise as are the physical sciences, "but it uncovers 
facts of another kind no less significant.
As soon as the science of history begins to ask questions
concerning the value and meaning of its data, it becomes the phil-
2 osophy of history. Questions of the worth and significance of
historical events, periods, movements, or personalities eventually 
lead to questions of metaphysics. History as science is a re- 
lative study dealing v/ith data of relative importance, but history 
as philosophy passes over the relativism of scientific history and 
seeks/
1. Der Historismus und seine Probleme, p.83 f.
2. ~»~ "" " " p. 77.
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seeks the absolute or absolutes which underlie and determine the 
course of human development.
I'roeltsch's interest in history was confined particularly 
to Christianity. It was only natural that his deep interest in 
Protestantism should be coupled with his absorbing passion for 
history. In the examination of Protestantism, therefore, the 
historical method was applied in order to determine the norms or 
absolute standards which remain unchanged and unaffected in -the 
historical development of Christianity. Troeltseh did not claim 
to be the first to employ the historical method in regard to Chris- 
tianity. Adolf Harnaek 1 s book on the Essence of Christianity had
o
already attempted the same thing. Troeltsch agreed with Harnaek 
that the historical method was the only adequate method of deter- 
mining the essence of Christianity, but he disagreed with Harnack's 
conclusion that the essence of Christianity lay in the message of
s s
Jesus. Alfred Loisy in his book L'Evangile et 1'Eglise, 1892 
attributed the essence of Christianity not to the U-ospel but to 
the Church. Troeltsch had even less use for Loisy's conclusion 
and branded it as Roman Catholic dogmatism. .Both theories were 
too simple, he said. Christianity is such a complex affair that 
a simple conclusion as to its essence is to be suspected. When 
one comes to consider Jesus, Paul, the Primitive Church, the Homan 
Catholic Church, the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Old and the ttew 
Protestantism/
1. Der Historismus und seine Probleme, pp.184,214-216,772.
2. Das V/esen des Christentums, 1900, Leipzig.
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Protestantism, and such movements as the Quakers, etc., one can 
see how varied and diverse are the manifestations of Christianity 
in history. The only satisfactory conclusion according to 
Troeltsch was that each epoch of Christianity is an entity in it- 
self and must be judged as such. The Soziallehren is an example 
of Troeltsch's conclusion for it attempts to discover the essence 
of Christianity in the various periods of Church history. 1
*
The full title of Troeltsch's famous historical socio- 
logical work is, Die ooziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und 
Gruppen. It was published in 1912. ^n English translation 
appeared in two volumes in 1931, twenty years after the original 
u-erman edition. This fact gives some indication of the importance 
of the book. In an introductory note to the English edition 
Charles G-ore says that the book "stands beyond question without 
a rival, whether in thoroughness or in comprehensiveness, as an 
exposition of Christian life and thought in relation to contempor- 
ary socia.1 facts, ideas, and problems from the beginning of Chris- 
tianity down to post-Reformation developments." Baron von Hugel, 
Troeltsch's intimate friend, calls the Soziallehren a "standard
o
work." Troeltsch defined his double task in the Foreword, "to 
make clear to myself both the ecclesiastical dogmatic tradition 
of Protestantism in its own historical sense, and the intellectual 
and practical situation of the present day in its true fundamental 
tendencies. Hence the double nature of my researches - the analy- 
sis of early Protestantism and the analysis of the modern world." 3 
The/
1. "Was heisst 'V/esen des Christentums 1 ?," Bd. II, Gesammelte 
Schriften, p.396.
2. Christian Thought, p.xii.
3. Soziallehren, "Foreword."
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I'he first chapter of the book deals with the early Church as it is 
related to the Gospel, Paul, and early Catholicism. The second 
chapter is on medieval Catholicism, and the third chapter, 538 
pages in German, is on Protestantism. In the conclusion Troeltsch 
declared that there are certain abiding values in Christianity 
which will serve as eternal standards for social questions, such 
convictions as personalistic theism, Divine Love, the necessity of 
human inequalities, and Charity. But Troeltsch 1 s conclusion was 
marked with the relativistic tenor of his philosophy of history, 
"Nowhere," he said, "does there exist an absolute Christian ethic, 
which only awaits discovery; all that we can do is to learn to 
control the world-situation in its successive phases just as the 
earlier Christian ethic did in its own way. There is no absolute 
ethical transformation of material nature or of human nature; all 
that does exist is a constant wrestling with the problems which 
they raise. Thus the Christian ethic of the present day and of 
the future will also only be an adjustment to the world-situation."1
We are not particularly concerned with Troeltsch 1 s his- 
torical method, however, or how he applied it to Christianity. »Ve 
must let the above suffice as an indication of the drift of his 
thought in so far as it influenced his theology. We must now 
have a look at his general theological position. This is given 
us/
1. Soziallehren, p.986; E.T. II, p.1013.
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us most concretely in the Glaubenslehre published posthumously in 
1925 from notes taken on his lectures at Heidelberg during the year 
1911-1912. Troeltsch himself said that he could never get himself 
to write a dogmatic and that if any one wished to toiow his theology 
he could turn to the numerous articles which he had contributed to 
Schiele's encyclopaedia, Pie Religion in Geschichte und itegenwart A
Troeltsch 1 s theology is based upon a double foundation, 
the historical elements in the Christian doctrines and the religious 
consciousness of contemporary Christianity. Revelation is, there- 
fore, a living reality. It is not static, it did not stop with 
the Mew Testament, it is active to-day. 2 Like Schleiermacher, 
I'roeltsch began with the religious consciousness of the Christian 
community and attempted to transcribe from it a Christian theology. 
But the subjectivism into which Schleiermacher slipped waa avoided 
by Troeltsch because of his historical interests. He felt, how- 
ever, that it was necessary to begin with the Christian conscious- 
ness because it is impossible to examine God in any direct way.^
The underlying continuity in Christianity, its kernel 
and essence, is the religious principle. "The expression prin- 
ciple 1 ," he said, "was first heard in modern scientific religious 
thinking/
1. Bd. IV, G-esammelte Schriften, p. 13; articles in Die Religion 
in Q-eschichte und G-egenwart; "Erlosung," "Eschatologie," 
^esetz," "Glaube" und G-eschichte," "Gnade, Gottes," "Offenbar- 
ung," "Predestination," "Prinzip, religiose," "Protestantism," 
etc.
2. Glaubenslehre, pp. 19-20; art. "Offenbarung" in Die Religion 
in G-eschichte' und G-egenwart.
3. Glaubenslehre. p.128.
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thinking "because it originated from modern psychology and the 
historical thought conditioned "by it. It is nothing other than 
the conception of the fundamental impulse that lies "behind individ- 
ual psychological phenomena and facts, or of the fundamental force 
produced "by them into a unified spiritual process recognizable "by 
intuition and divination." 1 The principle is the inherent ideal 
of Christianity. It is the formula for the motivating force of 
Christianity. It is the expression of the continuity of Chris- 
tianity which underlies all historical forms. ^he principle 
contains the essence of Christianity whose outward forms are diff- 
erent in different periods. One often speaks of a 'public spirit' 
or the 'spirit of an epoch or a movement' and this, Troeltsch said, 
is analogous to the Christian principle. Whether or not the word 
has been used, the Christian principle has been evident in many of 
the great theologies. Schleiermacher spoke of a Lebenszusammenhang 
Lipsius of a Urundverhaltnis, Hegel referred every religion to the 
underlying principle of the union of the finite with the Infinite, 
Biedermann demonstrated that the Christian principle illustrates 
the redeeming power of Christianity, Strauss saw the principle 
embodied in early biblical history.
The application of the Christian principle means the 
application of the historical-psychological method to religion in 
the place of the dogmatic method. But Troeltsch warned against 
a/
1. art. "Prinzip, religioses," in Die Religion in G-eschichte und 
Gegenwart.
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a common misunderstanding here. 'line principle is not the same 
thing as religion. The principle does not redeem and "bless, but 
the redeemed and "blessed past can be represented in the principle. 
An examination of Christianity, therefore, in the light of its 
abiding principle will reveal the outlines v/hich a modern dogmatic 
must assume.
The divisions of theology according to 1'roeltsch are in 
the main two: the exposition of the historical personalities of 
Christianity as to their religious and creative significance, and 
the exposition of present day religious and metaphysical beliefs, 
i.e. the Christian ideas of God, the world, man, redemption, and 
the life to come. -1-
The first section of dogmatic has to do with the Old 
Testament, the Person of Christ, and the subsequent history of the 
Church. The most important part of this section concerns the 
Person of Christ. The Old Testament derives its chief signific- 
ance from the fact that it prepared the way to Christ, "but the Old 
Testament itself reveals the religious principle in at least three 
ways. -first, the Old Testament gives certain definite pictures 
of G-od's revelation, independent of Jesus 1 s revelation, chiefly 
along the lines of monotheism. Second, the Old Testament reveals 
the fact that God's will is ethically determined. Third, the Old 




made a lasting contribution to religious thinking. 1
The Person of Jesus is the distinguishing mark of Chris- 
tianity. He can only be understood in connection with the Old 
Testament which preceded Him and the subsequent history of the 
Church which followed Him. He is not comparable to the founders 
of other religions simply because He is not only the founder but 
the centre and mediator of redemption. 2 The Person of Christ is 
to be distinguished from the principle of Christianity as did 
Strauss and Biedermann, but the Person and the principle are nec- 
essarily closely related. without the historical Person, the 
principle would lose its effectiveness. He is not the object of 
faith, but He is the centre and symbol of the Christian'community. 
He is the uplifting and vitalizing personality which the Christian 
places at the centre of his worship but who is not the object of 
that worship. He is, however, not absolute, He is the incarnation 
of the Christian idea of God and only in so far as He reveals God's 
loving forgiveness He can be called the Redeemer and Mediator. 3
The history of the Christian Church is divided by 
1'roeltsch into various periods: the Christianity of the Greek 
Catholic Church, the Roman Catholic Church, Old Protestantism, New 
Protestantism, and various mystical sects. In this succession 
there emerge great religious personalities like Paul, Augustine, 
and/
1. Glaubenslehre, pp.97-100.
2. art. "Glaube und Ueschichte," sec.5, in -Die Religion in 
Geschichte und G-egenwart.
3. Glaubenslehre, pp.100 ff.; the section on the Person of 
Christ in the G-laubenslehre is, in the main, a repetition 
of I'roeltsch's lecture, Die Bedeutung der ueschichtlichkeit 
Jesu fur den ulauben, which we v/ill consider in more detail
later.
-176-
and Luther who owe their power said influence to the Person of Jesus 
and who help to explain and interpret Him. 1
The second section of the Glaubenslehre deals chiefly 
with the Christian ideas of God, the world, man, and redemption. 
We come to know God, according to Troeltsch, through the subjective 
consciousness of God's revelation in us. Thus the consciousness 
of the Christian community is the index whereby we interpret God. 2 
The conclusion to which we must come when we consider our conscious- 
ness of God's revelation in us is that the Christian conception of 
God is an ethical theism supremely illustrated in the idea of holi-
rr
ness. It was God's holiness that Jesus talked about and it is 
a holiness which makes demands upon us. 4 There is nothing utili- 
tarian about the Christian idea of holiness, we do not endeavour to 
be like God because it brings happiness. We must answer God's 
demand whether it brings happiness or not. 5 In the same way, God 
as love has no reference to eudemonism. God's love is a form of 
love unknown to human relationships. 6 God's character is to be 
interpreted through His love. Creation itself is the greatest 
expression of Uod's love, for by creating men and bringing them to 
Himself He shows His great love for us. 7 This, however, does not 
mean that God must bring every man into fellowship with Him. i/e 
must/
1. Glaubenslehre, pp.118-121.
2. " pp.131 ff.
3. " p.184.
4. art. "Gericht Gottes," in Die Religion in Geschichte und 
	Gegenwart.
5. Glaubenslehre, pp.205-212; arts. "Gesetz" and "Theodizee 11 .
6. " pp.212-215.
7.  ' p.221; art. "Gnade."
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must say with Calvin, Troeltsch held, that Hod is not obliged to 
save every one.
As to the Christian idea of the world, the first point 
to notice is that the world is an expression of uod's creative 
activity. now the world came into existence is a question for 
science and not for theology. 2 The answer which the Christian 
gives to the ciuestion, "Has the world any meaning?", is given in 
terms of the world-governance and providence of u-od. It is an 
answer of faith not science, for to the Christian the meaning of 
the world lies in his fellowship with God. 3
The Christian idea of man makes him part of the world 
and as such he is u-od's creature. Man is separated from U-od "but 
is destined to come into fellowship with Him. Man's soul has an 
infinite worth, its likeness to Uod (Gottesebenbildlichkeit). 4 
There is in man the conflict "between his lower and higher selves. 
The "biblical account of man's original state and his fall from 
urace is a poetic illustration of this interaction of selves which 
historically has no significance "but which is eternally true in 
principle. The same principle is at work in the Pauline opposi- 
tion between the flesh and the spirit, and in the Platonic specu- 
lation on psyche f nous, and pneuma. The higher self, or the 







ultimately culminates in fellov/ship with God. But this fellowship 
is never completed in this life. It is never fully realized. 
This state is reserved for the life to come. In the meantime we 
push on endeavouring to overcome the "barriers that separate us from 
God. These "barriers are the two-fold sins which separate us from 
God. Original sin is the inherent weakness, frailty, and limita- 
tion of human nature. The doctrine of original sin means little 
to the modern mind as a doctrine but the idea is still significant. 
Actual sin is the conscious opposition of man. toward God. Guilt 
is just the realization that we are separated from God by sin, 
either original or actual, and guilt produces repentance. 2
The struggle of man toward the Kingdom of God as his 
ideal and the opposition of sin as the "barrier to God create the 
scene of Christian history. The Old Testament is a record of 
this struggle and of the final overthrow of the opposition "by the 
advent of a Ivfessianic Kingdom. In the teaching of Jesus the com- 
ing of the Kingdom of God is the overthrow of sin. The Catholic 
Church pointed to the dominance of the Church as the overthrow of 
sin's opposition. Protestantism did not stress the Church as did 
Catholicism, "but it retained many of the symbolic ideas of the 
triumph of the Kingdom of God. These are historic expressions of 
the philosophy of history which looks to the ultimate triumph of 
the/
1. Glaubenslehre, pp.285-300. 
2t -n pp. 300-317.
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the Kingdom of God to be realized in the life to come. 1
The Christian doctrine of redemption "brings the Chris- 
tian ideas of G-od, the world, and man into a religious relation- 
ship. No doctrine in the history of the Christian Church has 
been treated so variously as redemption and yet no matter how it 
has been conceived it has always been present in some form. The
underlying idea of redemption, G-od as loving and forgiving G-race ,
o 
is the highest and tenderest revelation known to man. This notion
of redemption distinguishes Christianity from the other religions 
of the world all of which, except for Mohammedanism and legalistic 
Judaism, are religions of redemption. In the Old Testament re- 
demption is defined in terms of the restoration of Israel and the 
Messianic Kingdom. Jesus taught that redemption was personal 
surrender to G-od and membership in the Kingdom of G-od both tempor- 
ally and eschatologically. Paul found redemption's meaning in the 
Death of Christ, but full redemption was to be achieved in the life 
to come. The Catholic Church followed Paul but declared that the 
merit of Christ's Death lay within the keeping of the Church and 
in the sacraments. Protestantism reacted against this ecelesias- 
ticism and reverted to the Pauline doctrine until the Enlightenment 
when the whole idea of redemption became repugnant to the Rational- 
istic temper. Schleiermacher tried to restore redemption to its 
Pauline interpretation but this endeavour landed Protestantism in 
subjectivity.
Troeltsch/
1. Glaubenslehre_, pp.317-325; art. "Eschatologie," in Die 
Religion in Ge schichte und Gegenwart.
2. art. "Gnade Gottes," sec. 2, in Die Religion in Geschichte 
und Ge^enwart.
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Troeltsch believed that redemption needed to be re- 
explained for the modern mind. The Death of Christ could not any 
longer be regarded as a vicarious sacrifice by modern thinking 
people. Such an interpretation of the .Death of Christ is in 
direct opposition to modern ethics and to the modern conception of 
the historical Jesus. Any doctrine which legalizes the conception 
of G-od, making Him demand satisfaction, is untenable to-day and 
needs re-thinking. 1
According to Troeltsch redemption from man's standpoint 
is the perfection and sanctification of his personality brought 
about by his submission to God and his acceptance of God's forgiv- 
ing Grace. Prom the standpoint of God, from whom redemption is 
initiated, it is the reciprocal action of His creative Will en- 
riched by the redeemed wills of those who have accepted His forgive- 
ness. If God is loving and holy, then redemption is logically 
a necessity in the natural order of things. God, therefore, is 
the Redeemer since it is His Grace that reaches out to man offering 
him forgiveness and fellowship. In so far as Jesus reveals God 
as forgiving Grace and redeeming love, He is the Mediator of re- 
demption. As the vehicle by which redemption is brought to us and 
as the symbol whereby it becomes intelligible to us, Jesus may be 
called the Redeemer. But although redemption is mediated through 
Jesus, by means of His revelation of God as forgiving Grace, it 
must be remembered that ultimately God is the Redeemer and that 




is constrained to have faith in uod which faith results in persis- 
tent ethical struggling -coward fellowship with God. Final re- 
demption, however, is not attained on earth but only in the life 
to come. Troeltsch admitted that this view led to a sort of
pantheistic union with
Redemption was for Troeltseh a process within the human 
soul effected "by G-od, a process from sin to fellowship with G-od. 
From the weaknesses and limitations of human nature, man is raised 
up out of his lower self and given membership in the Kingdom of 
God. Redemption, thus, is not concerned with a special act or 
an event in history such as the life or death of Jesus. Redemption 
is a present experience "being realized in men's souls to-day even 
as yesterday. The Person of Christ plays a part in redemption 
commensurate with His revelation of God as forgiving Grace. ̂
In an article entitled, "Does the Historical Study of 
Religions Yield a Dogmatic Theology?," Professor H.R. Mackintosh 
places under review the method of the religionsgeschichtliche 
Sehule as typified in Troeltsch to see if it can produce a thorough- 
going theology. In the light of Troeltsch 1 s dogmatic position, 
whi ch/
1. art. "Erl8sung," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
2. art. "Eschatologie;" Glaubenslehre;, pp.362-363.
3. art. "Glaube und Geschichte," and ''Gesetz 1' in Die Religion
in Geschichte und Gegenwart; and Gesammelte Schriften7~Bd.II t 
pp.639 ff., 666.
4. The American Journal of Theology, Oct.1909, pp.505 ff.
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which we have just considered in its summary form, this article 
may well serve as a sort of conclusion. Taking the three laws 
of the historical method, the law of criticism, the law of analogy, 
and the law of relativity, as given in one of I'roeltsch's writings?- 
Professor Mackintosh discusses the dogmatic consequences of 
Troeltsch's position and arrives at a negative answer to the title 
of his article.
In regard to the law of criticism it is held that history 
cannot give absolute information about past events. The law of 
probability precludes any attempt at absolute judgment. Such 
Gospel facts as the birth of Jesus and His final resurrection 
cannot be validated by historical science. All that can be said 
is that there is a probability that Jesus was born of a virgin in 
the manner stated and that He rose from the grave according to the 
Gospel account. ±*ut there is also the corollary possibility that 
He was not born of a virgin and that He did not rise from the 
grave. Professor Mackintosh readily admits that history as a 
science is governed by the law of criticism, but, he says, the 
Christian Gospel does not exist "in the pure vacuum of historical 
science." Although it has its roots deep in the soil of history, 
its branches are spread out into the free air of eternity. Chris- 
tianity is not a dead religion, it is alive in the hearts and souls 
of men to-day Just as it was in New Testament times. If Troeltsch's 
law of criticism is to rule out the data of history, then how is 
a/
1. "Ueber historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie," 
Bd. II, Gesammelte Schriften, pp.729 ff.
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a dogmatic possible?
The law of relativity attempts to level down all his- 
torical phenomena to the same plane. It is the historical series, 
the stream of events, the plane of development, that is the import- 
ant thing in history. This law, accordingly, will deprive the 
Person of Christ of His uniqueness and make of Him one of the sons 
of God. Perhaps He is a religious hero, a genius of His own kind, 
"but to make Him supreme or different from the rest of us is a blunt 
infraction of the law of relativity. It follows, therefore, Pro- 
fessor Mackintosh indicates, that any dogmatic "based upon the 
Redeemer is rendered impossible.
The lav/ of analogy enables the v/orker in comparative 
religions to assume that the human mind has "been developing along 
the same lines everywhere and at every period of time. This law 
and the law of relativity go hand in hand. Particular facts and 
external expressions of various religions are ultimately over- 
shadowed by universal principles. These principles have nothing 
to do with history, they are timeless symbols of thought. When 
Christianity is examined in the light of this law, it is found 
that those elements which had previously seemed to distinguish 
Christianity from the other religions are really borrowed elements 
dressed up in different forms. But such a theory, says Professor 
Mackintosh, degrades the Apostolic mind to an incredibly low level. 
A reading of the New Testament does not automatically suggest that 
its writers were plagiarists. On the contrary the New Testament 
invariably awes its readers by its life-giving power and its assiir- 
ance of and conviction in the facts which it relates and most surely
believes/
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believes. If, therefore, the historical method has no use for 
Christianity as a distinct faith, how can it produce a dogmatic?
Professor Mackintosh's conclusion is simply that no 
dogmatic is possible where these three laws are in force. "With 
all their "brilliant service to the cause of "biblical exegesis," 
he says of Troeltsch and his school, "they are useless for the 
purposes of Christian theology." The pre-conceived framework 
against which Troeltsch would place Christianity does not permit 
him to go "beyond the prolegomena to a Christian dogmatic. In the 
following sections on Troeltsch we will see these laws working 
themselves out, especially the law of relativity in connection with 
the Person of Christ and the absolute validity of Christianity.
I'roeltsch 1 s position in regard to the relation between 
the Person of Christ and the principle of redemption is set forth 
in a little lecture, Die Bedeutung der U-eschichtlichkeit Jesu fur 
den G-lauben, delivered before the Swiss Christian Student Confer- 
ence in Aaran in 1911. This lecture gives us, as the title states, 
Troeltsch 1 s view of the significance of the historical Jesus for 
faith, end, compact though it is, it is the most comprehensive 
statement which Troeltsch ever made on the subject of Christology. 
Accordingly, it is of great importance for our subject.
Troeltsch was primarily interested in the historical 
Jesus but not in a critical way. That is, he was not interested 
in examining the Gospel records of the life of Jesus, his interest 
lay/
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lay in the significance or the normative worth of the historical 
person. Speculations as to whether or not Jesus ever lived did 
not appeal to Troeltsch in the least. 1 To say that Jesus never 
existed is a pure monstrosity (eine Ungeheuerlichkeit) and to deny- 
that His teaching is knowable is surely an exaggeration (eine starte
P 
Uebertreibung). The question that concerns modern theology is
not so much about the historical Jesus "but whether or not in the 
light of Uew Testament criticism Jesus can still "be the norm for 
the Christian life.
Although Troeltsch refused to have commerce with any 
view of the historical Jesus which tended to regard the G-ospel as 
myth, and although he held firmly to the main outline of Jesus's 
life and teaching, he nevertheless found it necessary to separate 
the historical Jesus from the principle of redemption. Redemption, 
he said, is not procured for all time "by Christ, He is not unique 
in that way, redemption is from God, it is God who redeems each 
person in his own appointed time. And for this reason the Atone- 
ment is not valid for us td-day. 3 Later on Troeltsch denied that 
he separated Person and principle and tried to make a case for 
their mutual relationship, but here he was definite in his asser- 
tion that redemption is not mediated through a God-man or a Church 
but through the practical loiowledge of the inner will of God (Erlo- 
sung durch die practische .fcJrkenntnis des wahren innersten Willen- 
wesens Gottes). God therefore is the redeemer and redemption is 
the/
1. 4Pie Bedeutung der ueschichtlichiceit Jesu fur den Glauben, p.2
2 . -B- n -IT- n —rr--Tr--n-——n—— p<4
3 tt tl tt f! II IJ tt IT _. f• p.o.
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the knowledge v/hich we have of His if ill. This Troeltsch main- 
tained is his position, and it is, he "believed, the position of 
the modern educated Christian.
To eliminate the historical Jesus from the mediation of 
redemption, Troeltsch realized, was a view that would not find 
favour with those v/ho hold to the supernatural character of Jesus 
(die Ue"bermensehlichkeit Christi), nor with those v/ho find in 
Christianity a deliverance of mankind from the "bonds of sin through 
the suffering and death of a reconciling Christ whose life and 
death are decreed "by u-od. Such a view has meaning only for those 
who rely upon historical criticism as the means of validating evan- 
gelical history and for those v/ho define Christianity as that re- 
ligion of redemption which mediates redemption through the ever
f) 
new personal knowledge of God.
However, Troeltsch did not wish to "be misunderstood when 
he separated Person from principle, for ultimately the historical 
Jesus does play a part in redemption even if only indirectly. TO 
speak of Christianity or the principle of Christianity, 1'roeltsch 
declared, is meaningless unless we connect these words and phrases 
with the historical Person of Christ. At the centre of Christ- 
ianity there stands an historical person, this is the primary pre- 
mise of any discussion on Christianity. Religion must have an 
historical person at its centre otherwise it becomes a mere meta- 
physic. The Christian cult or community could never exist without 
an/
1. Greschichtlichkeit Jesu, p.7
2. ff " pp.17-18.
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an historical corner-stone or rallying-point. Consequently the 
cult and community, as the expressions of the Christian life, 
demand an historical Jesus. We could not imagine a Christian 
community founded or continued on mere doctrines, Troeltsch pointed 
out. The illustration in Jesus Christ of what Christianity pur- 
ports to be is the central focus of the cult. 1'he historical 
Jesus, therefore, is the symbol of Christianity around which the 
Christian community finds its gravity. Jesus as symbol (als des 
Hauptes und Sammelpunktes der G-emeinde) is not, therefore, unreal 
or mythical, His roots are embedded deep in the soil of history 
and as such He is the historical Jesus. 1
It is around this word "symbol" that 1'roeltsch centred 
his discussion of the historical Jesus. The mythical Jesus who 
emerges from a mythical criticism of the Hew Testament is, perhaps, 
logical in many ways and can be easily understood, but 1'roeltsch 
firmly denied that such a person could be the centre (das Centrum) 
of belief. The Christian believer is not attracted by a mythical 
figure of quasi-historical foundations, he demands a Jesus who 
lived a life on earth and died a death on a cross and from whose 
life and death there still issues forth a stream of living power. 
In the historical Jesus this power is seen at its height. He is 
the symbol of what Christianity can mean to the believer, but He 
is not an unreal or metaphysical symbol, He is a real symbol be- 
cause He is historical. If Christianity were no more than a 
principle/
1. Ueschichtlichkeit Jesu, p.30 f.
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principle or an idea then the believer would find it difficult if 
not impossible to derive any vitalizing power, whereas the histori- 
cal Jesus is the source of personal authority which the believer 
can tap and from which he can derive power. 1'he spirit of Jesus 
can have no meaning unless there was a real Jesus.^
Although the historical Jesus is the symbol of the Chris- 
tian community, Troeltsch did not give iLim a unique place in his- 
tory. It is difficult to divide time into B.C. and A.D., he held, 
for the modern educated mind finds it necessary to think in geo- 
logical terms and not in religious terms. Jesus as symbol is 
important but Jesus as Person is not so important. As a person 
He is but a link in the chain of human destiny as are we all. As 
an individual Jesus does not stand out as unique in the history of 
the world. His significance and value are closely related to His 
forerunners and to the thought patterns which preceded Him. But 
not only is Jesus to be understood in the light of Greek philosophy 
and the Old Testament, He is also a part of the development which 
took place subsequent to His death, i.e. in Paul, Luther, Schleier- 
inacher, etc. The whole history of the Christian religion begin- 
ning with the Old Testament and coining up to the present day is 
the frame against which Jesus must be placed if He is to be seen 
as He was and is. It is not unusual to hear theologians say that 
Jesus can best be studied by beginning with Old Testament thought, 
but it is quite a different thing to say, as did Troeltsch, that 
the whole line of development including even Luther and Schleier- 
macher/
1. Greschichtlichkeit Jesu, pp.32-33.
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macher is necessary in order to -understand Jesus. This notion of 
Troeltsch's that Jesus must "be regarded as a link in a chain is an 
indication of the relative significance which he assigned to the 
historical Jesus. Troeltsch was emphatic that Jesus is not the 
unique fact for belief.
The idea that Jesus is a link in a chain of prophetic 
revelation is a logical consequence of Troeltsch 1 s definition of 
redemption as knowledge of the Will of God. The significance of 
Jesus does not lie in the realm of redemption "but in the life of 
the Christian community. Jesus is significant "because He is the
support, centre, and symbol (Halt, Zentrum, und Symbol) of the re-
P 
ligious life. But Troeltsch warned against making this normative
significance of Jesus a doctrine in itself, it is more than doctrine, 
more than moral law. Jesus is the type (das Bild) of a living, 
cultural, elevated, and strengthening personality whose personal 
aims we must imitate and whose practical teaching is worthy of 
present application. There is nothing in this personality which 
should "be isolated into doctrine, just as the Person must not be 
isolated from the chain of prophetic development.^
Troeltsch 1 s interest in the psychological and sociologi- 
cal approach to religion lay behind his insistence on the importance 
of Jesus for the Christian community. Jesus is not unique as a 
Redeemer/
1. Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, pp.38-39; "Jesus wird ihr nicht die 
einzige fur unsern Glauben bedeutsame geschichtliche Tatsache 
sein."
2. G-eschichtlichkeit Jesu, p.42.
3. ——————ii n p .43.
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Redeemer "but as a rally ing-point for the community. As an example 
of the importance of Jesus for the Christian community Troeltsch 
pointed, to Schleiermacher and indicated how in the Reden which 
does not deal with the Christian community or cult Schleiermacher 
has little to say about the Person of Jesus, but in the G-laubens- 
lehre. which is based on considerations of community and cult, the 
Person of Christ stands at the centre. 1 Christianity was for 
Troeltsch essentially a social religion. Considerations of cult 
are of utmost importance and for this reason the Person of Christ 
as the centre of the religious life is also of utmost importance.
In a final paragraph or two Troeltsch dealt with the 
problem as to whether or not Christianity is the final religion, 
a religion for all time. Such a discussion is of course more or 
less meaningless, Troeltsch admitted. All that can be said is 
that it seems unlikely that a new religion will be developed during 
our present state of culture, but then of course no one can tell 
how long our present state of culture will endure. We can neither 
affirm nor deny the permanent value of Christianity or of Christ.^ 
For all we .know, the future may bring forth another religion at
rr
whose centre there will be some one other than Christ.
The phrase T G-od in Christ 1 can only mean for us that we 
worship in Jesus the highest available revelation of God, and that 
we make Him the rallying-point of our Christian life. The ultimate 
significance/
1. Geschichtlichkeit Jesu, p.45.2.        "       B~ p.49
3. » " p.50.
4. « " p.50.
-191-
significance of Jesus lies in His revelation of God.; this is His 
greatest work and because of it He is made the centre of Christian 
life. His Person need not "be dogmatized, Mcean and Chalcedonian 
creeds can be dispensed with. We must not confuse Jesus with God 
or the symbol of the religious life with redemption. God is the 
only Redeemer and, if Jesus has anything to do with redemption at 
all, it is only indirectly and commensurate, not with His Person, 
but with the revelation of God which He "brought to mankind. 1
Troeltsch's favourite phrase "cult and community" is the 
distinguishing mark of this lecture on the significance of the his- 
torical Jesus. The cult and the community are for Troeltseh the 
essentials of religion. Dogma and idea are of secondary import- 
ance, the cult and community are everything for they exhibit the 
living relationship which exists "between man and God. 2 Thus the 
Person of Christ is significant in so far as He makes possible a 
more vital communion with God. Jesus is the revealer of God, but 
as such He is also the centre of the Christian life for it is in 
Him that the community acknowledges His revelation.
Unlike the Hitschlians, from whom he derived his theo- 
logical impetus, Troeltsch was not willing to make Jesus the sole 
norm of Christianity. The historical law of relativity must come 
into play at this point and by means of it Jesus's place in the 
prophetic/
1. Ge s chi chfl. ichkeit Jesu, p.51.
2. " """ p.25.
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proplietic development is directly linked with those who preceded 
and those who succeeded Him. This prophetic development is an 
unbroken chain and Jesus is "but one of the connecting links. We 
may wish to glorify the Person of Christ with heroic adjectives 
"but He must remain from first to last a link and nothing more. 
Jesus cannot "be the sole norm for Christian faith just "because He 
is subject to His own times and the milieu in which He lived. It 
follows too from Troeltsch's premises that although we know the 
general outline of Jesus's life and teaching we do not know every- 
thing about Him. Such questions as His messianic self-conscious- 
ness will never "be fully answered due to our meagre knowledge of 
His own thoughts upon the subject. We cannot be true to the facts 
and maintain that Jesus is the sole standard of Christianity. V/e 
must remember that Jesus was conditioned by the thoughts and feel- 
ings of His own time and it is ridiculous to suppose that He can 
be an absolute norm for all times. On such questions as demonology, 
divorce, the immediacy of the Kingdom, and the Second Coming, Jesus 
showed Himself to be fallible and many of His pronouncements on 
these subjects are to be taken with moderate sobriety. In fact, 
Jesus was definitely impractical when He came to deal with socio- 
logical questions simply because His thinking was always on the 
religious plane.
V/e have only to read the lew Testament, i'roeltsch held, 
to discover that Jesus did not make Himself the absolute norm of 
faith/
1. Of. the Chapter on the U-ospel in the Soziallehren.
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faith, in fact it is quite clear, he said, that Jesus T s every 
teaching pointed to the Kingdom of God. This is the real absolute, 
not the Person of Christ. It was natural and logical for the 
early Christian community to transfer the absolute from the Kingdom 
of God to the Person of Christ, "but it was never Jesus T s wish that 
it "be so.
Although it is necessary to see Jesus in connection with 
His historical setting and to show Him His place among the prophets, 
Troeltsch admitted that He is nevertheless the centre and symbol of 
the ideals and aspirations of the Christian community and if this 
does not make Him the sole norm of faith, He is at least the supreme 
norm. In another connection, Troeltsch wrote, "Any sincere re- 
ligious life that goes beyond the limits of a primitive form of 
worship needs some sort of symbol, incarnation, or personal embodi- 
ment of the realization of its ideal.....from communion with which 
religious power pours out to it. fundamentally the same thing is 
true of the significance of Jesus for Christianity. He is the 
incarnation of religious power, illuminated always anew by the cen- 
turies, and whose heart-beat pulsates through the whole of Christen- 
dom just as the vibration of a steamship's engine can be felt through
o
every part of the entire ship."
Jesus is not unique as a Redeemer, but He is the 'Centrum1 
of/
1. Cf. Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte, 
pp.lOO-lOSl also the chapter on the G-ospel in the Soziallehren.
2. "Die Zukunftsm8glicnkeiten des Christentums," Bd. II, £esammelte_ 
Schriften, p.847.
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of the Christian community. Around the idea of cult and community 
Jesus T s significance must rest. It is impossible, Troeltsch held, 
to imagine communion with the Risen Lord, "but it is not impossible 
to find in Him the criterion of the community's life. 1
Troeltsch 1 s final word on Christology is contained in 
the first of a series of three lectures which, he was scheduled to 
deliver in Ureat Britain. His death prevented him from delivering 
these lectures "but as they had already "been written in manuscript 
form they were published posthumously in 1923 under the title 
Christian Thought, Its History and Application. Only the first 
lecture, "The Place of Christianity among the World-Religions," 
interests us here. The other two, one on "Ethics and the Philos- 
ophy of History" and the other on "Politics, Patriotism, and Re- 
ligion," have no bearing on our subject.
It is perhaps not quite correct to say that the lecture 
on "The Place of Christianity among the World-Religions" contains 
Troeltsch 1 s final word on Christology for the lecture, as the title 
indicates, is primarily a study of the finality of Christianity 
and only indirectly a statement of Christology. It must be re- 
membered that when Troeltsch wrote the lecture on the u-eschicht- 
lichkeit Jesu he was at the time a theological professor in Heidel- 
berg/
1. Geschichtlichkeit «Jesu, p.30; cf. also H.R. Mackintosh, The 
Person of Christ, pp.364-36§ and Wolfe's article in the 
American Journal of Theology, 1916, in defence of Troeltsch 
on the question of communion with the Risen Lordr and in 
opposition to Professor ivlackintosh 1 s position.
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berg, and that when he wrote this present lecture, some twelve years 
later, he was in the philosophy faculty at .Berlin. If, therefore, 
Christianity is treated from a philosophical standpoint rather than 
a theological one, we know the reason. We say that this lecture 
is Troeltsch's final pronouncement on Christology not so much be- 
cause of what he says in the lecture but of what he neglects to say. 
Troeltsch 1 s views on Christology must be inferred from what he says 
about the absoluteness of Christianity. This may appear like 
taking an unfair advantage , like relying upon the argument from 
silence, but we hope that such is not the case. 1'his lecture is 
Troeltsch 1 s last word on Christianity, and, if it does not give his 
full views, it at least indicates the trend of his thought.
iiaron von Hugel, who edited these final lectures of 
Troeltsch in their J£iglish form, points out in an introduction that 
since his Heidelberg professorship Troeltseh changed very radically 
in his theological thinking. In a word, this change was from 
theology to philosophy. In this connection we think of Strauss 
who became toward the end of his life a thorough-going materialist 
abandonning all his earlier theological interests. But Troeltsch, 
unlike Strauss, managed to retain a personal religious faith, 
while Strauss became more and more the iconoclast, Troeltsch en- 
deavoured to remain constructive.
The first part of the lecture on "The Place of Christian- 
ity among the World-Religions" is a restatement of Troeltsch 1 s
earlier book, The Absolute Validity of Christianity. 1 Troeltsch 
stated/
1. Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte, 
1st ed. 1901, "2nd. "ed. 1912".
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stated that a reconsideration of the theme of this early book, 
which was the expression of a new philosophy of history for him, 
would form the major portion of his lecture. "To put it briefly," 
he said, "the central meaning of this book consists in a deep and 
vivid realisation of the clash between historical reflection and 
the determination of standards of truth and value." 1 This "clash" 
became a real challenge for 1'roeltsch at an early age partly be- 
cause of his education along humanistic and historical lines and 
partly because he was eager to formulate for himself a satisfactory 
religious position. The "clash", however, became more marked and 
Troeltsch was disturbed to find a conflict between history and re- 
velation. ''It was largely out of this conflict, which was no
hypothetical one, but a fact of my own practical experience, that
o 
my entire theoretical standpoint took its rise." The study of
history presents a disjointed picture of flux and relativity, while 
religion offers, or should offer, finality and certainty. Trceltseh's
earlier book was an examination of the means whereby theology is
3 able to defend itself against these difficulties.
In the first book Troeltsch set forth the two fundamental 
concepts of theology which were held by most theologians to be 
sufficient means for guaranteeing the certainty and finality of 
Christianity. The first of these is the theory that Christian 
truth is substantiated by miracle. Troeltsch hastened to make 
clear/
1. Christian Thought, p.4.
2. « " p.6.
3. " " p.9.
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clear what he meant "by miracle. In this connection the word, has 
nothing to do with the so-called "nature-miracles" which "break or 
transcend natural law, "but i± refers to the miracle of conversion 
through the Christianity community and through communion with. 
Jesus. "The Christian life may indeed be compared to an island 
in the midst of the stream of history, exposed to all the storms 
of secular life, and lured "by all its wiles, yet constituting, in 
reality, a stronghold of experience of quite another order." In 
other words Christianity has often been validated on the strength 
of the redemptive experience of men.
The second concept of theology which has been used to 
guarantee Christianity's validity is that view taken by Hegel which 
makes Christianity the very expression of religion. "Christianity, 
it is maintained, is not a particular religion, it is religion." 2 
Christianity is the very essence of the spiritual life of man 
offering, as no other religion can, a spiritual path to salvation. 
'.Therefore, the v/hole history of religion is the best proof of the 
validity and finality of Christianity, it is not in opposition to 
Christianity, it is its proof.
Both these concepts, the one based on conversion and the 
other on Hegelianism, Troeltsch refused to accept as positive 
proofs for the final validity of Christianity. The concept of 
conversion or of miracle, he said, is really not miracle at all 
and/
1. Christian Thought, p.9.2.    "       «   p.11.
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and it loses its worth when we begin to examine similar conversions 
among the non-Christian religions. As to the second concept, 
Troeltsch claimed that he had come to learn that the history of 
religion knows nothing of the common underlying essence of all the 
religions or of their merging or verging toward Christianity as 
the final and perfect expression of religion. "Christianity," he 
wrote, "is itself a theoretical abstraction. It presents no his- 
torical uniformity, but displays a different character in every 
age, and is, besides, split up into many different denominations, 
hence it can in no wise be represented as the finally attained 
unity and explanation of all that has gone before, such as re- 
ligious speculation seeks. It is rather a particular, independ- 
ent, historical principle, containing, similarly to the other 
principles, very diverse possibilities and tendencies." i'roeltseh 
denied that all religions contain a common character or that they 
tend toward a common goal. He held that the distinguishing feat- 
ure about religion is its Individuality. Religion is different 
at different times, in different places, and with different peoples, 
i'he principle of Individuality is more evident in the history of 
religions than the principle of conformity. "Thus the universal 
law of history consists precisely in this, that the Divine Heason, 
or the .Divine Life, within history, constantly manifests itself in 
always-new and always-peculiar individual! sat ions - and hence that 
its tendency is not towards unity or universality at all, but 
rather/
1. Christian Thought, p.13.
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rather towards the fulfilment of the highest potentialities of 
each separate department of life. It is this law which, beyond 
all else, makes it quite impossible to characterise Christianity 
as the reconciliation and goal of all the forces of history, or 
indeed to regard it as anything else than an historical individual- 
ity." 1
Having dispensed with these two usual proofs for the 
validity of Christianity, Troeltsch set about in the constructive 
part of his earlier book to find a means of guaranteeing the val- 
idity of Christianity. This he found in the international char- 
acter and spiritual outlook of Christianity. A study of the 
religions of the world, a study in which 1'roeltsch was intensely 
interested, reveals the narrow and provincial scope of all the 
religions except Christianity. In Christianity "all limitation 
to a particular race or nation is excluded on principle, and this 
exclusion illustrates the purely human character of its religious 
ideal, which appeals only to the simplest, the most general, the 
most personal and spiritual needs of mankind. Moreover it does 
not depend in any way upon human reflection or a laborious process 
of reasoning, but upon an overwhelming manifestation of God in the 
persons and lives of the great prophets. Thus it was not a theory 
but a life - not a social order but a power." 2 Christianity's 
claim to absoluteness, then, depends upon its conception of God. 
"It possesses the highest claim to universality of all the religions, 
for/
1. Christian Thought, p.
2. " " p.19.
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for this its claim is based upon the deepest foundations, the 
nature of God and of man." 1 In a word, Troeltsch laid the proof 
of Christianity's validity upon its lofty conception of God which 
was not static or confined as it is in the other religions of the 
world and which therefore develops and expands with the centuries 
meeting all the needs of mankind. "It is the highest and most 
spiritual revelation we know at all. It has the highest validity. 
Let that suffice." 2
Troeltsch confessed in his last lecture that in some ways 
he had gone "beyond the conclusion reached in the earlier work. 
Practically he still held to his former position as to the validity 
of Christianity, "but theoretically he modified his position. We 
are not surprised to find Troeltsch modifying his earlier views 
when we remember that in the meantime his Soziallehren and Per His- 
torismus und .seine Probleme had appeared, both of which exhibit 
Troeltsch 1 s thesis that Christianity as well as the history of 
social, ethical, aesthetic, and scientific ideas are best inter- 
preted according to their individualizations during different 
periods, in different ways, and by different people. "The concept 
of Individuality," Troeltsch admitted,"impresses me more forcibly 
every day." S For this reason he found it difficult to reconcile 
his former view of an absolutely valid and supreme Christianity 
with the concept of Individuality.
Troeltsch/
1. Christian Thought, p.20.
2. " " p.21.
3. " " p.21.
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Troeltsch wished to modify his earlier assertion that 
Christianity is the loftiest religion because in the meantime he 
had become more and more interested in the general history of re- 
ligions and this study had convinced him of the relative signifi- 
cance of all religion and the importance of the concept of 
Individuality. "A study of the non-Christian religions," he said, 
"convinced me more and more that their naive claims to absolute 
validity are also genuinely such."-1- Troeltsch, therefore, arrived 
at the conclusion that Christianity in its present form is a pro- 
duct of tiestern civilization just as the other religions are the 
religious expressions of their civilizations. Just as V/estern 
civilization has imparted to and taken from Christianity so that 
we to-day, whether we are professing Christians or not, are sur- 
rounded on all sides of our every day lives by Christian influences, 
it follows that Christianity depends upon our continued civiliza- 
tion for its existence. Herein lies its validity. By means of 
Christianity we are what we are, and, therefore, if we would con- 
tinue to be as we now are, Christianity must be for us the only 
valid and absolute religion. "We cannot live without a religion, 
yet the only religion that we can endure is Christianity, for
Christianity has grown up with us and has become a part of our
p very being."
Troeltsch, it must be remembered, was himself a deeply 
religious/
1. Christian Thought, p.22
2. " " p.25
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religious man and he was not content to leave matters at such a low 
level, although theoretically that is where he was landed. Christ- 
ianity, he said, could not "be so influential nor could it be re- 
garded as absolute unless it did contain at least the accent of 
ultimate truth. The experience of Christians is the only proof 
which can "be offered that this is so, and, while this may not con- 
vince others, it is the ultimate guarantee of Christianity for 
those who believe. Troeltsch here reverted to the "miracle- 
apologetic" which he decried in his earlier book, "but here he 
hastened to condition the Christian experience as a proof not of 
the validity of Christianity but merely as the individual's feeling 
or assurance that Christianity is valid. The redemptive experi- 
ence cannot be made a universal proof simply because the devotees 
of other religions may have the same experience expressed in diff- 
erent ways. Just as the Christian feels that his experience is 
ultimate and absolute, so too may the Buddhist or Mohammedan feel.
Troeltsch 1 s conclusion, that Christianity is absolute 
for Christians, has a practical bearing upon the question of 
foreign Missions. We have mentioned before that 1'roeltsch was 
keenly interested in foreign Missions, but in this last lecture 
we discover a considerable lessening of his zeal as a result of 
the application of his position in regard to the finality of 
Christianity. "Here we have to maintain," he said, "in accord- 
ance with all our conclusions hitherto, that directly religious 
missionary/
1. Christian Thought, p.26.
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missionary enterprise must stand in quite a different relation to 
the great philosophical world-religions from that which it stands 
to the crude heathenism of smaller tribes." 1 Missions henceforth 
should concern themselves with the latter, the lower religions, 
and endeavour to cultivate Christianity in proportion as Western 
civilization is adopted. In dealing with the higher, more philo- 
sophical religions, Christianity can hope for little more than 
"spiritual wrestling." It is to the primitive peoples that 
Troeltseh would confine missionary activity. Here lies the Chris- 
tian missionary duty. But it is no simple matter that faces evan- 
gelists because the other world-religions are in varying degrees 
missionary-minded and they are out to do what Christianity proposes 
to do among the heathen. This contact and competition is, however, 
a good thing, according to Troeltseh, for although Christianity 
cannot hope to absorb the great world-religions, a measure of
mutual agreement and understanding will arise which will doubtless
2 benefit all participants.
The course v/hich Christianity will take in the future is 
unpredictable. If Christianity is characterized by its individ- 
ualizations, then it is impossible to say what the future will 
bring. «/e are emerging upon a new era, Troeltseh maintained, and 
Christianity must keep abreast of the times or it is lost. AS it 
develops and modifies itself in accordance with our changing civil- 
ization it is ever new and its finality is unknown. 3 If, Troeltseh 
said/
1. Christian Thought, p.28.
2. " " p.30.
3. " " p.31.
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said, such a conclusion seems skeptical, he can only say that for 
himself as a Christian he believes that the religions of the world 
are "tending in the same direction, and that all seem impelled by 
an inner force to strive upward towards some unknown final height, 
where alone the ultimate unity and the final objective validity 
can lie." Although this cannot be proven and although there is 
no theoretical ground for such a hope, it was nevertheless Troeltsdi's 
conviction that it was so. It is on this personal note of experi- 
ence that Troeltsch concluded his last lecture on Christianity.
Baron von Hugel, who knew Troeltsch and his writings as 
well as any one, tells us that he regretted to see Troeltsch moving 
farther and farther away from evangelical Christianity. This final 
lecture on "The Place of Christianity among the World-Religions" 
represents Troeltsch at his furthest departure from orthodoxy. 
There is, I think, a note of personal dissatisfaction in Troeltsch's 
own words and the mere repetition of the plea for his listeners not 
to think him skeptical would seem to imply that he himself was con- 
scious of the possibility of such a charge being made. Other 
liberal thinkers have glorified in their skepticism. Strauss flung 
his materialistic challenge at the feet of Christianity with sneer- 
ing defiance. But there is reason to suppose that Troeltsch did 
not take heart in the conclusions of his mind. He did not close 
his/
1. Christian Thought, p.32.
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his lecture with a fan-fare of trumpets heralding the dawn of a 
new Christianity. There is no cutting-edge to his final words, 
no challenge, no warning. V/e gather that his hand is weary and 
that his theory has conquered his heart. On the one hand, we see 
a i'roeltsch who theorized himself into relativism, and on the other 
hand, we hear him whispering his personal faith in the Absolute. 1 
In none other of his writings did Troeltsch exhibit his 
two-sided character as in this lecture. After he reviewed his 
former position in which he abandonned the proof of personal ex- 
perience as a guarantee of Christianity's validity, he nevertheless 
chose this very means as the only final proof. We cannot doubt 
that Troeltsch was a religious man, both his writings and his 
friends attest that fact, but his faith was locked up within him, 
a thing apart from his theories, and he never seemed to be able to 
express in words the faith he experienced. Unlike Strauss, who 
relinquished his faith for his philosophy, and unlike Biedermann, 
whose faith finally threatened his philosophy, i'roeltsch remained 
inconsistent to the end, his faith triumphant on the personal side, 
his/
On the two-fold character of Troeltsch cf. von Hugel's saying, 
"The religious i'roeltsch continually propels and warms us 
religiously, but the philosophical Troeltsch often, at the same 
time, draws us back and chills us philosophically," Essays and 
Addresses, 1st. series, p.187; also Paul Mezger in Die Absol- 
utheit des Christendoms und die Religionsgeschichte. p.34 who 
says the same thing, "Der christliche Theologe Troeltsch lasst 
sich allzusehr imponieren von dem Religionsphilosoph Troeltsch." 
For expressions of Troeltsch 1 s personal faith see Die Absol- 
utheit de_s Christ entums und die Religionsgeschichte, pp.103 ff.; 
"Zur Frage des religiosen Apriori," G-esammelte Schriften, 
Bd.. II, p.768; "Die Zukunftsmogliehkeiten des Christentums," 
G-esammelte schriften, Bd. II, p.847.
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his philosophy on the rational side.
Troeltsch 1 s ultimate stand is that Christianity is re- 
lative. This is the answer which he gave to the title of the 
lecture, "The Place of Christianity among the world-Religions." 
Christianity's place is a relative one. This conclusion is a 
natural one resulting from the religio-historical method. In Pie 
Absolutheit des Christentums Troeltseh pointed out that by "absolu- 
theit" is usually meant the "best" and that to speak of Christian- 
ity as the absolute religion means that Christianity contains the 
best revelation of U-od. That Christianity does possess this 
"best" was the thesis of that book. In his last lecture, however, 
he hastened to modify his former position by reminding himself that 
"best" does not mean the "only" revelation. Other world-religions 
contain revelations which seem to approach, if not equal, the 
Christian revelation. Accordingly, when we speak of the absolute 
validity of Christianity it must be remembered that we speak only 
for ourselves. If we, as Christians, are convinced that Christ- 
ianity is absolute, then it is all very well for us. but it must 
be realized that the Hindu and Buddhist have a right to feel the 
same way about their religions.
There is no final proof of Christianity's claim to absol- 
uteness except for the individual. «'e cannot help but feel that 
Troeltsch could have said much more than he did about personal 
experience if he had not been tied to his historical method. In 
his little book on Protestantism and Progress, 1 Troeltsch gave the 
clue/
1. English Translation in 1912.
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clue to his method in the words, "this inquiry is only concerned 
to show the causal connexion between Protestantism and the modern 
world."1 So, too, the Soziallehren is a majestic compendium of 
facts and theories relating Christianity with the social order, 
but as an expression of the Christian faith it is practically 
worthless. This is the necessary result of the historical method. 
It is interested in comparisons and evaluations but it is afraid 
to appeal to the Christian experience. There can be no absolute- 
ness, no finality, no uniqueness about a Christianity that is merely 
one of the world-religions.
The interesting thing about I'roeltsch 1 s last lecture for 
our subject is the utter disregard of the Person of Christ. No 
where in this lecture does He appear. Even the teaching and ex- 
ample of Jesus are neglected. If Troeltsch had demonstrated the 
relative importance of the Person of Christ, we perhaps could 
understand what he was driving at, but it is almost incredible that 
no mention at all is made of Him. 2 It would be unfair and no doubt 
incorrect to infer that Jesus Christ plays no part in Christianity 
according to Troeltsch for we have his own testimony and that of 
his friends to disprove such a presumption. But it is true that 
in this historical study the Person of Christ has nothing to offer 
or contribute. What Christianity is without Jesus Christ may be 
of interest to the sociologist and historian, but for the Christian 
any/
1. Protestantism and Progress, p.204.
2. Only two quotations from Jesus are made in the whole book, 
pp.98 and 152, and these are not developed.
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any attempt to explain and interpret his faith without reference 
to the fountain-head and corner-stone of that faith is a mere foible.
I do not think we can excuse Troeltsch's complete lack 
of consideration for the Person of Christ on the grounds that he 
was dealing with a purely historical inquiry. Without Jesus Christ 
Christianity may be one of the religions, it may not be better or 
even equal to the other world-religions, but if He is taken serious- 
ly, as the Hew Testament reveals Him, then it is impossible to dis- 
regard the unique, absolute, and final claim which Christianity 
makes, and that claim is Jesus Christ. As far as Troeltsch goes, 
he is right, but he does not go far enough. He only covers the 
external surfaces of Christianity, he never comes to grips with its 
source and centre.
If Christianity is a religion of redemption and if this 
is religion's distinguishing feature, as 1'roeltsch believed it to 
be, then something ought to be said of Him who claimed to be the 
Redeemer of all men. To avoid Him or to neglect Him will not help 
to interpret Christianity. Professor H.R. Mackintosh, in an art- 
icle which we have already quoted, concludes his estimate of the 
religionsgeschichtliche Schule with the observation, "unless a theo- 
logian takes the specifically Christian attitude to Jesus - unless 
with the saints of every time he puts Jesus in the supreme place, 
a place that covers and determines everything in the relations of 
Uod and man - he is not a Christian theologian any more. That 
which he is building up is not Christianity, but something quite 
different." 1
1. "Does the Historical Study of Religions Yield a Dogmatic 
Theology," p.519.
CHAPTER VI
THE CHRISTQLQGY OF STRAUSS. BIEDERmOT, AJTD TRQELTSCH
COMPARED AND CONTRASTED.
The common characteristic in the Christologies of Strauss, 
Biedermann, and Troeltsch is the separation between the Person of 
Christ and the principle of redemption. It is because of this 
separation that their names have "been linked together in this thesis. 
We have followed in some detail the main streams and the lesser 
tributaries of their speculative positions and it is hoped that the 
foregoing exposition has revealed their singular affinity. TO keep 
this separation in the forefront has been the main objective of the 
last three chapters. We have not been concerned with critical 
appreciation so much as with exposition in order that this one point^ 
the separation of Person from principle, might stand out clearly 
and sharply. The "kernel" of their (Jhristologies, to use one of 
their favourite words, has been sufficiently isolated, it is hoped, 
so that it may be examined more closely. JJ'irst of all, we must 
state simply Just what this kernel is and where it came from. Then 
we must show how Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch working in 
their own ways produced different Christologies which nevertheless 
contained a common nucleus.
"The Metaphysical only, and not the Historical, can give 
us Blessedness." 1 This oft-quoted saying of if'ichte's may serve 
as/
1. JTiohte, The Way, towards the Messed Life, p.392.
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as an index to the underlying tie which bound Strauss, Biedermann, 
and Troeltsch together in their general outlook on Christianity. 
Eternal truths were the stuff whereon Christianity was made, accord- 
ing to them, and to seek out and develop these truths constituted 
the task of the Christian theologian. 'i'he truths of Christianity 
have permanent significance. Once discovered and "brought into the 
light of day they become eternal, unchangeable, freed of their his- 
torical associations and limitations. Truth is timeless and, 
therefore, non-historical. In Christianity truth has often been 
wrapped up in the ample folds of history but once the outer gar- 
ments are removed the naked truths stand forth in all their pris- 
tine purity. i'he historical externals of Christianity may at 
times help to accentuate its significance or they may assist in 
displaying what might otherwise be regarded as bare abstractions, 
but at no time is the historical covering essential to an apprecia- 
tion of the truths which it enfolds. Historical events and 
eternal truths are two very distinct categories and if they are 
placed together they must not be regarded as coalescing. They 
remain distinct, just as water and oil when mixed do not form a 
solution but an emulsion. Christianity is such an emulsion in so 
far as it contains eternal truths and historical events, and no 
amount of doctrinal or creedal stirring can combine the two.
Redemption, accordingly, as one of the truths of Christ- 
ianity, must be stripped of its historical setting if it is to have 
an eternal character. In the history of the Church redemption has 
always been associated with the Person of Christ. Creeds and 
councils have insisted that Jesus Christ is the Redeemer and that
redemption/
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redemption is mediated through His Person. This association was 
regarded "by Strauss, Biedermann, and 1'roeltsch as the Church's 
unpardonable sin, the unforgivable blunder, the unmitigated error. 
In making redemption depend upon the Person of Christ the Church 
confused time and eternity. It made it seem as if the principle 
of redemption were true and effective only in so far as it were 
concerned and bound up with the Person of Christ. Such a com- 
bination was unthinkable to Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. It 
would be equivalent to saying that we can know nothing of the teach- 
ings of Deutero-Isaiah or of the iipistle to the Hebrews because we 
do not taaow who wrote them. It would be like saying that the laws 
of physics and chemistry cease to operate when we forget their dis- 
coverers. TO undo the wrong committed by the Church ever since 
its inception and to set matters right once and for all in regard 
to the place of Jesus Christ in the Christian scheme of things was 
the task undertaken by such as Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. 
It was in the spirit of reformers, purifiers, restorers, 
that these three thinkers set about their task of correcting the 
Church on this important matter. If they were iconoclasts destroy- 
ing the cherished beliefs of the ages, they took heart in the 
conviction that they were tearing down unnecessary scaffolding in 
order to reveal the true temple underneath. Strauss in his later 
age became definitely anti-Christian but in his earlier stages he 
repeatedly took his stand against those who charged him v/ith atheism. 
Although Biedermann became more and more of a Christian, he was 
like Strauss charged with unbelief and nothing hurt him more. 
Troeltsch 1 s/
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Troeltsch's last lectures are punctuated with the plea for his 
hearers not to think him skeptical. All three were earnest and 
sincere in their ambition to wash away from the body of Christian 
truth the historical grime which had accumulated during the cen- 
turies. A note that is sounded again and again in the writings of 
these men is the need for a "modern" statement of the Christian 
truth. They were acutely conscious of the new vistas opened up 
by science and research. flew horizons were beckoning men's minds, 
and if theology were to keep abreast of the advances made in the 
sciences, it must be fashioned anew in accordance v/ith the contem- 
porary mode. It was, therefore, as theological harbingers of a 
new era that Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch began their work.
i'he common Christological position taken by Strauss, 
Biedermann, and Troeltsch came from a common inheritance. Some- 
thing has already been said of the tendencies and currents of 
thought which moulded and shaped the theological patterns of the 
nineteenth century. we spoke of the influence of philosophy and 
politics, how the philosophers and the political temper of the 
times provided the fountain-source for nineteenth century theology. 
Having surveyed the theological systems of Strauss, Biedermann, 
and Troeltsch and having extracted the Christological nucleus com- 
mon to all three, we are now in a position to see to better advan- 
tage wherein their theology owed its development to these contemporary
influence s.
*'irst of all, the philosophical movement of the late
eighteenth/
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries made a profound impression 
upon the thought of Strauss, Biedermann, and iroeltsch. The nine- 
teenth century is generally regarded "by itself because the figure 
of Immanuel Kant stands at the threshold of the century. Kant has 
teen regarded as the terminus a quo for any consideration of nine- 
teenth century thought. we need not here review the whole of 
Kant's philosophy "but it will not he amiss to recall certain of his 
conclusions which had their influence upon theology. In the 
Critique of Pure Reason Kant followed along in the waJce of the 
scientific emphasis laid down "by the Aufklarung, but in the matter 
of religion he denied that the ideas of U-od were rational ideas. 
The so-called rational proofs for the existence of trod were, througti 
his critical method, rendered untenable. In the Critique of 
Practical Reason Kant demonstrated his powers as a moral philoso- 
pher and showed how it is possible for man to believe in freedom, 
immortality, and G-od. In the Religion within the .Limits of Reason 
Alone Kant came closest to dogmatic theology and dwelt at length 
about the doctrine of sin which he called the "radical evil in man" 
showing how this was an obstacle to man's attainment of moral per- 
fection and happiness. The overcoming of this obstacle lay within 
the idea of a "humanity well-pleasing to u-od" which stands in the 
religious life as the ideal toward which man must strive. The 
moral struggle toward this "ideal of human perfection11 is redemptim. 
R.S. Pranks sums up the Kantian theology in an admirable paragraph 
as follows: "As regards the religious doctrine of Kant in general, 
it is clear that he has carried the separation of Christian doctrine 
from the historic Christ even further than Steinbart. He is thus 
the/
-214-
the father of all Modernism, which, distinguishing between the 
Christ of faith and the Jesus of history, finds the doctrines of 
the Church profoundly true as ideas, though untrue if understood 
literally as referring to the historical Jesus."
The similarity "between Kant and the writers we have "been 
considering is patent. To find Christian doctrines true as ideas 
was the paramount ambition of them all. Kant himself "by separat- 
ing Person and principle began the Christological ball rolling. 
His chief work, however, lay in the realm of critical philosophy 
and he had neither the time nor the inclination to examine further 
the theological principles which he isolated. He has been regarded 
as the philosopher of Protestantism. "Kant is the guard," says
Karl Heim,"on the frontier of the human mind, sternly restraining
2men within their proper limits." The inheritance which Kant be- 
queathed to theology became the capital fund from which writers 
like Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch drew unreservedly.
Fichte, the second of the great philosophical triumvirate, 
carried on the work of Kant but in the main his theological posi- 
tion was very much in line with that of his predecessor. Fichte 
was not concerned with the problem of the radical evil in man, he 
contended that the struggle for the ideal was the main thing in life. 
Fichte's/
!  A History of the Doctrine of the Jork of Christ, vol. II, 
p~.216;Franks uses 3teinbart~Td.l809) a"s a typical G-erman 
"Aufklarer" who incorporated the Deism of iSngland and began in 
Germany the criticism of the history of doctrine.
2. Spirit and Truth, p.153.
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Fichte's theology is shot through and through with morality. 
"Fichte thinks of himself," says Karl Heim, "as one who creates 
himself and looks on his own handiwork." 1 He had no more interest 
in the Person of Christ than Kant had. Jesus was the manifesta- 
tion of the divine, this was His importance for the Christian re- 
ligion, "but as an historical person He fades into insignificance. 
Fiehte's well-known dictum that only the metaphysical saves is the 
distinguishing characteristic of his position. If Jesus were to 
return to the earth to-day, Fichte said, He would be satisfied to 
learn that the ideas which He represented were still at the core of 
Christianity. Jesus Christ is not superior to Christianity, He is 
the exemplar of mankind and each one of us as we recognize our part 
in the divine programme "become with Him Sons of God. Fichte 1 s 
importance for nineteenth century theology lay in paving the way to 
Hegel who gathered up the threads of the Kantian and Fichtean theo- 
logy and wove them into a new pattern.
The fundamental principle "behind Hegelianism was the 
union of the Infinite and the finite, the coincidentia oppositorum. 
In Christology this principle came closer to orthodox Christianity 
than had the principles of either Kant or Fiehte. Hegel saw in 
the Person of Christ the union of the Divine and human and thus the 
supreme illustration of his philosophical principle. Jesus Christ 
as the God-man is the historical example of the union of Infinite 
and finite. In Jesus the transcendence of God is obliterated and 
divine and human mingle as one. Here again, however, as in Kant 
and/
1. Glaube und Denken, p.49; E.T. p.41.
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and Fiehte it is the idea which Jesus represents rather than Jesus 
Himself who is significant. Hegel's emphasis upon the Person of 
Christ as the union of the Infinite and finite was a decided step 
forward in Christology but ultimately the result was no greater 
than in Kant and Fichte, Jesus still remained apart from Christian- 
ity. Christian doctrines were transformed into Hegelian princajdes 
and this logically excluded the Person of Christ. Professor H.R. 
Mackintosh has given Hegel's Christology in a succint form, he 
says: "It would "be unfair to say that in this scheme Jesus is de- 
prived of all importance, for He is held to have "been the first to 
realise the great speculative principle for which the Christian 
religion stands. If not Himself the CJ-od-man, He first perceived 
that God and man are one. Thus far Hegel transcended the unhis- 
torical naivete of the eighteenth century. But it is clear that, 
apart from this casual chronological relationship, Christian doc- 
trine, in its revised and sublimated form, has no longer any par- 
ticular connection with the historic Christ. Christianity receives 
absolute rank, but at the cost of its tie with history. For only 
the world-process as a whole, and no single point or person in it, 
can be the true manifestation of the Absolute."
Kant, Fichte, and Hegel all stressed the importance of 
metaphysical ideas in distinction from their historical setting, 
but Hegel added the appendix that in history the ideas of Christ- 
ianity have been illustrated. In Christology Hegel's view was 
an advance over his predecessors in the direction of orthodoxy in
so far as he regarded the Person of Christ as a necessary medium 
for/
1. The Person of Jesus Christ, p.258.
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for the -understanding of the union of Infinite and finite. Strauss, 
Biedermann, and Troeltsch, like their philosophical forebearers, 
sought to emphasize the metaphysical ideas of Christianity apart 
from the historical Jesus. Strauss, like Kant, was willing to 
stake everything on the ideal of human perfection. Biedermann, 
like Fichte, toward the close of his life approached evangelical 
Christianity in attempting a closer relation between the Person of 
Christ and the principle of redemption. And Troeltseh, like Hegel, 
insisted upon the historical Jesus as the symbol of Christian truth. 
These parallels are not to "be pressed too far, "but they indicate 
the lines of development and the influences which the philosophers 
had upon the theologians. There is, at least, this parallel "between 
the philosophers and the theologians, "both separated the Person 
from the principle.
The distinction which the nineteenth century philosophers 
made "between Christianity as a system of ideas and its historical 
setting, a distinction which as we have seen Strauss, Biedermann, 
and Troeltsch adopted, is the distinction "between what Brunner calls 
"general revelation and special revelation," it is the distinction 
"between ethic and evangel, it is, in short, the distinction "between 
philosophy and theology. The attempt to erase this distinction 
proved to "be too great a task for Strauss and he threw in his lot 
finally/
1. R.S. Franks says of Kant and Hegel that they may "Be viewed
as having revived. ... .the G-nostie religion of redemption. Like 
the Gnostics, they have separated the Divine principle of re- 
demption from the historic Jesus, "but it is for them no trans- 
cendent Aeon Christus, "but an idea immanent in the human mind." 
A Hidtory of the_ Doctrine of the Work of Christ, II, p.224.
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finally with philosophy. Biedermann, too, was conscious of his 
failure and toward the end of his life tried to relinquish his hold 
upon philosophy in favour of theology. Troeltsch presents us with 
a strange inconsistency, of a system which grew more and more 
"radical," as he says, and of a man who retained to the end a devout 
personal faith. The philosophical movement begun in Kant impelled 
the theologians of the nineteenth century headlong into philoso- 
phical principles.
The great contribution which philosophy made to the theo- 
logy of this century was the break which it helped to make with the 
strict formalism and rigid ecclesiasticism of the preceding cen- 
turies. Where the Church had been dormant, listless, and apathetic, 
the impetus of philosophy came sweeping in like a tidal-wave. Con- 
tented theologians and self-complacent pastors were roused to life 
and pushed to the wall. The Church was challenged as it had not 
been- since the Reformation and if it was to persist with honour and 
dignity this challenge must be met. frith one accord, as though 
summoned by the "last trump," churchmen sprang to the pulpit and 
lecture-platform to acquit themselves and their faith. Philosophy 
had broken through the barriers of conventionalized thinking and a 
new land had been discovered. He who refused to join the marching 
crusade was soon trampled underfoot and left behind forgotten. 
Once again the Person of Christ became the focus of attention as 
He had not been since the fourth century. To plead His cause, to 
redefine His significance, to set Him before the world in His true 
garments, this became the absorbing passion of nineteenth century 
theologians, and Strauss, Biedermann, and 1'roeltsch were but three
of/
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of the many who had something new and startling to say. 1'his 
stimulus to theological thinking provided by the philosophical 
movement in Kant, Fichte, and Hegel cannot be too much exaggerated 
It was the motive power behind the century and its influence was, 
to use Lichtenberger 1 s word, "immense."
Prom this early nineteenth century tree of knowledge, 
which was digging its roots deeper and deeper into the bedrock of 
science and philosophy, there emerged several budding offshoots. 
Of these the philosophy of history current at the beginning of the 
century was the most robust and influential. The philosophical 
movement was but one phase of the Enlightenment. Along with it 
in parallel strides ran the course of the physical sciences. Sir 
Isaac ITewton in the early years of the eighteenth century had 
pointed a new direction for science with his law of gravitation. 
The discovery of the principle behind the falling apple suddenly 
transformed a chaos into a cosmos and scientists began to speak of 
a universe in the literal sense of the word. 'i'he Newtonian physics 
made men realize that the physical world was no longer a mere play- 
thing in the hands of an arbitrary Divine Will, but it was a realm 
of law and order in which chance and indeterminacy were meaningless 
terms. The principle governing the universe was the law of cause 
and effect. Like the hymn of Joseph Addison men began to sing 
about the "Spacious firmament on high" with its planets and con- 
stellations moving in perfect symmetry proclaiming "the hand that 
made us is divine." Some years later, in 1859, Charles Darwin 
incorporated/
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incorporated this rule of physical science into his biological 
theories and the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, 
as the title of his epoch-making "book reveals, regarded life in 
terms of physical and mechanical laws. In Scotland David Hume 
was working with Newtonian principles in the field of history. His 
Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding, 1748, set forth the 
thesis that the object of history was the discovery of the univer- 
sal principles of human nature which at all times and in all places 
were to be subjected to the law of cause and effect. Hume's Essay 
on Lj.racles, in which he denied the possibility of the suspension 
or transcendence of natural law became a standard argument against 
supernatural!sm. In Germany Lessing published his Education of 
the Human Race, 1780 with the thesis that as the individual pro- 
gresses and develops through successive stages from childhood, to 
youth, to manhood, so, too, the race as a whole is a progressive 
developing process. Henri Bergson 1 s idea of a "creative evolution" 
would have appealed to Lessing no doubt. In theology this idea 
had a pronounced effect upon the question of the validity of Christ- 
ianity and the general impression which Lessing circulated was that 
Christianity belonged to an inferior childhood past beyond which 
the modern world in its manhood had outlived. Speaking of the 
relation of history to ideas Lessing denied that "contingent his- 
torical truths" were proofs of necessary truths of reason. The 
important point to notice about this position is that Lessing re- 
garded historical events as "contingent," and in so defining his- 
tory he set the tune which the nineteenth century was quick to 
adopt/
-221-
adopt as its the me-song. A contemporary of Lessing, Salomo Semler, 
working in the virgin soil of Hew Testament criticism which was 
soon to be so thoroughly ploughed up, showed the trend of the times 
"by digging down into the roots of the creeds of the Church and 
showing how they are all the result of natural growth. Church 
history, he said, must "be taken at one sweep for it is a develop- 
ment from first to last. All these thinkers, Newton, Hume, Lessing, 
Semler, and their host of contemporaries, were postulating a philo- 
sophy of history which had profound influence upon the theology of 
the nineteenth century. But the single name which had more to do
with the idea of history as a development than all of these namesi
together was the philosopher Hegel.
The Hegeliaxi dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and syn- 
thesis was the logical expression of the physical law of cause and 
effect. The Darwinian phrases, natural selection, struggle for 
existence, survival of the fittest, were the "biological expressions 
of Hegelianism. For Hegel history was a moving stream which rushed 
tempestuously on "between banks of natural law. The Old Testament 
philosophy of history which looked up to a guiding Providence was 
either criticized as unscientific or completely ignored. History 
was no longer regarded as a perpendicular movement toward God or 
from God, but as a horizontal process in which God Himself was in- 
volved. If the Infinite and the finite are essentially one, then
history is a unity, a flowing stream, a continuous process. 
In/
1. The idea of development in the early nineteenth century seemed 
to imply also the idea of progress. History is advancing to- 
ward a blessed goal.
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In theology this philosophy of history had direct bearing 
upon such problems as revelation, the Person of Christ, and the 
finality of the Christian religion. Obviously, in a formula which 
excluded everything that did not conform to the process-principle, 
a divine revelation was out of the question except so far as Ciod 
and His manifestations were revealed in the natural order of things. 
In the same way, a Christ who claimed to be the turning point in 
history could not be taken seriously by a philosophy which brooked 
no miracles, no favourites, no accidents in the course of history. 
Moreover, the Christian religion, although it may be considered as 
containing the best truths of mankind and of God, is not necessarily 
the final religion because in a universe where change and develop- 
ment rule who would dare pronounce final judgments even on religious 
questions. Redemption, therefore, is a process within the natural 
order. Emil Brunner describes the attitude taken by G-erman idealism 
in regard to redemption thus: "The whole of the historical process 
is the history of redemption, of the growing Kingdom of G-od. Just 
as when some one wakes in the morning, between the first moment of 
waking and the state of being fully awake there is an infinite 
series of continuous stages of becoming awake, so the whole of his- 
tory is an awakening of humanity, within which Christ is the 'moment1 
when humanity is fully awake. This 'moment' is called redemption, 
the Kingdom of God. But within this process there is no real 
change, all flows on evenly and without interruption. The state 
of non-redemption merges naturally into that of being redeemed." 
The/
1. The Mediator, p.87.
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The philosophy of history which was a portion of the 
inheritance of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch had no interest 
in what Brunner called Einmaligkeit. The ideas of a "once-for-all" 
incarnation, redemption, and atonement were repugnant to the mas- 
culine view of history. Jesus may "be defined with all the terms 
of heroic admiration and with all the phrases of reverent devotion, 
"but to think of Him as a Mediator or Redeemer of a unique character 
accomplishing in His Person what is true only of the whole of human- 
ity, this was too much to ask of a modern educated man, "it is 
treating humanity as a minor and stripping it of all its rights; 
it is intolerable." Biedermann and 'I'roeltseh, and Strauss in his 
earlier periods, were quite willing to regard the teaching of Jesus 
as of the greatest importance, even as a revelation from U-od, "but 
Jesus Himself in their systems was not decisive and His teaching, 
worthy as it is, may justly "be regarded as a general truth toward 
which the whole history of the race is moving. To say that his- 
tory changed its direction with the coming of Christ was to oppose 
history, it was shutting one's eyes to the light of science. 
Jesus 1 s rightful place as xroeltsch repeatedly urged, is as a link 
in the chain of religious prophets. The chain stretches back to 
Plato and forward to Schleiermacher. Jesus is somewhere in the 
middle "but not central in the sense that He is unique or without 
parallel.
It is, accordingly, the task of Strauss, Biedermann, and 
Troeltsch to reinterpret and redefine Christian doctrines in the 
terms/
1. The Mediator, p.115.
-224-
terms of this philosophy of history. inhere are grains of truth 
in all the Christian doctrines but these mast be isolated from the 
rough husks of history. What the New Testament and the tradition 
of the Church has said of the incarnation of G-od in Jesus Christ 
and redemption by Him is metaphysically true apart from the Person. 
If redemption must be localized, then it must be in the race, the 
ideal of human perfection. Jesus was imperfect simply because He 
was a man and subject to His times just as we are, only the race 
is pure.
The great positive contribution of this philosophy of 
history was in the impulse which it gave to the historical examina- 
tion of New Testament records. 'i'he principles of development and 
growth were applied to the content and form of the individual books 
of the New Testament with the result that our knowledge of the New 
Testament has been greatly enriched. i'he constructive conclusions 
which the critics reached may have been few and meagre, but there 
can be no doubt that they opened doors hitherto closed to the world 
and revealed chambers laden with treasures of information. The 
problems of dating the books of the New Testament and showing the 
inner developments and "tendencies" which gave rise to the Christ- 
ian/
The mathematics of such a proposition did not bother these 
thinkers. i'hat the sum of unequals should yield an equal was 
thought reasonable enough. A story which has been told in 
a variety of forms illustrating this proposition is given by 
Professor H.R. l&ickintosh in one of his lectures. He tells 
of a woman who made scones to sell at twopence although they 
cost her twopence halfpenny to make. 'm/hen asked how she 
could make anything that way, she replied, "Only by selling 
a great number!"
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ian faith became one of the most absorbing and revealing enter- 
prises of the century. Of the three men we have examined it is 
especially to Strauss that much credit must go for the furthering 
of this criticism. His Leben Jesu was the lever which pried open 
the locked doors of tradition and legend allowing those who dared 
to penetrate the Holy of Holies in search of the historical Jesus.
It is not necessary to linger on the influence of this 
philosophy of history upon the systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and 
Troeltsch. They were three among the legion who regimented them- 
selves under its banner. Others fell behind and others pushed 
further ahead but they stuck doggedly to their principles command- 
ing the doctrines of the Church to surrender to a new regime. 
Strauss marched in the vanguard of Hew Testament criticism and if 
his alarums were too nervous and intimidating they nevertheless 
steeled men's minds to the oncoming attack and marshalled the scien- 
tific examination of the Scripture records through a rewarding 
campaign. Biedermann took up his place among the intelligence 
department. He was willing to let Strauss plunge on ahead while 
he devised means of rehabiliating the conquered territory. He was 
not content to leave it in its ruined condition as Strauss had de- 
livered it, he wished to reorganize it and put it to work again 
for the good of the cause. Thus it was that while Strauss had 
routed the enemies of myth and superstitution and brought the his- 
torical Jesus tied and bound before a critical tribunal, Bieder- 
mann, as one of the judges, was willing to plead His case and set 
Him at liberty provided He relinquished His hold upon His followers, 
Biedermann was a staunch defender of the principle which would
separate/
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separate the Person of Christ from what belonged rightfully to the 
whole of humanity.  yhen victory seemed to "be within their grasp 
and as the speculative movement swept on like the philosophy of 
history which it promulgated, Ritschl turned traitor and threatened 
the line of defences in various serious segments. Just as he was 
planning to reinstate the overthrown Person of Christ, the figure 
of Troeltsch could "be seen arriving with belated re-enforcements. 
With the principle of "Individuality" as his chief weapon, he 
slashed his way through the traditional bulwark of historical 
Christianity and succeeded in isolating each particular division. 
The line of tradition was severely broken and the Person of Christ 
lost His authority and Kingship. He was now deprived of His 
leadership and must co-operate with His assistants as best He could. 
Christianity's claim to finality was beginning to look ridiculous. 
Its leader had been separated from His forces.
Aside from the philosophical movement and the philosophy 
of history current during the opening years of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, both of which made their mark upon the theological positions 
of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, the general spirit of the 
age, its tone and temper, its meItanschauung, was influential in 
moulding theological thinking. A modern writer in contrasting 
the character of the iaddle Ages with that of the Enlightenment 
says: "The humility, the self-distrust, the dependence upon super- 
natural powers, the submission to external authority, the subor- 
dination of time to eternity and of fact to symbol, the conviction 
of/
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of the insignificance and meanness of the present life, the sombre 
sense of the sin of man and the evil of the world, the static 
interpretation of reality, the passive acceptance of existing con- 
ditions and the belief that amelioration can come only in another 
world beyond the grave, the dualism between u-od and man, heaven 
and earth, spirit and flesh, the ascetic renunciation of the world 
and its pleasures - all of which characterized the kiddie lges - 
were widely overcome, and men faced life with a new confidence in 
themselves, with, a new recognition of human power and achievement, 
with a new appreciation of present values, and with a new convic- 
tion of the onward progress of the race in past and future." What 
was it that contributed to this changed attitude toward life? What 
were the factors which broke down the old authorities and proclaimed 
a new freedom? We have already spoken of the philosophy and theory 
of history as they impinged upon theology but here we must deal wilh 
more general influences.
1'he political background of the nineteenth century fur- 
nishes some light upon the sudden shifting of emphases in theology. 
It is not necessary to dwell for any length upon the political 
situation of Germany at this period in order to understand the 
general currents of life. It is enough to keep in mind that the 
opening years of the century ushered in a cloud of gloom and dis- 
couragement which settled down over the whole of trermany. Napoleon 
was forging ahead in spite of every effort to stop him and it looked 
very/
1. A.C. McGiffert, The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas, 1915, p.11.
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very much like only a matter of time until Germany would be forced 
under an unwilling yoke. The self-complacency of the individual 
u-erman states in previous years was suddenly turned to self-abase- 
ment and humiliation. Heretofore the freedom of the fatherland 
had been taken for granted. How that it was seriously questioned, 
it was cherished and guarded with jealousy. J^very day saw new 
defenders of the Uerinan nation taking their stand not only in the 
army but in all the walks of life, literature, art, music, and re- 
ligion. The Napoleonic wars had stirred the conscience of the 
nation to a new height and a wave of race patriotism swept over the 
country dispelling the clouds of gloom and evoking the silver lin- 
ings of hope and freedom.
After the overthrow of the French, Germany began a slow 
but steady reform in government. Prussia was the first state to 
adopt revolutionary measures in the matter of education and one by 
one the other states followed the example. Constitutionalism 
became the conversation and creed of political circles. Democracy 
and freedom were beginning to show themselves. The idea of a 
divine right of kings, the principle of a theocratic state, was 
forgotten in the passion for sell'-expression. The new freedom 
in theology which broke with the traditions of the past and estab- 
lished new modes of thinking is closely parallelled in the history 
of German politics.
In the economic realm the century was characterized by 
a like revolution. Feudalism and landed property gave way to 
individualism and competition. Commerce sprang into new life. 
With the advancement of science and engineering a new assurance 
of/
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of power came to the German business man and merchant. Industrial 
centres grew up over night and a great migration from country to 
city took place.
The leadership of education which had formerly "been in 
the sole keeping of the Church passed into the hands of the State 
The village pastor who had divided his time between his church and 
the school was obliged to choose one or the other as education be- 
came more and more secularized. Ethics began to stand on its own 
feet without the support of religion. The categorical imperative 
of the Kantian philosophy was but the theoretical expression of the 
actual state of affairs. With the deepening sense of self- 
sufficiency the ideas of human depravity and sin were overshadowed 
and overlooked. A new philanthropy gripped the hearts of the 
people. The self-expression of the race became the rallying cry 
of the times.
In the literature of the early nineteenth century the 
voice of the people found expression. There is no better way to 
study the currents of thought in this period than to read the poems 
of Schiller and Goethe. These two artistic souls captivated the 
hearts and minds of Germany to an incredible extent. It has been 
said that Goethe has been honoured more than any other German. 
And their praise is still being sounded. One needs only to go to 
Weimar in the summer months and watch a countless procession of 
young and old paying tribute to their memory to realize the place 
they hold in the soul of the nation even to-day.
In Schiller and Goethe the Rationalism of the age lost 
all the narrow bitterness and hypocrisy with which it had been 
associated./
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associated. Not that they ever reached a very high plane of 
Christian thinking, for they remained Nationalists themselves to 
the end, but they disowned the scoffers and scorners of religion 
who ridiculed anything traditional without knowing why or without 
offering anything constructive as a substitute. Lichtenberger, 
who devotes an entire chapter of his great book on the History of 
German theology in the Nineteenth Century to the Classical Litera- 
ture, says of Schiller: "To the frivolous and materialistic tend- 
encies of his time he opposed the beauty and moral grandeur of 
virtue. fleeing from the lower levels and hewing out for itself 
a rough and solitary pathway through the rocks, the poetry of 
Schiller, without dreading the abysses which it skirts along, trans- 
ports us to the summits of things."
The power of the poetry of achiller and uoethe lay in 
the masculine virility of their philosophy. They were crusaders 
against all that tended to debase man. They reacted against any 
semblance of the doctrine of sin and human inability to rise above 
the tragedy of this world's life. Truly Pelagian in theology, 
they looked to the self-redemption of mankind through moral strugg- 
ling. Religion is but a stage in the long process from the super- 
stition of ecclesiastical dogmas to faith in the race. As Auguste 
Comte in France developed his theory that religion was a necessary 
step toward a higher religion, humanity, so too in the Classical 
Literature of the nineteenth century humanity became the author's 
God. Goethe's character .tf'aust is the typical example of the ideal
man. /
History of German Theology in the nineteenth Century, p.243
-231-
man. He has an insatiable thirst for knowledge, and his faith 
lies in the creations of man not of G-od.
To an age which was rapidly becoming self-conscious of 
its own power, the works of ^chiller and Goethe appealed more 
strongly than the doctrines of established orthodoxy, ^specially 
among the youth was their cause championed. Free to pick and 
choose the best from all available systems of thought, eclecticism 
became the literary creed of the day. Man must work out his own 
salvation. He must realize that he is the captain of his soul and 
the master of his destiny.
The chief influence of the Classical Literature upon 
theology was the blunt disavowal of sin and the staunch assertion 
that man is sufficient unto himself. This same influence was felt 
in the philosophical movement and in the current philosophy of his- 
tory. In the systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, and 
this applies to many others in the century, this Weltanschauung did 
much to discredit the Person of Christ. The idea of a Ilediator 
or a Redeemer became unnecessary. If a man believes he can save 
himself, he can have no need, or even respect, for one who claims 
to offer salvation in His Person. At most Jesus must be regarded 
as an ideal symbol toward which the race is moving. He cannot be 
given a central place in the modern world where super sti tut ion and 
formal authorities have been pushed aside to make room for freedom 
of conscience and belief. As in H.G. Well's Invisible King the 
world must create for itself a new G-od not arising out of creeds 
and dogmas but arising out of man. God must join forces with 
struggling humanity. Religion must relinquish its place to society.
Although/
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Although the theological result of the early nineteenth 
century >VeItanschauung was the separation of the Person of Christ 
from the principle of redemption, as we have seen in the systems of 
Strauss, iiiedermann, and i'roeltsch, it must lie said that in the 
realm of philanthropy this world-view had very definite and reward- 
ing consequences. An age that puts the accent on morality, on 
action rather than faith, is often concerned with righting the lot 
of the oppressed and in making life feearable for all of mankind. 
Aside from the general outeroppings of this activist philosophy in 
the form of hospitals, charity work, slum-clearances, and improved 
race relationships, this was the age of expanding missionary activ- 
ity. Within a period of ten years at the opening of the century 
missionary societies from Basle, Berlin, and Paris were pushing out 
into unknown lands to sunder the bonds of backward civilizations 
and to plant the seeds of modern western culture. Milton's 
Areopagitica written long before the nineteenth century had ex- 
pressed the thought, "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered 
virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and 
seeks her adversary," and this became the practical philosophy of 
Germany. To sally out and meet adversaries of all kinds became 
the creed and doctrine of the land.
«e have tried to show to some extent how the common posi- 
tion of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch in separating the Person 
of Christ from the principle of redemption was the theological ex- 
pression of three factors, the trend of philosophy, the theory of
history,/
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history, and the general outlook on life. But although btrauss, 
Biederraann, and Troeltsch held a common view on the subject of re- 
demption, nevertheless their systems have distinctive features 
which serve to set them apart from each other. Their systems are 
like concentric circles with a common centre tut with circumferences 
of different dimensions. We must, therefore, strike out from the 
centre, their common viewpoint, and travel the various radii which 
lead to their particular circumferences. ne will not repeat what 
has "been said in the previous chapters "but gather together the main 
threads which are tied directly to our problem of the relation of 
the Person of Christ to the principle of redemption.
We can arrive at some indication of the differences in 
the systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch by observing the 
men themselves, their lives, their personalities, for in some real 
sense a man's philosophy ultimately depends upon the kind of man 
he is. All three were theologians to "begin with. Biedermann, 
however, was the only one of the three to remain a theologian to 
his death. Strauss later in his life repudiated all connection 
with the Church and with Christianity and shut himself up within 
the precincts of materialistic philosophy where he still attempted 
to observe the theological world but his outlook was too circum- 
scribed by his environment. In his university days he lived and 
studied at the Stift in Tubingen which at the time was the theolo- 
gical seminary of Wurttemberg. His interests then were thoroughly 
theological/
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theological and great hopes were laid for his career in the Church.1 
Even after he was graduated, when he acted for a short time as a 
village pastor, his theological interests showed no signs of waning 
although he was finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile Gos- 
pel preaching with the Hegelianism with which he had "become enam- 
oured. The publication of his first Leben Jesu estranged Strauss 
from his father and made his home life unenviable. His mother 
never lost faith in him although it is obvious from his letters 
that she was not at all happy in his writings and the drift of his 
thinking. ioward the end of his life Strauss was confessedly not 
a Christian in even a broad sense. His last book, in fact, may be 
regarded as a polemic against Christianity.
Unlike Strauss who drifted further and further away from 
Christianity due to the ridicule and criticism of his works as 
well as to his own developing thinking, Biedermann lived more and 
more within the bounds of Christianity until at the time of his 
death he seemed ready to modify many of his former liberal con- 
clusions. In another place we have reported the scene at his 
death-bed where his last words reveal his sincere, if groping, 
faith. And as the movement of their lives were in different dir- 
ections, so too Biedermann's works witness to his increasing faith 
just/
1. Professor Karl Heim of Tubingen told me that many visitors to 
Tubingen interested in the atheistic movement in Kussia seek 
out Strauss's old room and pay homage to his memory and the 
impetus which he is supposed to have given atheism. Other 
famous rooms in the Stift are those once occupied by Schelling 
and Hegel.
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just as Strauss 1 s indicate his decreasing faith. i'rorn the publica- 
of the .p'reie Theolbgie until the appearance of the second edition 
of the Dogmatik, Biedermann passed from strict speculative Hegel- 
ianism to something approaching evangelical Christianity. It is 
true that his Dogmatik is essentially speculative and Hegelian "but 
it only needs comparison with some of his early works to show the 
positive trend in his thinking. In practice, too, Biedermann was 
a professing Christian. While preaching became to Strauss a stumb- 
ling-block which he could not overcome except by avoiding it alto- 
gether, Biedermann retained until his death an intense personal 
interest in the pulpit. His custom was to preach in the small 
village churches near his home in Zurich, and we are told that he 
acquitted himself with the same honour and dignity in humble vill- 
ages as in his classroom. Biedermann was a zealous presbyter. 
I'he unity, the harmonious functioning of the Church, was one of his 
deepest concerns and on more than one occasion he commanded a cen- 
tral position in addressing assemblies of the Swiss Church. He was 
constantly in the Pauline phrase "endeavouring to keep the unity of 
the spirit in the bond of peace." Although otrauss denied that 
he wished to begin a new Church, he emphatically avowed that he v/as 
through with the present one. Biedermann had no such desire and 
though he remained a liberal in theology he tried to strengthen 
his associations with the established Church.
Troeltsch's greatest works were executed while he was 




were spent in Berlin in the chair of philosophy. He may be com- 
pared with Strauss, therefore, in that both turned to philosophy 
in their latter days. But the comparison is not to be forced too 
far because Troeltsch did not make the boast of scrapping theology 
for philosophy as Strauss had done, he retained to the end his in- 
terest in theological questions. But unlike Biedermann, xroeltsch 
showed no deepening of the Christian experience. xroeltsch pre- 
sents us with a"Janus-bifrons ;i who is both the philosopher and the 
believer at one and the same time. 1'his two-faced characteristic 
is Troeltsch 1 s great inconsistency and makes criticism of him pre- 
carious. His own testimony, coupled with that of his friends, 
bears witness to his personal faith. Yet his books never speak 
that faith and we find personal references few and far between. 
In his last published lectures there is a decided absence of any 
appreciation for the Christian experience, and yet he urges his 
hearers not to think him sceptical although he is admittedly becom- 
ing more radical. 1'roeltsch, therefore, stands somewhere in between 
Strauss and Biedermann for he refused to deny Christianity as Strauss 
did and yet his personal faith found no expression in his works as 
was the case with Biedermann. Even Troeltsch's early interest in 
l.j.ssions which shows his close connection with the Church is ser- 
iously modified in his last lecture on Christianity in which 
ivdssions becomes a disheartening problem in the face of the re- 
lativity of Christianity among the other world-religions.
btrauss died a militant antagonist to Christianity. 
Biedermann shifted his speculative position toward his death and 
by so doing seemed to usher in upon his soul a flood of light long
shaded/
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shaded from him by his own devices. I'roeltsch died suddenly in 
the midst of his work and we get the impression that his task was 
 unfinished. Strauss died unhappy, at odds with the world. Bieder- 
man, quite the reverse, met his Maker with calmness and joy. 
Troeltsch in his last writings was certainly not optimistic. All 
three changed the direction of their thinking, Strauss "became more 
antagonistic to Christianity, -Biedermann more susceptible to the 
evangelical tradition, and 'iroeltsch more radical and inconsistent.
A deep-seated distinction in Strauss, Biedermann, and 
Troeltsch is revealed when their respective methods are examined, 
different as they were in their lives and personalities, they were 
nevertheless bound together by a common Christological outlook. 
1'his common bond, however, was the result in each case of a dis- 
tinctive method of approach. Strauss was always the critic work- 
ing with varying degrees of success with the critical method. His 
Leben Jesu by which he is best known, is the best example of his 
criticism, but even in the U-laubenslehre he is intent on breaking 
down critically all historical doctrines, and in iter Alte und der 
neue Irlaube his criticism finds its object in Christianity in gen- 
eral. Although he claimed for himself the role of reformer, he is 
always an iconoclast and if he has positive conclusions to offer 
they are minimized by the predominance of negative results. When 
we speak of the Leben Jesu we would do well to keep in mind the 
full title for it is not a "life"of Jesus so much as it is a life 
of Jesus "critically examined." The critical tools with which
Strauss/
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Strauss is a master are reason, eommonsense, logic, and Hegelian- 
ism. Facts are what make the world go round for Strauss, he will 
have nothing to do with superstitution, tradition, myth, or legend. 
Anything that savours of the past is liable to be false or at least 
encrusted with unhistorical traditions. Like the barnacles that 
retard the speed of a "boat, Strauss felt that sentimental fancy was 
retarding the progress of Christianity. To remove these unhis- 
torical "barnacles, at whatever cost, was Strauss's ambition and he 
chose the mythical method of criticism to do the job. Strauss was 
no mediocre critic, he was a master at the trade. His Leben Jesu 
reveals a stupendous knowledge of "biblical facts and theories of 
interpretation. Details are piled up endlessly in the desire for 
thoroughness and exhaustiveness. His own critics, guided by a true 
instinct, tried to confute his conclusions, but in doing so they 
showed themselves terribly deficient in the critical method which 
Strauss used with such telling effect.
Biedermann was always the speculative theologian. He 
accepted Strauss 1 s criticism of the G-ospel records in toto but he 
balked at Strauss's dogmatic conclusions. Hot a critic in the 
same way that Strauss was, Biedermann confined his task to the in- 
terpretation of the results of criticism. Taking his stand with 
the most liberal tendency in New Testament criticism, he resolved 
to organize their results into a Christian theology in the spirit 
of the times. Speculative theology is, therefore, Biedermann 1 s 
special province. He, too, works with the tools of reason and 
Hegelianisrn but he uses them not so much to deface the past as to 
model and fashion a new structure for the present. Biedermann is
primarily/
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primarily constructive, although he passes through the stages of 
destruction on his way toward a higher level. If, as Strauss had 
shown, the historical Jesus was so wrapped up within the garments 
of myth as to be quite invisible, then something must "be made of 
the mythical Jesus even if He be regarded as no more than a symbol 
or illustration of the Christian principle. With his eyes on the 
past Biedermann attempted to reconstruct Christianity by redefining 
the Christian doctrines in keeping with Strauss's results and in 
line with Hegelianism. In his later years, he realized the fall- 
acy of his method. He saw that speculative theology and the evan- 
gelical experience make poor companions. This discovery was the 
point of departure for a new appreciation of Christianity. But 
essentially even to the end Biedermann was a speculative thinker 
and his final Dogmatik is still very much enslaved to Hegelianism.
Troeltsch was always the historian. He, too, like 
Biedermann, accepted Strauss's criticism and the further develop- 
ments in that field since Strauss. And Troeltsch accepted the 
speculative theology of Biedermann. What Troeltsch found lacking 
in both Strauss and Biedermann was an appreciation of history. New 
Testament criticism will not tell us what Christianity is or was, 
nor will pure speculation. V/hat is needed, Troeltsch insisted, 
was an examination of historical Christianity using the laws of 
historical research as a method. These laws are three: the law 
of criticism, the law of analogy, and the law of relativity. With 
these tools in his hands Troeltsch was able to reduce Christianity 
to probabilities and relativities. Dogmatic theology is not his 
strong point, in fact he refused to write a systematic theology.
He/
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He was an historian from first to last as his greatest works pro- 
claim. Later his interest in history took him into the study of 
comparative religious where he furthered his method with consider- 
able success. Christianity, however, "became one of the religions. 
It is not final, at least we have no right to say so, all that we 
can say is that it suits us in our particular civilization. His- 
torically considered, Christianity reveals distinct eras or periods 
in which principles are predominant. The true estimate, there- 
fore, will realize that Christianity is a religion of moods and 
temperaments.
The three methods represented "by Strauss, Biedermann, 
and Troeltsch became the foundations of three distinct schools of 
theology. In the case of Strauss it was the school of Hew Testa- 
ment criticism. Biedermann stood at the head of those who followed 
Hegel closely, and the group became loiown as the Speculative School. 
Troeltsch has always been ranked as the leading exponent of the 
religionsgeschichtliche Schule. For one who is not interested in 
the intricacies of their methods or systems, Strauss is certainly 
the most appealing writer. His style is robust at all times. It 
moves with a swiftness which carries the reader on and on in spite 
of the results. Biedermann's style of presenting his case is 
marked with a monotonous logic so usual among Hegelians and if it 
does not appeal in the same way as Strauss's liquid criticism it 
is perhaps a more logical and philosophical style of writing. Of 
the three, Troeltsch is undoubtedly the most prolix. His sentences 
are often unintelligible even after repeated readings. Germans 
themselves find him difficult and often prefer to read the i'rench 
translations/
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translations of his works. He was a very prolific writer and the 
very length of the list of his writings may account in some measure 
for his stiff and glassy style.
In order to distinguish more sharply between the peculiar 
positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch it will "be advis- 
able to consider the particular emphases which they make. Bound 
together "by a common Christological principle, they nevertheless 
accent and stress different points as they set about developing 
their main positions. We have already spoken of the emphases of 
the century which they had in common, we must now note some of 
their individual distinctions. In general their emphases depend 
upon their methods of approach. Strauss, as we have seen, used 
the mythical method of historical criticism and with this weapon 
at hand laid the emphasis upon the exposition of the traditional 
life of Jesus. His object was to clear the way for a philoso- 
phical faith based not upon the Church or the New Testament but 
upon the best tenets of morality and reason. By stressing the 
non-historicity of the Gospels he hoped to discredit all forms of 
complacent faith in an historical Jesus. Biedermann laid the 
accent of theology upon the redefinition of Christian doctrines in 
the light of Hegelianism. Both Strauss and Biedermann succeeded 
in separating the Person of Christ from the principle of redemption 
but each had his own way of doing so. Strauss 1 s denial of Christ- 
ianity and affirmation of a philosophical materialism was to Bieder- 
mann the result of misplaced emphasis. Biedermann's conclusions
tended/
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tended to reinstate Christianity by bringing it up to date. 
Troeltseh emphasized the historical approach to Christianity and 
demonstrated the Individuality of various periods of Christian 
history. In so doing he made Jesus relative, a link in a chain, 
and thus joined the ranks of Strauss and Biedermann in separating 
the Person from the principle.
In each of these three systems the Person of Christ is 
treated differently. Although their conclusions verged toward a 
common idea, they differed as to the significance of Jesus. Strauss, 
from the first, saw in Jesus no more than a mythical figure of 
history. By this he did not mean that Jesus had never lived, "but 
the history of the life which He is said to have lived has "been 
forever lost to mankind. Due to the Messianic prophecies with 
which the minds of the Jews were enlivened and to the conviction 
that Jesus Himself was the fulfilment of these prophecies, the earty 
Christian narratives of His life and work have "been so sentimental- 
ized and warped out of shape in order to fit the Ifessianic hopes 
that Jesus's real existence is unknown. So exhaustively did 
Strauss apply his method that Jesus emerged \vithout character and 
without reality. In order to stem the flood of criticism which 
was poured upon him, Strauss tried to modify his position "by show- 
ing that Jesus was nevertheless a man of high moral courage, a hero, 
a religious genius of tremendous proportions. But these emenda- 
tions were short-lived. Strauss later struck them out and resorted 
to his original conviction that Jesus as an historical person is 
unloiowa"ble. Later in life, as he grew more and more philosophical, 
he began to carry his results still further. Up to this time he
had/
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had been content to show how the early narrators had been deceived 
into thinking that Jesus was the Ikessiah just as Jesus Himself was 
deceived into believing this. But now we find Strauss raining 
his torrents of criticism upon both the recordists and Jesus Him- 
self for being deceivers as well as deceived. i^yth is defined not 
only as the unintentional fabrication of truth but even wilful dis- 
regard for fact and history. Thus, Jesus in Strauss's final cate- 
gory is a self-deceived and deceiving impostor who has no right to 
command the faith, not even the respect and admiration, of any 
modern minded man.
Biedermann constantly acknowledged his debt to Strauss 
and accepted the mythical criticism of the life of Jesus, but the 
conclusion to which Strauss was driven, namely, to deprive the 
Person of Christ of any significance whatsoever, was the point of 
departure in Biedermann 1 s Ghristology. n/e are told that Bieder- 
mann was sorely disappointed in otrauss f s last book and his dis- 
appointment is an indication of a difference in emphasis. .Even 
if Jesus's life is enveloped with myth, He is nevertheless import- 
ant, nay in fact essential to Christianity. This was Biedermann 1 s 
positive accent in Uhristology. i'he eternal truths of Christian- 
ity, of which redemption is one, depend for their guarantee upon 
the Person of Christ. In Him we see not only the metaphysical 
union of Infinite and finite, of Divine and human, as Strauss him- 
self had once acknowledged, but Me is the first to represent the 
principle of redemption in actual historical form. without Him 
we would loiow nothing of the principle of redemption. He is the 
means whereby it has become intelligible and applicable. It matters
little/
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little to Biedermann what criticism does to the details of Christ's 
life on earth, He is, according to the U-ospels, the human embodi- 
ment of redemption. It was this historical actuality that gave 
Christianity its driving force. 'i'o deprive it of the historical 
founder and guarantee is to cut its roots from the living source. 
But in spite of his insistence upon the importance of the Person 
of Christ for the principle of redemption, Biedermann was far from 
making Jesus the Redeemer. Just as the principle is worthless 
without the Person, so too the reverse is true. Without the prin- 
ciple idea the Person is a mere human agent whose work stopped at 
His death. To insure Christianity's permanency and finality the 
two, Person and principle, must ever be considered in their mutual 
relationship. This was Biedermann's final conclusion in Christ- 
ology and it is marked with a strange inconsistency. Convinced 
of the value of the historical Person of Christ for redemption, he 
nevertheless refused to relinquish his hold upon Hegelianism and 
the result was a confusion of thought which was at once a dualism 
and a unity.
Troeltsch discovered that the significance of the his- 
torical Jesus lay in His relation to the Christian cult and com- 
munity, .following upon the footsteps of Strauss and Biedermann, 
he separated the Person of Christ from the principle of redemption 
"but at the same time found a category in which to place Jesus, so 
that He became the centre of faith. In so far as He revealed the 
character of G-od, Jesus may be spoken of as the Redeemer, but 
Troeltsch insisted that ultimately G-od is the Redeemer, not Jesus 
Christ. But to neglect the historical Jesus is to neglect history,
and/
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and history shoves that the Christian community has always placed 
its centre of support upon Jesus. The ideas and principles which 
He revealed are eternally true, as Strauss once held and as Bieder- 
mann always "believed, "but ideas and principles alone would never 
have created a Christian cult and community. They need a rallying- 
point for their life and this can only "be found in the historical 
Jesus. For Troeltsch Jesus is more than an illustration of the 
principle of redemption, He is more than the guarantee of its effic- 
acy, He is the head of the Christian community. Actually Jesus 1 s 
significance is not related to redemption at all, except in a very 
indirect way, for redemption is knowledge of God's Will. If Jesus 
is not the Redeemer, He is, nevertheless, the corner-stone of the 
Christian's faith and as such is of eternal importance. The re- 
sult of Troeltsch's position was the same as that of Strauss and 
Biedermann, the Person was separated from the principle. -ftach 
arrived at this common conclusion, but each regarded the Person of 
Christ differently.
As with the Person of Christ, so too with the doctrine 
of redemption, Strauss, Biedermann, and i'roeltsch, although sharing 
a common conclusion, nevertheless represent three distinct concep- 
tions, -b'or all of them redemption was made effective through 
other means than the Person of Christ. Strauss's doctrine of re- 
demption seldom makes an appearance simply because the Redeemer is 
an unhistorical person with no spiritual efficacy. But when he 
does speak of redemption it is alv/ays in terms of the race. Humanity
is/
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is being redeemed more and more as the years go by. iVith the aid 
of science and modern philosophy the race is gradually emerging 
from a state of imperfection toward a final ideal. The Christian 
doctrine of redemption, in so far as it is in accord with Hegelian- 
ism, is of value, but it stands on its own feet, as it were, with- 
out the support of the Person of Christ. Man's chief end in life 
is to realize that the Infinite is one with the finite, and that 
humanity is being redeemed slowly but surely. To take one's place 
in the development of the race and to share in the experience of 
the race is what we as individuals must do to be redeemed. For the 
individual, redemption is a moral striving and struggling to raise 
oneself from the depths of sensuous experience to a state of union 
with the Absolute. This union was not understood by Strauss in 
any mystical sense but as the realization of the union of Infinite 
and finite in the Hegelian sense.
Biedermann took his stand v/ith Strauss in affirming that 
the Church has wrongly predicated of Jesus what is true only of the 
race. The attributes which tradition has ascribed to the Person 
of Christ really belong only to divine humanity. Jesus as an 
historical figure has no bearing upon redemption, which is a prin- 
ciple applying only to humanity as a whole. But Biedermann 
went beyond Strauss in validating the principle of redemption by 
the Person of Christ. The two are separate, yet they are mutually 
exclusive. This confusion and inconsistency in his system, es- 
pecially in his laat work, makes it extremely difficult to ascer- 
tain just what Biedermann did think about redemption. At one 
moment it seems to imply a relationship of love between God and 
man/
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man and at another time it is so blurred with Hegelian terminology 
as to be almost -unintelligible. However, we are safe in saying 
that whatever he thought of redemption it was always considered as 
man's own accomplishment, as the elevation of the human to the 
divine.
Troeltsch is more explicit than either btrauss or Bieder- 
mann in defining redemption. It is, he said, the knowledge which 
we have of the Will of God. The emphasis in i'roeltsch, as in 
Strauss and Biedermann, is placed upon man, not upon G-od. Redemp- 
tion is what man knows, not what u-od does. Jesus reveals G-od, 
but only in so far as His revelation assists us in approaching God 
can He be called Redeemer. The main distinction between these 
three thinkers in regard to redemption is that for Strauss and 
Biedermann redemption is always considered as a moral process, 
while iroeltsch conceives of it as an intellectual process. But 
the distinctions vanish into unimportance in the light of their 
common view that redemption is a process initiated and promulgated 
by man himself. It is something that comes from below not from 
above. It is the striving and groaning of humanity toward the 
Kingdom of God.
In regard to the question of the finality of Christianity 
the difference of emphasis appears once more. In his early days, 
when he posed as a reformer, Strauss regarded the ideas exhibited 
in Christianity as eternally true and valid. Thus Christianity 
was for him secure until the end of time- It was the highest 
religion/
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religion and the most valid. i'his opinion was not incompatible 
with a critical view of the Hew Testament and a redefinition of 
doctrine in Hegelian terminology because Christianity waa to emergs 
a timeless religion expressing eternal truth. In his later days, 
however, this optimistic hope for Christianity's future was under- 
mined by Strauss's interest in materialistic philosophy. tfor 
eternal truths Strauss substituted mechanical and biological laws. 
In the end, Christianity was deprived of its validity and its 
future was regarded as problematical. Christianity as a religion 
may be quite good enough for the multitude of unthinking folk who 
wish to place authority in superstitution and myth, but for the 
modern man Christianity is only a stupid sentimentalism. As Strauss 
called the Resurrection a colossal "humbug" so, too, is the whole 
of Christianity in his opinion. Science has shown the way toward 
light and that way leads beyond Christianity.
Biedermann, who became more and more the Christian, re- 
mained in the position which Dtrauss had formerly taken, namely, 
that Christianity as the embodiment of eternal truths is, therefore, 
a supreme and permanent religion for mankind. Actually he had 
but little to say on this question, but we can safely infer his 
mind. His interest in the Church would hardly have continued had 
he lost his faith in the future of Christianity.
1'roeltsch more than the others concerned himself with 
this question. Although he says in one place that the problem is 
insoluble, he nevertheless hastens to make certain conjectures. 
His theory of history compelled him to reduce Christianity to its 
individual phases. As a whole it is unmanageable and unpredicat- 
able. It can only be studied according to its individual out- 
croppings/
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croppings at particular periods of time. His last lecture on 
Christianity gives his final utterance on the subject and it is 
C[uite pessimistic. Christianity, he says, is not better than the 
other world-religions. It is perhaps the best religion for us in 
our Western civilization, but it is going too far to say that it 
is better for the Chinese than Buddhism or for the Arab than Moham- 
medanism. The future of Christianity is therefore commensurate 
with the future of western civilization.-1-
The distinctive features of the positions of Strauss, 
Biedermann, and Troeltsch become apparent in a negative way by 
considering some of the omissions which their systems reveal, tfe 
do not wish to put words into their mouths when they themselves 
preferred to be silent, nor do we wish to judge them by what they 
did not say. By omissions we have in mind the patent instances 
where they were obviously groping and feeling their way with hesi- 
tation and reserve. In this connection we think immediately of 
their common silence and reticence when they come to deal with the 
traditional beliefs of the past. Although they claimed to follow 
in the footsteps of the reformers, they nevertheless retained very 
little of the substance of the Reformation. i'hey claimed to carry 
on/
1. Karl Heim of Tubingen regards "relativism" in Protestant theo- 
logy - of the type which xroeltsch represented - as the fore- 
most reason why a large number of Protestants have, in recent 
years, embraced Roman Catholicism; Spirit and Truth, p.16.
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on the torch of liberty and freedom lighted in the sixteenth cen- 
tury, but they were willing to neglect and pass over the results 
and conclusions so dearly purchased. The nineteenth century, as 
we have seen, was an age of self-assertion and as such was regarded 
"by every one as a new age, a transition age, the modern age. Ko 
one would have suggested that the Kingdom of Heaven "belonged to 
the "poor in spirit," it was rather the reward of those who were 
"hungering and thirsting after righteousness," of those who were 
pushing on into uncharted realms. Humility was not considered a 
virtue in the nineteenth century, it was in fact something to be 
avoided like the humility of Uriah Keep in Dickens's David Copper- 
field. With the spirit of modernity in the air there was little 
attention paid to the spirit of antiquity. The Romantic Movement 
was ostensibly a return to classical culture but rather than a re- 
turn it was more of a re-interpretation of modern life with the 
help of certain classical principles. In theology the past was 
forgotten in the passion for the new. Theologians were not con- 
scious of being "compassed about by a great cloud of witnesses. 11 
They were pioneers of faith, they struck out upon new and unblazed 
trails. 'i;he desire to get at the root of things, to explain the 
mysteries of the universe resulted in blatant negligence of the
past.
btrauss T s Leben Jesu is prefaced v/ith the remark that 
here is a new departure in methods of treating the life of Jesus. 
The new departure is away from tradition and historical belief. 
The Jesus of history has been obscured simply because He has been 
bound up with past fancies. One of the indirect results of 
Strauss's/
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Strauss's criticism was the renewed encouragement which it gave to 
the break with the past. As though writing a life of Jesus for 
the first time in history, Jtrauss makes the biblical facts fall 
in line with his method. By subjecting the U-ospel to his own 
Procrustean bed of criticism he is enabled to cut off the portions 
of historical tradition which extend beyond. ^specially do we see 
Strauss's break with the past in his last book where the very title 
tells us much. I'o have done with the "Old Faith" and to usher in 
a "New Faith" - this is his final word to posterity. It is the 
hew faith, the new methods, the new criticism, the new age, that 
appeal to Strauss.
Medermann offers a contradiction to Strauss in that he 
has no wish to break with the underlying principles of Christian 
doctrine. Christianity must not go by the board, it must be re- 
defined in keeping with the new age. But Biedermann 1 s apprecia- 
tion for the past is little more than otrauss's and what he does 
hold to are metaphysical ideas and principles, not the historical 
tradition. Like Strauss, Biedermann was a typical product of the 
century. Jiis desire was to fashion things anew and edit Christian 
doctrine in a new popular edition intelligent to all.
Troeltsch as the historian cannot be said to ignore the 
past as did Strauss and Biedermann. But his laws of history were 
such that he discovered nothing of final or eternal significance 
in the past. The principle of Individuality rendered the past a 
colossal grab-bag from which good things and bad things have emer- 
ged. Ho one age can be regarded as normative for another. The 
guiding principles of Christianity in the first century are not
the/
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the guiding principles now. The past cannot teach us the future 
just "because there is no uniformity, no underlying essence, which 
we can isolate and use as a measuring stick. Although he loves to 
dwell in the past, Troeltsch nevertheless wants a Christianity 
which will appeal to the modern educated man. The past formulas 
and creeds are outworn and need to be replaced with new ones in 
the spirit of the times. rfe are passing into a "new age", Troeltsch 
says, and we must have a new Christianity.
More concretely we notice a break with the past in the 
treatment of the doctrine of G-od. Here Strauss, Biedermann, and 
Troeltsch all seem to be groping in a semi-darkness. Their utter- 
ances sink to mere whispers at times and again their confusion 
brings forth a jumble of incoherent statements. Vague general- 
izations and philosophical abstractions occupy their minds. Again 
and again we can sense a strain of the Deism so popular but a few 
years before, or of the Pantheism and panlogism which characterized 
the thought of Rationalism.
Both Strauss and Biedermann are slaves to the Hegelian 
coincidentia oppositorum in which God descends from His high throne 
to meet mankind as it ascends from its earthly existence. In the 
union of divine and human a new element is formed which seems to 
bear no correspondence with its component parts. God is lost 
somehow in the union. His being is merged and mixed beyond recog- 
nition. The traditional view of a transcendent God is largely 
forgotten in the eagerness with which they make God join the move- 
ment of humanity. He is transcendent because He is the Absolute, 
the Infinite, the eternal goal toward which mankind is moving. The
idea/
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idea of the Fatherhood of G-od is either totally ignored or meta- 
physically interpreted as the union of the divine and human. 'i'he 
attributes of love, compassion, mercy, and tenderness are largely 
omitted in the Hegelian scheme. In his later years Strauss piled 
confusion upon confusion "by substituting the workings of mechanical 
law for his idealistic philosophy. The heavens declare the glory 
of God and so, too, do the species where the laws of the struggle 
for existence and survival of the fittest hold sway. Biedermann 
never went so far as Strauss and at times we find him speaking of 
the Fatherhood of G-od, but again he speaks of the Absolute in the 
Hegelian fashion and we can only conclude that he is groping in 
the darkness of his own imperfect conception.
Troeltseh's own personal faith reveals an appreciation 
for the Fatherhood of G-od "but his writings are singularly devoid 
of his own faith. when he speaks of eschatology he admits that hjs 
view impinges on pantheism. Whether or not Troeltsch, as with 
Strauss and Biedermann, had an undeveloped doctrine of G-od because 
the Person of Christ meant so little to them, or whether they had 
no doctrine of the Person of Christ because the Fatherhood of G-od 
meant so little to them, it is not necessary to determine, one 
thing is sure and that is their reticence on the subject. 'i'here 
is/
1. Strauss ultimately concluded that modern science had completely 
destroyed the traditional views of transcendence and he is re- 
ported as having said sarcastically, "Die ^ohnungsnot ist fur 
G-ott eingetreten;" quoted by Karl Heim in Giaube und Den ken, 
p.40; the English translation suggests (p.31n) that the retort 
be translated, "The housing-problem has now arisen in the case 
of God!"
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is a Danish fa"ble which tells of a spider spinning its web near 
the floor in order to catch more insects but it unwittingly cut 
the suspending thread in its enthusiasm and the whole web fell into 
the dust. Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch cut their systems 
away from a personal conception of God. 1
It has already been mentioned that the spirit of the 
times was away from anything that tended to debase or degrade man's 
natural powers. This attitude resulted in a break with the trad- 
itional doctrine of sin. To Strauss, Biedermann, and i'roeltsch 
the biblical account of the Pall of man was not the felix culpa 
it was to Augustine, who called it blessed just because it was the 
means which led to salvation in Christ. It was a baseless de- 
gradation of human nature to think that it was unable to help it- 
self. God created man in His own image and as such man must be 
regarded as potentially divine. Human nature is essentially good. 
It does not wait for salvation statically, it redeems itself 
through its own effort and will. "I ought therefore I can" was 
the categorical imperative of the nineteenth century. Sin is no 
more than moral lethargy, weakness, ignorance. It can be overcome 
by struggling and by keeping the ideal of human perfection ever 
before the eyes.
Bmil Brunner has indicted the nineteenth century for
its/
A further illustration of their groping might be drawn from 
what they have to say about revelation. The distinction 
which Brunner makes in The Mediator between "special revelation" 
and "general revelation" did not present itself to their minds. 
They always speak of revelation in a general sense.
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its watered-down conception of sin. Sin as an essential element 
in personality is never the idea in this century. Sin is always 
regarded in the plural as certain acts committed, it is never re- 
garded as part of the constitutional nature of man. Truly Pelagian 
in this respect, Strauss, Biedermann, and 'i:'roeltsch pass over the 
doctrine of sin with hurried steps as they march toward the con- 
viction that man is essentially good. They were wont to speak of 
man's divinity, not his depravity.
As a final instance of their break with the past and of 
their halting and reserved convictions we may point to the lack of 
interest shown "by Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch in the doe- 
trine of the Atonement. For them to "be silent on this point is 
to be expected as the natural consequence of their common view of 
the Person of Christ. A theology which has little use for a lov- 
ing Father and a Divine Son can have but little to say of an Atone- 
ment. Strauss was willing enough in his formative years to 
rationalize the metaphysics of the Atonement but he concluded that 
the idea that God must be satisfied for the sin of mankind by the 
death of a single individual was as unworthy of Christianity as it 
was unintelligible. To Biedermann the Atonement is never more 
than pure Hegelianism, Christ's office of Priest being interpreted 
as the union of divine and human. Troeltsch thinks the idea of 
atonement is out of touch with modern thinking. The theological 
positions of btrauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, in the final 
analysis/
1. cf. The Mediator, Chap.I, and The V/ord and the >^orld, pp.49 ff.
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analysis, are stripped of the doctrines which we expect to find in 
any Christian system. There is a limit to such stripping and 
there is a danger. There is a lesson to "be learned from the van- 
ishing cat in Alice in Wonderland - we must "be careful to 
more than a feline grin in theology.
Although the differences which we have enumerated in 
Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch help us to interpret and appreci- 
ate their systems as a whole, still through the varying light and 
shade of these differences there shines, like a penetrating search- 
light, the common bond which united them together, namely, the 
separation of the Person of Christ from redemption. This common 
principle was not confined to these three men alone. We have seen 
how it was expressed in the Rationalism which preceded them. nor 
was it to die when they died. It became one of the main tenets of 
liberal theology and found its way into the theologies of a myriad 
of thinkers living in the four corners of the world.
The separation of Person and principle is not unknown in 
the twentieth century in our own day. Adolf Harnack helped to 
popularize the notion in his famous lectures in Berlin on Pas nifesen 
des Christentums, 1900, the English translation of which caused 
considerable stir among English speaking theologians. A typical 
sentence from these lectures reads, "The Gospel, as Jesus proclaimed 
it, has to do with the father only, and not with the Son." 1 Speaking
of/
1. What is Christianity, p.144.
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of Harnack's Christology a modern commentator says, "A mere glance 
at his conception of the Person of Christ is sufficient to reveal 
the chasm that separates even Harnaek from the full and complete 
faith of the Catholic Church. There is no Godhead of Christ in 
any real sense, and in Christ's mind it means no more than the 
Divine element that is revealed in the uniqueness of His humanity. 
There is no atonement or redemption by His death and no absolute 
claim on Uhrist's part on the love, worship, and homage of man as 
His supreme Lord and Master."1 Harnack is often credited with 
being a forerunner of the twentieth century in theology, but, as 
we can see, he really harks back to the nineteenth century and 
there is a deal of truth in Brunner 1 s contention that through Har-
9
nack theology returns once again to Rationalism.
The liberal theology of which Harnack was a leading ex- 
ponent spread rapidly in Germany and then to America where it found 
a very acceptable soil. ne are not finished hearing in America of 
the distinction between the religion which Jesus taught and the 
religion of which He is the object. Imminent preachers throughout 
America have made this distinction popular. The movement as a 
whole was branded as Humanism, but unlike other movements of the 
same name, of which the Reformation itself was one, this American 
variety contended in a fashion very reminiscent of the nineteenth 
century that man is able to work out his own salvation. A renewed 
interest/
1. Maurice Jones, The Hew Testament in the 1'wentieth Century, p.17.
2. The Mediator, p.67.
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interest in psychology was one of the consequences of this move- 
ment. A study of the human personality, its inhibitions and com- 
plexes in many cases superseded the interest in the evangelical 
tradition. A typical statement from the Humanists, reminding us 
of itrauss and i'roeltsch, is the following from a popular writer: 
"Religion draws its sustenance from the deep soil of accumulated 
social experience, and from the wide-spreading roots of individual 
inheritance and impressionability. 1'he subtle, powerful influ- 
ences of imitation, suggestion, and subconscious habits operate in 
religion, giving it stability and intensity." 1 Prom the fluid pen 
of Julian Huxley comes these words: "The pursuit of the religious 
life is seen to resemble the pursuit of scientific truth or artis- 
tic expression, as one of the highest of human activities, success 
in which comes partly from native gifts, partly from early training 
and surroundings, partly from sheer chance, and partly from personal 
efforts."^ In one of the most popular of the books produced by 
this movement, Walter Lippmann's Preface to Morals, we read an 
account of the ringing down of the curtain upon the drama of re- 
velation. "To many who were in the audience," he writes, "it is 
now evident that they have seen g. play, a magnificent play, one of 
the most sublime ever created by the human imagination, but never- 
theless a play, and not a literal account of human destiny. 1'hey 
know it was a play. They have lingered long enough to see the 
scene-shifters at work. 1'he painted drop is half rolled up; some 
of/
1. Ames, E.S.. The Psychology of Religious Experience, p.295-
2. Huxley,Julian, Religion without Revelation, pp.53-54.
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of the turrets of the celestial city can still "be seen, and part 
of the choir of angels. But "behind them, plainly visible, are 
the struts and gears which held in place what under a gentler light 
looked like the "boundaries of the universe. They are only human 
fears and human hopes, and bits of antique science and half-forgotten 
history, and symbols here and there of experiences through which 
some in each generation pass." 1
The characteristics of the so-called Humanistic movement 
are unmistakably parallel to the guiding principles of Strauss, 
Biedermann, and Troeltsch. We see the same appeal for the scien- 
tific outlook, the avoidance of anything tinged with emotionalism 
or traditional fancy, and the conviction that man can work out his 
own redemption by way of moral and social reform.
It was not luitil a few years ago that this liberal theo- 
logy so popular in the nineteenth century was met with any real 
opposition. In the so-called Barthian Theology of Crisis liberal 
theology came up against a formidable foe, and to-day it is evident 
that the pendulum has swung back once more in the direction of the 
evangelical tradition of the Church. The insistent demand of the 
new movement in theology is on the sin of man and the sovereign 
Grace of G-od through the Person of Jesus Christ.
But liberalism goes on and, strangely enough, it is in 
Germany that it is finding new roots once again in the German 
Christian Movement (die deutschglaubige Bewegung). Once again the 
divine/
1. A Preface to Morals, p.116.
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divine potentialities of man are "being extolled to the skies and 
the glory of the race is taking the place of the religion of re- 
demption. The National Socialist ideology under the Third Reich 
is emphasizing the divinity of the German race and nation. Such a 
"book as Alfred Rosenberg's Per Eythus des 20.Jahrhunderts, is a 
typical expression of this movement. A single sentence will re- 
veal its temper and tone. "To-day a new faith has arisen:- the 
"blood-myth, the belief that to fight for the Blood is to fight for 
the divine in man; the "belief - embodied with a vision that leaves 
no possibility for doubt - that the Nordic Blood presents that 
mystery by which the ancient sacraments are superseded and trans- 
cended." 1 In a speech to a group of young boys and girls gathered 
for a sports competition, a German youth leader in reply to the 
question, "Is German tfaith Atheistic?", said, "Our faith is God; 
our Church is the German home; our congregation -is the German 
people; our priest is every race-conscious German; our Bible is
the Germanic soul and its imperishable works; our sacraments are
f) 
work, struggle, and love; our creed runs: Blood and honour!"^
1. i)er Mytfrus des 20. J ahrhunderts, 3rd. ed. 1932, p. 129.
2. Busso Lowe in Junge""Kirche, ^Fitter Jahrgang 1935, heft 10,
p.477; from the mass of literature which this latest Bewegung 
has occasioned we may mention Karl Earth's brochure Theologische 
Existenz heute , li/&nchen, 1933, in which he sets forth his 
reasons for rejecting the movement; a more general study of 
the whole question of Deutschglaube is discussed in Kurt 
Hutten's Christus Oder Deutschglaube, Stuttgart, 1935.
CHAPTER VII
THE PERSON OF CHRIST AND THE PRINCIPLE OF REDEMPTION:
CONCLUSION.
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to indicate 
the basic reasons why the common position of Strauss, Biedermann, 
and Troeltsch - i.e., the separation of the Person of Christ from 
the principle of redemption - cannot be maintained in the interests 
of an evangelical Christianity. Thus far a minimum of adverse 
criticism has been levelled against their systems. In setting 
forth their peculiarities as well as their similarities and in 
tracing the determining forces in the philosophy and theology of 
the century on which they constructed their Christologies, an effort 
has been made to expound rather than criticize. It is the task 
of this chapter, therefore, to come face to face with their common 
Christological position and to demonstrate wherein the separation 
of Person from principle is in error.
There are various ways in which the Christological posi- 
tion of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch may be criticized. It 
may be criticized from the standpoint of present day theological 
thinking, or it may be criticized in the light of the New Testament 
and the witness throughout the centuries of professing Christians. 
That there are other methods is not denied, but at least these two 
methods of approach are possible. It is upon the latter method, 
the teaching of the New Testament and the witness of believing
Christians,/
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Ohristians, that Strauss, Biedermann, and 'i'roeltsch can be best 
criticized. But present day theology has much to say about the 
typical nineteenth century position and to neglect the modern ver- 
dict is to pass by an important piece of incriminating evidence. 
In summary fashion, therefore, it will be well to consider some of 
the criticisms which present day thinkers bring against atrauss, 
Biedermann, and Troeltsch.
In the foregoing discussion considerable stress has been 
laid upon the philosophers in order to indicate the great influence 
which philosophy had upon theology. 1'he nineteenth century had 
as one of its characteristics the close affinity of philosophical 
and theological thought. In a word, theology of the type represen- 
ted by Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch was enslaved to philoso- 
phy. The ambition of Strauss and Biedermann was to bring tte whole 
doctrine of Christian truth into harmony with Hegelianism. Troelbseh, 
though not an ardent Hegelian, nevertheless insisted upon a meta- 
physical basis for Christianity as the guarantee of its reality, 
.b'or these three theologians, and for scores of others who followed 
in their footsteps, theology was a sort of handmaid to philosophy.
The two outstanding thinkers in the nineteenth century 
who claimed that they separated theology from philosophy were 
achleiermacher and Ritschl. Sehleiermacher in the beginning of 
the first edition of his G-laubenslehre declared that he had ex- 
cluded philosophy from his system, and section three of the third 
edition contained a similar declaration. "The piety which forms
the/
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the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is, consider
ed purely 
in itself, neither a Knowing nor a Doing, but a modific
ation of 
reeling, or of immediate self-consciousness." The word
s "Knowing" 
and "Doing" were directed specifically at Kant and ^icht
e. But 
Schleiermacher with all his good intentions was not with
out a phil- 
osophical inheritance, nor was his theology completely 
non-philoso- 
phical, jumil Brunner, who calls Schleiermacher "the o
nly really 
great theologian of the past century," has pointed out 
that 
schleiermacher was far from realizing his boast to have 
excluded 
philosophy from theology. 1
What Schleiermacher hoped to do to the philosophy of Kan
t 
and Fichte, but which he failed to do according to Brunn
er, Ritsehl 
hoped to do to Hegelianism. Ritschl's primary task was
 to put 
Christianity on its feet and free it from the bonds of H
egelianism. 
But if Schleiermacher failed to exclude philosophy from
 his theo- 
logy, so too did Ritschl. It is true that he denied th
e charge 
that he "like Kant in his Religion within the limits of 
Reason alone, 
makes religion a subordinate appendix to morals," but he
 was never- 
theless a Kantian in his insistence upon the ethical ch
aracter of 
Christianity. 2 And although he said sarcastically of H
egelianism, 
"Das Absolute! wie erhebend das klingtl," he was not to
tally devoid 
of philosophical leanings, and his whole system of nert
urteile was 
a sort of philosophy in Itself. 3 
The/
1. Emil Brunner, Me Iflystik und das Wort, p.6.
2. Rechtfertigung und versohnung, III, p.215; iS.T. p.
226.
3. Theologie und Letaphysik, p.18.
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The point as to whether or not ochleiermacher and 
were exceptions in the nineteenth century in their attitude toward 
the relation of philosophy and theology may perhaps "be argued, "but 
in the new theology, the so-called Uarthian movement, they are 
grouped without apology with their contemporaries who endeavoured 
to harmonize theology and philosophy. And it is against this 
tendency of the nineteenth century that present day theology directs 
much of its attack. One of its outstanding features is the decided
departure away from philosophy, away from the "anthroposophical
p movement," as Karl Heim calls it. Of course, thinkers like Xarl
Barth and iimil Brunner never deny that the intellect is necessary 
for theologizing. u The observer is not in a position," says Barth, 
"to offer the sacrifice of the intellect as little as he can jump 
away from his own shadow."^ Even Luther and Calvin, he goes on 
to say, had their diatonic tendencies, and Kierkegaard's anti- 
Hegelianism was itself a philosophical dialectic. But the emphasds 
with Barth is to subordinate the systematic and logical expressions 
of philosophy to theology. iiven Karl Heim of Tubingen, who is 
frequently regarded as the systematic philosopher of the Barthian 
theology and who attempts like Troeltsch to lay a metaphysical 
basis for Christianity, concludes his book, G-laube und Denken, with 
the non-philosophical declaration, "Yfe stand before One Who is not 
to/
1. cf. what Brunner has to say of modern theology in u|he_ Mediator 
and his criticism of Jchleiermacher in Die Itystik und das rtort.
_ __ _.. ^ _ , . I ^ ^ ^T2. Spirit and Truth, p.13.
3. Dogmatik, I, p.403.
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to be reached directly "by any inference from given reality. >!e 
stand "before the 'Unknown G-od' ..... .Paul was come to bear witness
concerning a .Leader Who could show the way, as none other than He 
could, to this great Unknown."1 The philosophical quest - these 
writers claim - should not be merely academic but "existential." 
The point which present day theology makes is not that 
philosophy is unnecessary, but that it is not final in the matter 
of revelation. Emil Brunner, for example, admits that he has a 
strong personal interest in metaphysical questions and occasionally 
likes to "put in his own oar," but he goes on to say that "philoso- 
phical wars and rumours of war" have no significance for the Christ- 
ian faith. "When I said that Christian faith, or, to speak more 
concretely, the Christian theologian is only indirectly interested 
in questions of metaphysics and philosophy of religion, I did not 
mean that they are of no importance. '1'hey are as important and 
interesting as anything that concerns the nature of man. Indeed, 
as touching the centre of man, they have a specific importance. 
But from the point of view of Christian faith, they have signi- 
ficance only for the knowledge of man, not for the knowledge of 
G-od. According to faith's own assertion, Christian knowledge 
of G-od has a different source and a different content." 2 Phil- 
osophy can only go so far toward the Divine and then it must 
stop. If it persists in trying to ascend heights to which 
faith alone can attain, it does so in vain, like the child who 
reaches for the moon. "Beware lest any man spoil you through 
philosophy/
1. Glaube und jjenken, p.219 f; E.T. p.226.
2. The Word and the ./oriel, p. 16 f.
-266-
philosophy and. vain deceit," 1 Paul warned, and this is the caveat 
which modern theology sounds. "While philosophy has been able to 
weaken a religion," says Professor W.P. Patterson, "it has never 
been able to make one." 2 The insistence of present day theology 
as over against the theology represented by Strauss, Biedermann, 
and Troeltsch is that reason and revelation are not to be equated. 
Ho longer, as in the nineteenth century, is there felt to be a need 
to vindicate the Christian faith by philosophy. 3
The present day movement away from philosophical theology 
is but one point at which the nineteenth century systems of Strauss, 
Biedermann, and Troeltsch may be criticized. Modern theology has 
exposed other vulnerable spots in the theology of the last century, 
as for example in regard to the problem of the philosophy of his- 
tory. The nineteenth century was essentially an optimistic cen- 
tury. Self-assurance, placidity, and confidence were the ear-marks 
of its thinking. Theology was concerned with the divine potential- 
ities of man. If any asked, "How can I find G-od?" - there were 
a variety of ready answers. No one would have suggested that the
%.
road from man to G-od was an unbridged gulf. The Hegelian theory 
of horizontal history became the creed of a century which learned 
to base its arguments on evolution and progress. The imago Dei is 
latent/
1. Col. 2:8.
2. Rule of Faith, P-343.
3. Toward~the "end of his life Biedermann moved in this direction 
but he never completely arrived at a definite conviction in 
regard to the matter. Cf. also Kant's Opus Postumum which 
rejected the moral argument for G-od 1 s existence and vaguely 
pointed the way toward a theism.
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latent in every man and to awake to his divine apprenticeship "be- 
came the life task of every man.
In more modern times, however, due largely to the wide 
acceptance of the Barthian theology and to the recent findings of 
the new psychology, the nineteenth century Weltanschauung has seemed 
singularly out of date. The self-confidence of the last century 
has been exchanged for a more realistic, if less optimistic, view 
of man and the world. Brunner compares this self-sufficient 
attitude to the story of Robinson Crusoe which, he says, is the 
story of a man's endeavour to live a completely independent life 
discovering all truth by and for himself. 1 The present day theo- 
logy admonishes a new anthropology which places the accent on man's 
sin, on his failures, on his innate limitations. 'He speak to-day 
quite freely about "complexes," "reflexes," "inhibitions," and 
"repressions," words which to a nineteenth century theologian would 
have been not only meaningless but unworthy of man's high dignity. 
Those who speak disparagingly of the new theology think they do it 
harm by pointing out that its emphasis on the dark side of life is 
but a return to Calvin's doctrine of total depravity. But this is 
just the note which needs sounding these days, according to our 
latest theologians, our most learned psychologists, and our most 
popular fiction writers. There is no wish to return to the faint- 
hearted pussilanimitas of the Middle Ages, but there is a need to 
return to the realization that all men suffer a "sickness unto 
death,"/
1. The Word and the World, p.90.
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death," to use Kierkegaard's phrase. 1
The modern trend away from the easy optimism of the last 
century can "be dated rather exactly for it was initiated "by the 
humiliation of the World War. We have already noticed that the 
War had a profound effect upon the thinking of Troeltsch, but, in 
his case, rather than driving him to a more realistic view of life
it depressed him almost beyond hope and he became sullen and pessi-
2mistic. Troeltsch, perhaps, died too soon to revise his Weltan- 
schauung in the light of the War's aftermath. It is to the 
theologians of the post-war era to whom the deepening sense of 
failure came like a bomb scattering the self-assurance and confid- 
ence of the nineteenth century into a million pieces. Karl Barth, 
for example, speaks of the years which followed the War as a disease 
which spread over Europe like a plague. "A perplexity," he says, 
"extends over the whole range of human endeavour, present and 
future. It is a perplexity felt by man simply by virtue of his 
being a man, and has nothing to do with his being moral or immoral, 
spiritual or worldly, G-odly or ungodly. Man cannot escape his
human-ness, and human-ness means limitation, finitude, creature-
2hood, separation from G-od." And Emil Brunner makes the same con- 
fession. "We live," he says, "and yet we do not live. we are 
living beings. We have part in the life of the world which biol- 
ogy ascribes for us. We possess vitality: we are a ripple on the 
stream/
1. See Karl Heirn's Spirit and Truth, pp.116-118.
2. Of. the change which the first lecture in Christian Thought 
makes over Die Absolutheit des Clhristentums.
3. Das Wort G-ottes^und die"TCeologie, p. 189; E.T. p. 183.
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stream of the elan vital: the wonderful yet mysterious force which 
we call life holds us in its grip. But we observe that this vital- 
ity means not only life: it also means death. One does not have 
to be a sophist or cynic to call this life a desperate and vain 
struggle of the will-to-live against a must-die. Vain, I say, 
"because in the end death remains victorious over life." 1
This attitude in present day theology which sees life as 
a "perplexity" and a "vain struggle" is paralleled in other fields 
as, for example, in our post-war literature and our so-called new 
psychology. As one illustration of the former, the Kussian, 
Dostoievslgr, is a case in point. The impression which one receives 
in reading his novels is that the world is sick and that the natural 
man is a sorry creature, anything but divine. The only hope for 
man lies in his release from this mortal coil at death. Redemption 
becomes a possibility only after a descent has been made into the 
bottomless pit of despair. In contrast to Biedermann's definition 
of religion as an elevation of the human T I T to G-od the newer think- 
ing denies unequivocably that man can raise himself at all, and 
affirms that religion is really a descent, a going-down, to the 
very depths where man stands helpless before the presence of God. 
In the Reformation phrase, used in regard to Christ's Person, 
Finitum capax infiniti, Earth would insert a non and speak in 
Kierkegaard's language of the infinite qualitative difference bet- 
ween God and man.
The/
1. The Theology; of Crisis, p.45 f.
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The point need not "be laboured that present day theology 
moves away from the whole tenor of the nineteenth century. It "balks 
at Schleiermacher 1 s confusions and stoutly repudiates Hegel's coin- 
cidentia oppositorum. Of the former, Barth has said, "With all 
due respect to the genius of Schleiermacher I cannot consider him 
a good teacher in the realm of theology, because, so far as I can 
see, he is disastrously dim-sighted in regard to the fact that man 
as man is not only in need, but beyond all hope of saving himself; 
that the whole so-called religion, and not least the Christian re- 
ligion, shares in this need, and that one cannot speak of God simply 
by speaking of man in a loud voice." The clear cut distinction 
which characterizes this present day theology is between religion
and revelation and it is iJmil Brunner especially who has urged this
p distinction to great lengths. Religion is always a movement,
and a vain one, from man to God; revelation is always a movement 
from God to man. Such a distinction sounds strangely out of place 
in the systems of Strauss, Biedermann, and i'roeltsch, and the mod- 
ern insistence upon it indicates how far present day theology has
<T. 
moved away from the nineteenth century.
There is still one more important instance of the trend 
of present day theology away from the standards of the nineteenth 
century/
1. Das Wort Gottes und die 'i'heologie, p. 195; E.T. p. 195.
2. T/3F7 The Mediator.
3. SomeTJnTng perhaps ought to be said of Earth's theory of
Urgeschichte and Endgesohichte, of history above history. But 
suffice it to say that it is against such a relative theory of 
history as Troeltsch fostered. It attempts to reach an absol- 
ute which transcends history, i.e. revelation. History for 
Barth is from beneath, revelation is from above.
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century and that is in regard to lew Testament criticism. In this 
connection it is Strauss, rather than Biedermann or Troeltsch, v/ho 
stands out most sharply against the present tendency. The so- 
called ''mythical'1 method of Hew Testament criticism inaugurated "by 
Strauss has largely done its work and is to-day regarded rather as 
a necessary step in the history of criticism than as a challenging 
position. It is true that Strauss has his representatives to-day 
in such thinkers as Jensen, the reknown German Assyriologist who 
would explain all things "by his "Gilgamesh Epic;" Kalthoff who 
explains Christianity on social and economic grounds; the American, 
W.B. Smith who developed a pre-Christian cult of a divine Jesus; 
the Englishman, J.M. Robertson, a staunch supporter of the Kation- 
alist Press. But the modern mythical criticism has not the 
currency to-day that it had in the nineteenth century, it does not 
upset the whole field of theological thinking. To-day the inter- 
est in New Testament criticism is religious, not historical, in the 
sense that documents, texts, and dates are of paramount concern. 
The nineteenth century was occupied in a "Battle of the "books" and, 
as Professor Saints"bury has said, "It has been the mission of the 
nineteenth century to prove that everybody's work was written by
some one else, and it will not be the most useless task of the
p twentieth to betake itself to more profitable enquiries."
The results of Strauss's criticism and that of the Tubin- 
gen School which he initiated are largely discredited to-day. The 
nineteenth/
1. See Chapter V of M. Jones's The Hew Testament in the Twentieth
Century.
2. Quoted by Jones in The New Testament in the Twentieth  Gentury,
p.4.
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nineteenth century attempt to relegate most of the Hew Testament 
books to the middle of the second century stands in blatant con- 
tradiction with modern conclusions which place nearly every Hew 
Testament document, except perhaps for John's G-ospel and Second 
Peter, well within that margin and some scholars like Harnack even 
put the synoptic Gospels at 65 A.D,, a date which would have seemed 
ridiculously early to Strauss. Baur's four genuine Pauline epis- 
tles have now been increased to nine even among radical critics. 
At any rate, the interest to-day seems to be more in their relation- 
ship than in their authenticity and date. Maurice Jones says of 
the present century, "The pertinent enquiry is no longer 'Who wrote 
the books, and when were they written?' but 'What do the books 
contain, and what is the true meaning of that content? 1 The pre- 
sent age is essentially concerned with ideas, and with the problem 
of personality possibly even more than with ideas. 'Personality' 
may in truth be described as the key to the religious spirit of 
the age. In the matter, therefore, of the interpretation of the 
Lew Testament it is a question of 'personality' as revealed in 
Jesus Christ that is of supreme significance. I'he 'storm-centre' 
of the twentieth-century criticism is no longer the books of the 
Hew Testament as such, but the Person of Christ as represented and 
taught in the books. !t
The new attitude toward u'ew Testament criticism is illus- 
trated in the writings of such thinkers as Earth and Brunner. They 
give full acceptance to the criticism of the New Testament and deny 
that/
1. Jones, The Hew Testament in the Twentieth Century, p.5 f.
-273-
that it can harm or alter in any essential the Absolute Word of 
God. They see the right and the need for criticism and in -this 
respect they show how far away they are from the charge often made 
against them that their theology is but a quickened Fundamentalism. 
Brunner has made plain this position. He says, "Fundamentalism 
conflicts with science because it is not truly Christian. ... .the
principles of true Christianity and of true criticism are identical 
......Fundamentalism errs by insisting on rigidity and finality of
form, which, through lack of critical insight, it assumes to be 
essential to its existence......He who identifies the letters and
words of Scripture with the Word of G-od has never truly understood 
the Word of G-od - he knows not what constitutes a revelation."-^- 
In fact, Brunner himself confessed that he was something of a radi- 
cal in matters of criticism. Earth gives criticism full reign in 
saying, "Christian Churches and theology must let historism say 
its say out, in order that, when it has said what with full right 
it has to say about the Biblical text, the Church and theology may 
go on their own feet and say the other, the altogether other thing, 
that no longer is it devout men who are speaking but J&od's own
2voice is being heard." For Strauss and the nineteenth century in 
general criticism was tantamount to the destruction of cherished 
beliefs, and Strauss T s own rejection of Christianity in favour of 
a materialism is a tragic illustration of this conviction. But to 
Brunner/
1. The Theology of Crisis, pp.14,18,19,41.
2. Dogmatik, I, p.286.
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Brunner, for example, faith, is quite compatible with criticism. 
"Historical criticism," he says, has indeed freed us for ever from 
the conception of the unity which was the fruit of the theory of 
the Verbal Inspiration of the Scriptures. It is not the letter of 
Scripture which is the same in the Old and the New Testament, "but 
the Word, the rtord of U-od, and indeed in a manner which differen- 
tiates the whole Bible, in principle and categorically, from all 
other forms of religious literature. The Uod who speaks to us in 
the Bible speaks to us nowhere else. The Christian religion does 
not only assert the unity, but the exclusive unity of the revela- 
tion contained in the scriptures. This rtord of Uod is the word
\
of Jesus Christ in the Old Testament as well as in the New, the 
Word which is reality in Jesus Christ."
Doubtless in many other respects it could be shown that 
the newer theology has repudiated, in the main, the most surely 
believed tenets of the nineteenth century theology as represented 
in Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch. Much water has run under 
the theological bridges since their day, and, if rapids and whirl- 
pools still ruffle the current, the stream is a steadier one than 
it was in the last century for its strength is not drained so much 
by irrelevant tributaries. But the stream rushing on toward the 
open sea is sweeping over new country and the wide nineteenth cen- 
tury banks have given way to the regulating break-waters of the 
present day. No longer does theology flood over into the fields 
of philosophy as it once did, no longer does it idle along with an
air/
1. The Mediator, p.172 f.; of. The Word and the i<orld, pp.83 ff.
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air of optimistic tranquility. The theology of crisis has man- 
oeuvred the meandering stream of nineteenth century thought through 
the spill-way and "by freeing it of its excess "burden has directed 
its course through the rock-hewn channel of the V/ord of God.
The criticism of present day theology, only a small taste 
of which has "been given here, is not the sole means, nor the "best 
means, "by which the positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch 
may be judged and found v/anting. By indicating the difference in 
direction "between nineteenth century thinking and the modern day 
the general theological tenets of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch 
may be considered untenable, "but it remains to deal more particular- 
ly with the relation of Person to principle and while modern theo- 
logy has something to say about this it will serve our purpose 
better to turn to the New Testament itself. »*e do not create 
Christianity anew, we must seek it in its records.
The standard of jucjgonent by which the common Ghristology 
of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch must be criticized is the 
Hew Testament. What is the plain teaching of the Hew Testament 
in regard to the relation of the Person of Christ to the principle 
of redemption? This is the decisive question, and the answer we 
give v/ill decide the place which Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch 
must be given. The relation of Person to principle is, in the 
first instance, not so much a speculative problem as an historical 




The central theme of the Hew Testament teaching on re- 
demption is that Jesus Christ is the Mediator of G-od 1 s saving grace 
and is, accordingly, the Redeemer. From the speculative Christ- 
ologies of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch with their talk of 
myth, principle, and symbol we turn to the Hew Testament and find 
the simple formula that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world 
unto himself." 1 In this proclamation the whole of the New Testa- 
ment unites as with one voice declaring that in Christ redemption 
is made effective. No matter what the conclusions of "biblical 
criticism may "be, and no matter what the specific purpose of the 
individual writers may have "been, the "basic teaching of the Hew 
Testament is centred clearly and absolutely in the salvation 
wrought by Jesus Christ. "Jesus is Lord!" - this confession of 
the early Christians is written on every page of the Hew Testament. 
In his latest "book, Jesus der Herr, Professor Karl Heim of Tubingen 
writes, "If v/e had not been reared from youth in the language and 
phraseology of the ITew Testament, if rather we were to discover 
this book anew, the fact would strike us more sharply than is now 
the case that the Hew Testament, in spite of all its varieties of 
dogma, presents a common impression, namely the fact that here 
there speak to us men who have renounced their right to self- 
determination and have placed their lives in the hand of another 
who, even after His death, they are convinced will be with them
all/
1. 2 Cor. 5:19.
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all their days unto the end of the world. nl
There is no separation of Person and principle either in 
fact or in theory in the Kew Testament. The two are a unity in 
Scriptxire. If the Gospels are examined it will be discovered that 
Jesus Himself claimed to be the Msdiator, the Redeemer, the Saviour, 
and the Apostolic writings represent the confirmed belief in Jesus's 
witness to Himself. The New Testament, apart from Jesus's own 
claims, teaches that redemption comes through Him. The plain 
teaching of the New Testament has nothing to say about Strauss' s 
mythical Jesus, or about Biedermann 1 s principle of redemption, or 
about Troeltsch's symbol of community life. The plain teaching 
of the Hew Testament is that only God can save, yet Jesus saves.
That Jesus is Redeemer and Saviour is written in bold 
letters upon the pages of the Hew Testament. The very name Jesus 
is considered by the first Evangelist as a portent that "he shall 
save his people from their sins," 2 and the fourth Gospel explains 
His very existence "that the world through him might be saved." 3 
Redemption is never described as a principle or as an eternal truth 
apart from the Person of Christ. In Him "we have redemption
A
through his blood" not through His example or His illustration of 
what it means to be redeemed. He Himself in His own Person redeems. 
Redemption/
1. Jesus Per Herr, p.54 f. This book does not claim to be a 
Glaubenslehre but seeks to make plain the great "Either-Or." 
Either Jesus Christ is merely a great personality of the dead 
past - or He is the Living Lord; either we must put our trust 





Redemption cannot be achieved by striving toward ethical perfection, 
it is something given, as Paul says, "not according to our works" 1 
but through the grace of G-od in Jesus Christ "who gave himself for 
us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity and purify unto him- 
self a peculiar people, zealous of good works." 2 And the emphasis 
in the New Testament on Christ's redeeming work is put upon the 
Cross. It was the Death and Resurrection of Christ which, although 
disturbing the Apostles's hope (Lk. 24:20,21) and proving to be a 
stumbling-block to the Jews and foolishness to the G-reeks (I cor. 
1:23), were regarded as the guarantees of redemption. The Cross
is for the Apostles not the "colossal humbug" which it was to
2 Strauss but the "power of G-od." By means of the Cross Jesus was
able "to taste death for every man" 4 and it is in this sure know- 
ledge that the Apostle writes, "Forasmuch as ye know that ye were 
not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your 
vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers; but
with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and
K 
without spot." Redemption in the New Testament is not to be
reached, therefore, by the struggling ascent of man toward higher 
ideals but by the descent of God in Christ even to death on the
Cross.
The New Testament writers were not concerned with a doctrine
of/
1 2 Tim. 1:9.
2. Tit. 2:14.
3. I Cor. 1:18.
4. Heb. 2:9.
5. I Pet. 1:18,19.
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of redemption simply "because they knew from first-hand experience 
what Jesus had done for them. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Christology of the Apostles is always a simple, even a 
vague and undeveloped, statement of fact. They never theorize 
a"bout Christ or His power to redeem. The nineteenth century idea 
that redemption can be achieved "by man's own efforts would have 
"been ridiculous to the iu'ew Testament writers whose new found faith 
was centred solely in their experience of Jesus's loving and saving 
Person. Nor is the idea of Jesus's example as teacher, prophet, 
or religious genius, so common in the nineteenth century, given 
much place in Uew Testament Christology. Peter in the early chap- 
ters of Acts speaks of Jesus of Nazareth who "by miracles and signs 
showed Himself approved "by God, but he scarcely mentions Jesus the 
teacher. It was the Death and Resurrection of Christ which formed 
the main parts of Peter's Christology. .tiven Paul, who has been 
branded as the greatest theologian of Christianity, did not under- 
take a systematic delineation of Christ's Person or Work. For Paul, 
as for the Disciples, the knowledge of Christ's saving power was 
ultimately expressed in His Person. It is the exalted Christ 
which commands Paul's attention, but not in a metaphysical sense 
which would deprive His Person of humanity or historicity. She 
exalted Lord is also the Jesus "of the seed of jJavid according to 
the flesh." 1 Nor is the exalted Christ far removed from us. 




not I, but Christ liveth in me." Whether or not this is Christ- 
mysticism, what Paul definitely proclaims is the inwardness of 
faith in Christ as the Redeemer.
The Hew Testament exhibits an Apostolic licence in formu- 
lating a Christology. Doctrines are subordinated to the experience 
of redemption in Christ. The New Testament minds may be likened 
to a prison through which the one white light of Jesus Christ 
passed and was broken up into different colours. The Epistle to 
the Hebrews, with all its critical and exegetical problems, makes 
it plain that Christ 1 s Person is the guarantee of His Mediatorship. 
The Johannine Christology, with its disturbing Logos doctrine, 
nevertheless declares that Christ is the measure of all things. 
Differing in their accounts, the ITew Testament writers are in agree- 
ment that in Jesus and in Him alone is there redemption. Jesus 
Himself had not formally taught a doctrine of His Person and in'ori:. 
In regard to His saving mission there are but two explicit refer- 
ences. At one time He said, "The Son of man came not to be min- 
istered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for 
many." 2 ifoatever the words "ransom" and "many" imply, it is clear 
from this passage that Jesus regarded His mission as the Redeemer 
to involve His death. In the other instance which reveals His
own consciousness of His mission, He said, "This is my blood of
2 the new testament, which is shed for many." The giving up of






was to be made effective. It was the simple formula, Jesus saves, 
upon which the Apostles based their christologies. It was not 
a conviction adopted from or fostered by Judaism or contemporary 
thought, it was a unique experience to which they were compelled 
to witness. There are, no doubt, various speculative theories 
possible as to how Christ saves, the Apostles themselves differed 
here, but the one point on which there was general agreement is 
that Christ does save.
Person and principle are never separated in the Hew Tes- 
tament. Redemption is a meaningless term in the lew Testament 
apart from Christ, and Christ is always regarded as somehow one 
with G-od. To say with Strauss that Christ and His Disciples were 
disillusioned is to ignore the potent power which the New Testament 
reveals, as for example, in the missionary activities of the early 
Apostles. i'his power was the gift of Christ. To say with £ie- 
dermann that Christ inaugurated the principle of redemption which 
can now be freed of His Person, is to fly in the face of the raul- 
ine Christology which definitely relates redemption with the Redeem- 
er. Or to say with 1'roeltsch that trod is ultimately the Redeemer 
and that Jesus's only value lies in the unifying power which He 
gave to the early Christian community, is to forget Christ's own 
witness to His mission and the fact that the Christian community 
owed its existence to its faith in Christ as the Redeemer, not 
merely as the symbol of life. Unless, therefore, we are to ignore 
the plain teaching of the ttew Testament, Strauss, -biedermann, said 
Troeltsch are in serious error in separating Person from principle. 
If they have not the uospel at the foundations of their systems,
and/
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and the G-ospel is essentially the good news that God is in Christ 
reconciling the world, then their systems scarcely deserve to "be 
called Christian. What they construct is something altogether 
different from Christian theology. It may "bear resemblances to 
the G-ospel, it may even use the Gospel vocabulary, but that it is 
not the Gospel is certainly obvious.
The New Testament faith in Jesus Christ as the Redeemer 
which lay at the heart of its vague and groping Christologies is 
confirmed in the first century writings of the Apostolic Fathers. 
The fact that thinkers like Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and Polycarp 
reiterated the firm conviction of the New Testament is significant 
in the face of the contentions made by Strauss, Biedermann, and 
Troeltsch. Strauss held that the U'ew Testament writers had been 
led astray in their accounts of the life and work of Jesus because 
of the hopes and promises of the Old Testament. Hot only this, 
but he held toward the end of his life that Jesus Himself as well 
as His narrators had been radically disillusioned. Wow it is con- 
ceivable that this should have been the ease were it not for the 
fact of history. If Christianity had terminated with the death of 
Christ, if there had been no Christian Church, then Strauss 1 s inter- 
pretation would perhaps be conceivable. But the historical situa- 
tion is quite otherwise. History shows us that Christianity grew 
by leaps and bounds, that early Christians were enabled to turn
"the/
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"the world upside down." Christians did not cease to exist when 
Christ was crucified, in fact through the witness of the Apostles 
multitudes confessed their faith in Him as their Redeemer. To stand 
with Strauss is to ignore the early history of the Church and to 
discredit the intelligence and sincerity of an ever-increasing 
multitude of followers.
In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers it is plain that 
redemption was defined, as in the New Testament, with reference to 
the Person of Christ. Again and .again in these first century 
documents there appears the straightforward declaration that in 
Christ alone is there salvation. Strauss's theory does not seem 
to ji"be with the facts. It speaks of disillusionment and unful- 
filled promises; they speak of redemption and the glory that is 
in Christ. In the so-called Second Epistle of Clement, an ancient 
homily whose real author is unknown, the opening words express the 
conviction of an early Christian. "Brethern," it reads, "we ought 
so to think of Jesus Christ, as of &od, as of the Judge of quick 
and dead. . . . . .Jtf'or He had mercy on us, and in His compassion saved
us, having beheld in us much error and perdition, even when we had 
no hope of salvation, save that which came from Him. For He called 
us, when we were not, and from not "being He willed us to "be." 2 Or 
consider, for example, the oft-quoted confession of Polycarp when 
he was asked to renounce his faith in Christ: "Fourscore and six 
years have I "been His servant, and He hath done me no wrong. How 
then/
1. Acts 17:6.
2. Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, p.86
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then can I "blaspheme my King who saved me?" 1 Or as another illus- 
tration take these words from Clement 1 s Epistle to the Corinthians: 
"We, having "been called through His will in Christ Jesus, are not 
justified through ourselves or through our own wisdom or under- 
standing or piety or works which we wrought in holiness of heart, 
"but through faith, whereby the Almighty G-od justified all men that
have been, from the beginning; to whom be the glory for ever and
2 ever. Amen."
Do these utterances support Strauss's notion that the 
early Christians were disillusioned? Do these confessions of 
faith suggest that they were originated as rationalizations of un- 
fulfilled hopes? Or rather do we not see here a joyous conviction, 
a sure knowledge, that new life has come to these men through Jesus 
Christ? These writers would have laughed at Strauss 1 s criticism 
and pointed to their own lives as proof of what they believed. 
These early Christians were able to upset the world not because 
they had discovered eternal truths or a principle of redemption 
but because they themselves knew that their lives had been changed 
through no personal merit but only through the grace of trod in
Christ.
Biedermann's repeated, if inconsistent, attempt to separ- 
ate and yet unite the Person of Christ and the principle of redemp- 
tion stands over against the Apostolic Fathers as a speculative 
hypothesis opposes a firm belief. billing to admit that it was 
Jesus/
1. Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, p.206
2. " " " p.70.
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Jesus who first gave the principle of redemption its intelligence 
and its currency, Biedermann nevertheless insisted that we do 
wrongly to predicate of Jesus what was meant only for divine man- 
kind. I'he principle once delivered exists in its own right with- 
out the support of the Person. In the face of such v/ri tings as 
are attributed to the Apostolic Fathers what he suggests is decidedr 
ly counter to what was "by them most surely believed. Just as the 
New Testament is devoid of any separation of Person from principle 
so too the Apostolic .fathers insist that redemption comes from the 
Redeemer. "Let us fix our eyes," says uiement, "on the blood of 
Christ and understand how precious it is unto His father, because 
being shed for our salvation it won for the whole world the grace 
of repentance." 1 Here is Biedermann's principle of redemption 
made available to mankind, but not without the Person of Christ 
whose "blood", i.e. whose life on earth and death on the Cross, is 
the means of redemption, not only the guarantee and illustration. 
It is not the principle which these writers seek, but the Person.
"Him I seek," says Ignatius writing to the Romans, "who died on
•p 
our behalf; Him I desire, who rose again." Or as the same writer
says in writing to the Smyrnaens, "I have perceived that ye are 
established in faith immovable, being as it were nailed on the 
cross of the Lord Jesus Christ, in flesh and in spirit, and firmly 
grounded in love in the blood of Christ, fully persuaded as touch- 
ing our Lord that He is truly of the race of David according to the 
flesh,/
1 Lightfoot, Apostolic fathers, p.60. 
.      H n p. 151.
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flesh, "but Son of God "by the Divine will and power." There is 
no separation of Person and principle here. Salvation is grounded 
in the Person and to seek to loose Him from redemption is a meaning- 
less enterprise to which the Apostolic Fathers gave no thought 
simply because it was unthinkable.
If we place Troeltsch's insistence that Jesus has nothing 
to do with redemption but derives His whole significance from the 
fact that Christians have made Him the symbol and centre of the 
community over against the teaching of the Apostolic Fathers, the 
same contradiction appears as in the case of Strauss and BiedermaniL 
In the first place, Troeltsch's separation of the Person of Christ 
from redemption is as unthinkable as Is Biedermann's in the light 
of the Apostolic Fathers. To define redemption as our knowledge 
of God's Will is not to define it as the early Christians experi- 
enced it. True, redemption did bring about a new knowledge of the 
Will of God, but redemption was never defined by them in human or 
intellectual terms but always with regard to the Redeemer, Jesus 
Christ. "This then," reads the Second Epistle of Clement, "is our 
reward, if verily we shall confess Him through whom we were saved."^ 
Troeltsch T s theory that Christ was the rallying-point of the early 
Christian community is in line with the Apostolic Fathers until he 
begins to emphasize the sociological character of Christianity to 
the exclusion of the Person of Christ. These early Christians did 
centre their life in the Person of Christ but not merely as a symbol, 
He/
1. Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, p.156.
2. " " Tl p. 87.
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He was to them a living reality who had redeemed them from a dead 
existence to a new creature-hood. "Ye are stones of a temple," 
says Ignatius to the Ephesians, "which were prepared "beforehand for 
a building of God the Father, "being hoisted up to the heights 
through the engine of Jesus Christ, which is the Gross, and using 
for a rope the Holy Spirit; while your faith is your windlass, and 
love is the way that leadeth up to G-od." Here is Troeltsch's 
Christian society "but it is brought into being, it is "hoisted up", 
through Jesus Christ - who is no mere symbol or principle of 
cohesion, He is the very "engine" which makes it possible and with- 
out whom it would cease to be. Writing to the Magnesians, Ignat- 
ius says, "Be ye salted in Him, that none among you grow putrid,
seeing that by your savour ye shall be proved. It is monstrous
P to talk of Jesus Christ and to practise Judaism." To be salted
in Him, this is the secret of the Christian community.
The criticism of Strauss, the speculation of Biedermann, 
and the sociology of Troeltseh stand in a disjointed relationship 
to the writings of the Apostolic Fathers. The disillusionment and 
short-sighteitiess with which the early Christians are charged are 
conclusions of a later day and age and are not discernible in the 
records themselves. Over against the cold speculation of our 
nineteenth century thinkers place this jubilant declaration found 
in the Epistle to Diognetus: "In whom was it possible for us law- 
less and ungodly men to have been justified, save only in the Son 
of/
1. Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, p.139. 
TI  »" p.145.
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of God? 0 the sweet exchange, 0 the inscrutable creation, 0 the 
unexpected "benefits; that the iniquity of many should be concealed 
in One Righteous Man, and the righteousness of One should justify 
many that are iniquitous!" Could Strauss, Biedermann, or 
Troeltsch deny that the writer of these words had found the secret 
of redemption?
The plain teaching of the Hew Testament, which speaks 
always of Jesus Christ the Redeemer and never of a principle of 
redemption, is confirmed not only in the writings of the Apostolic 
Fathers but in the continuing experience of the Christian Church. 
The testimony of Christians throughout the centuries has been in 
line with the teaching of the New Testament.
Throughout the Christological centuries there were many 
controversies and heresies in regard to the Person of Christ, but 
any divergency from the New Testament was not to separate the Per- 
son from the principle but was concerned chiefly with the inter- 
pretation of the Person. Driving a straight and oftentimes narrow 
wedge between the conflicting Christologies of the fourth century 
and later, the Church drafted its great Creeds, its confessions of 
faith, all of which made it clear that in Jesus Christ and only in 
Him is there redemption. Coming up to the Reformation era, which 
was not essentially concerned with Christology, the New Testament 
teaching /
1. Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, p.508 f
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teaching on redemption was kept intact and if the preceding cen- 
turies had forgotten that Jesus Christ was the Redeemer the Refor- 
mers "brought it to the consciousness of the Church once again with 
renewed emphasis. It was not until the nineteenth century that 
the separation of Person and principle had any wide-spread effect 
upon the general trend of the Church's thinking. Tte common 
Christological position of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch was 
no doubt incipient in many of the tendencies of earlier centuries, 
as in Arianism, Socinianism, and Deism to take three widely separated 
illustrations, tut until the nineteenth century the Church was in 
general agreement that Jesus Christ was the only Mediator without 
whom redemption, not to say Christianity itself, was unthinkable.
It is possible to trace the Hew Testament faith, as 
opposed to the separation of Person from principle as represented 
in Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch, in the experiences of Chris1>- 
ians who, though they may "be separated by a span of centuries or 
even by a continent, are as one in affirming with the Disciples 
and Apostles that redemption is mediated through Jesus Christ. 
History offers a wide choice of illustrations, but we will confine 
ourselves to three: Augustine, Sadhu Sundar Singh, and Kagawa. 
This selection is quite arbitrary, it is made in order to show that 
the Christian experience of those who declare that they know what
 
redemption means is the same for the fifth century as for the twen- 
tieth, the same for the Hindu as for the Japanese. All three are 
alike in so far as they experienced a definite conversion to Chrisir 
ianity and for that reason what they have to say about redemption 




Augustine, who is regarded not only as the greatest of 
the Apostolic Fathers but the spiritual father of the Reformation, 
"bridges the centuries from the early Church to modern times. It 
is not too rash a thing to say that he has influenced all systems 
of Christian thought. Catholics, Protestants, Rationalists have 
admitted him to "be the greatest of the Church Fathers. Every great 
thinker since his day has referred to him in some way or another. 
We need not here attempt to determine wherein Augustine's genius 
lay, "but the impetus and spiritual passion which he "bequeathed to 
subsequent Christian thinking lay certainly to a large degree in 
the personal authority with which he spoke and wrote. Christian 
thinkers everywhere at all times have acquiesced to his personal 
experience.
V/hether or not Augustine in his youth was such an immoral 
scoundrel as we have "been led to believe is an open question, but 
it is certainly undeniable that he experienced a right-about-face 
conversion which translated him from the quest for truth in Mani- 
chaeism and Heo-Platonism to a deep conviction in the Christian 
faith. The Confessions, the classic which contains the history 
of his life up to the time when he became a Christian, is not so 
much an acknowledgment of sin as it is an expression of praise and 
thanksgiving for a new found faith. Troubled by his inconsistency 
in holding to high ethical ideals and yet living a life far below 
his aspirations, Augustine suddenly solved his problem when one 
day as he was walking in a garden he heard the voice of a child 
say,/
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say, "Tolle lege, tolle lege". He interpreted this to refer to 
the Scriptures and as he opened the Hew Testament his eyes fell 
upon the Pauline text, "Let us walk honestly, as in the day; not 
in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wontonness, not 
in strife and envying. But put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and 
make not provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof." 1 
From this time on his whole life waa changed and he was enabled to 
overcome the temptations and difficulties with which his life had 
been burdened. Augustine's conversion in the year 386 A.D. was 
but the same sort of experience which from Paul to the present day 
has been the common experience of countless Christian men and women.
Augustine's thought is characterized by a deep mystical 
piety which is the expression of a living relationship with G-od.
The oft-quoted sentence, "Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor
2 nostrum, donee requieseat in te" sets the tenor of the Confessions
and expresses the great joy which this discovery gave him. This 
is no speculative union with the Absolute in the Hegelian sense 
but a living relationship with a living G-od. Augustine, like all 
Christians who attempt to explain their faith, did not attribute 
his redemption to his own efforts but solely to the grace of G-od. 
"I sought a way of acquiring strength to enjoy Thee," he says, 
"but I found it not until I embraced that 'Mediator between God 
and man, the man Christ Jesus,' 'who is over all G-od blessed for- 
ever 1 calling me." 3 Only God through Jesus Christ is able to 
redeem./
1. Rom. 13:13-14; Confessions, VIII, 12.
2. Confessions, I, 1.
3.     » VII, 18.
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redeem. Man alone is utterly lost and when G-od redeems a man 
through Christ he will say as did Augustine, n lSy whole hope is only 
in Thy exceeding great mercy."
Although much of Augustine's thinking in regard to the 
Person of Christ was coloured "by the thinking of his day, one point 
is clear and that is that Jesus Christ is the only Mediator "between 
G-od and man and the only Redeemer. In the Btichiridion, a little 
handbook of Christianity, he says of sin "It cannot "be pardoned 
and "blotted out except through the mediator between G-od and man,
o
the man, Christ Jesus." Christ's Cross is the sign that sin has 
"been remitted, - it matters not whether Augustine interpreted 
Christ's Atonement as a sacrifice to G-od or as a ransom to the 
Devil. Conscious of the torment and ubiquity of sin Augustine 
was convinced that "no one, no, not one, has "been delivered, or is 
being delivered, or ever will be delivered, except by the grace of
rs
the Redeemer." There is no suggestion in Augustine of a principle 
of redemption which might be subtracted from the Person of Christ. 
ISan himself or even the ideal of human perfection is as nothing 
without the sovereign grace of G-od in Christ. To strive upward 
toward the ideal of union with the Infinite, as Hegel later advised, 
would have seemed ridiculous to Augustine who regarded redemption 
as the gift of G-od not to be achieved but to be accepted. 
Augustine's experience stands in direct opposition to the common 
position/
1. Confessions, X, 29.
2. Enchiridion, 48.
3. Original Sin, 34.
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position of Strauss, Biedermanii, and Troeltsch. Between the 
mythical criticism of Strauss, the speculative theology of Bje der- 
mann, the relativistic sociology of Troeltseh, and the personal 
faith of Augustine , there exists a chasm so deep and clearly de- 
fined that one is forced to take sides and say, "This side is 
right; that side is wrong." To one who reads in Augustine's 
words his own experience, so that the great Church Father seems to 
speak not of himself tut for all who have come to the knowledge of 
G-od in Christ, the logical abstractions and rational tenets of the 
nineteenth century seem but sounding "brass or tinkling cymbals. 
What can myth and disillusion mean to such as share Augustine's 
experience? What can the separation of Person from principle 
mean to a man who humbly acknowledges that his conversion from a 
worse to a better life, from death to life indeed, from darkness 
to light, from ignorance to knowledge, has been brought about by 
Jesus Christ? And what does it mean to speak of a Jesus who is 
a link in a prophetic chain and who derives His significance solely 
from His connection with, the Christian community to one who speaks 
of Jesus and G-od in the same breath?
The difference between Augustine and Strauss, Biedermann, 
and Troeltsch is the difference of extremes of which there can be 
no coincidentia oppositorum. It is the difference between the 
experiential and the speculative approach. While Strauss, Bieder- 
mann, and Troeltsch went to great lengths to buttress their posi- 
tions with, hard and fast arguments, with logic, c ommon-sense, and 
reason, Augustine simply stated in the simplest language possible 
his experience of saving grace. He did not try to prove it, he
did/
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did not even appeal to common-sense, he knew what he had experi- 
enced through the Person of Christ and that loiowledge was for him 
the surest thing in life. Eternal truths, principles, historical 
tendencies, all these which concerned the nineteenth century are 
left out of Augustine's vocabulary and experience. The one point 
on which he concentrated all his thinking was Jesus Christ the 
only Mediator "between God and man.
To turn from Augustine to Sadhu Sundar Singh is to pass 
from the Ancient Church to the twentieth century, from the Roman 
Empire to India. But the differences in time, country, and race 
are offset by the same evangelical experience which characterizes 
these two names. The Sadhu might be compared with the great 
Church Father in many respects. They shared a common conversion 
experience from which they dated their spiritual existence; their 
experience led to a mystical piety rooted in a living relationship 
with G-od through Jesus Christ; they attributed their Christian 
faith unequivocably to the almighty love of God who through the 
Son had brought them from a state of sin to divine iionship.
In his little book, With and without Christ, Sadhu Sundar 
Singh gives an account of his life in India, his rearing in the 
Hindu religion, his spiritual problems, and his conversion to 
Christianity with its subsequent joy and comfort. In all this we 
are reminded of Augustine's Confessions not only because the con- 
tent is very much the same but even little things, like the influ- 
ence of their mothers, are strikingly parallel. Just as Augustine 
continued to hunger and thirst after truth and peace although 
Cicero and Manichaeism interested him for a time, so, too, the
Sadhu/
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Sadhu found little consolation in the Hindu Shastras and Sanskrit 
scriptures. "I was disappointed", he says, "I could not find any- 
where that spiritual food for which I hungered, and in this state 
of unrest I remained until I found the Living Christ." 1
Sadhu Sundar Singh, disappointed with his Hindu teachers, 
went to the American Presbyterian Mission school at Kampur "but he 
found no immediate solution to his queries there and, in fact, "be- 
came quite antagonistic to Christianity. Prom Rampur he went to 
Sanewal to the Government school and it was while studying here 
that he was converted. His own account of this experience is 
fascinating and arresting. "I got up at three in the morning," 
he says, "and after bathing, I prayed that if there was a God at 
all He would reveal Himself to me, and show me the way of salvation, 
and end this unrest of my soul. I firmly made up my mind that, 
if this prayer was not answered, I would "before daylight go down 
to the railway, and place my head on the line "before the incoming 
train. I remained till about half-past four praying and waiting 
and expecting to see Krishna, or Buddha, or some other ^.vatar of 
the Hindu religion; they appeared not, but a light was shining in 
the room. I opened the door to see where it came from, but all 
was dark outside. I returned inside, and the light increased in 
intensity and took the form of a globe of light above the ground, 
and in this light there appeared, not the form I expected, but the 
Living Christ whom I had counted as dead. To all eternity I shall 
never/
1. V/ith and without Christ, p.96.
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never forget His glorious and loving face, nor the few words which 
He spoke: 'Why do you persecute me? See, I have died on the 
Cross for you and for the whole world. ' These words were "burned 
into my heart as "by lightning, and I fell on the ground before Him. 
Ifcr heart was filled with inexpressible joy and peace, and my whole 
life was entirely changed. Then the old Sundar Singh died and a 
new Sundar Singh, to serve the Living Christ, was bora." 1
As he concludes his little "book, the Sadhu confesses 
that "Without Christ I was like a fish out of water, or like a bird 
in the water. »/ith Christ I am in the ocean of Love, and while 
in the world, am in heaven." It was the reality of the Living 
Christ in his life which made all the difference to Sundar Singh, 
He was no theological professor, no Hegelian dialectician, he never 
argues, he proclaims and declares. "The proof of the power and 
presence of the Living Christ is found," he says, "not in this
world 1 s philosophy and imperfect logic, but in the lives and ex-
v. 
periences of true Christians." He himself is one of the best
proofs because surely he was a true Christian. But the Sadhu 
claimed no monopoly on his experience. He was aware that what had 
happened to him had happened to countless others like himself. As 
we read our own thoughts between the lines of the Confessions of 
Augustine, so, too, we group ourselves with those who share in the 
Sadhu's experience. The Sadhu never set himself apart as an ex- 
ception. He regarded himself as one among a multitude of all 
kinds/
1. rfith and without Christ, p.100 f.
~~"~~ " " p. 129.
n TI " " p.viii.
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kinds of "beings who have come to know u-od through Jesus Christ. 
"Scientists and philosophers who believe in evolution," says the 
Sadhu, "speak of the survival of the fittest by natural selection. 
Here is, however, another greater fact, proved by the changed lives 
of millions, that in divine selection there is the survival of the 
unfit (i.e. sinners). Drunkards, adulterers, murderers, robbers, 
have been lifted up from the depths of sin and misery and have re- 
ceived a new life of peace and joy. 1'his is the salvation which 
is obtained through Jesus Christ, who came into the world to save 
sinners."
Sadhu Sundar Singh, like the Disciples and .apostles, 
like the Apostolic i'athers, and like Augustine, referred his Christ- 
ian faith not to any principle or idea of Christianity apart from 
Christ but to Jesus Christ Himself, the author of salvation. Con- 
scious of his own inability to rise to any heights, the Sadhu 
realized that if he were to enjoy peace and joy it would not be 
because he had sought them but because they had been given to him. 
!1 0n account of sin, the conscience becomes numb and the will is 
made weak and powerless. In such a condition, a man, seeing death 
and danger ahead, is unable to escape them - so helpless is he - 
even though he has a strong desire to do so."2 Only through Christ 
can a man be saved from hopeless despair to radiant peace. "Christ- 
ianity," says the Sadhu, "is Christ Himself, Who said, 'I am the 
V/ay, the Truth, and the Life 1 (Jn. xiv. 6). This cannot be said 
about/
1 - Reality and Religion, p.63. 
2. " " » p.69 f.
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about any other religion. They are "based on ceremonies and 
teachings, but Christianity is based on the living Christ Himself, 
Who is with us for ever. Christ gave His followers no word written 
"by His own hand, for the reason that He Himself was always to be 
with them, nay, in them, and to carry on His work through them." 1
Sadhu Sundar singh takes his place along with Augustine 
as another illustration from a different century and a different 
race of the Christian experience which, as opposed to the specula- 
tive theology of the nineteenth century, bases redemption on the 
Person of Christ. It now remains to speak of one other example, 
Toyohiko Kagawa of Japan.
Kagawa is without doubt the leading Christian social 
worker in the world to-day. American journalists like to tag him 
as "Japan's No.l Christian," but the description is perhaps too 
confining for he does not belong to Japan alone but to the whole 
world. Like Augustine and Sadhu Sundar Singh he illustrates the 
Christian experience which opposes the speculative theorizing of 
the nineteenth century. In other respects he differs widely from 
the great Church Father and the Sadhu. Augustine was driven to 
monasticism and meditation, Sundar Singh found his Christian faith 
driving him to the four corners- of the globe preaching and witness- 
ing to the power of Christ, but Kagawa interprets his experience 
in terms of social service work, his Christianity takes him to the
slums.
The/
1. The Search after Reality, p.59.
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The memory of his childhood is a haunting nightmare to 
Kagawa. He was denied the love and care which a child is heir to 
"because he was. an -unwanted child. His disagreeable family life 
forced him to live by himself and little by little his thoughts 
and dreams became insoluble questions for which he could find no 
adequate answers. "There is nothing to do but to drift with the 
clouds and be driven by the rain," he laments. "Oh, that the 
thunders would roll and the rain descend in torrents! Or that the 
ship of life would suddenly sink and I could go down with it in 
peace." Despair and disappointment came to the young Kagawa in 
heavy measure. He was profoundly affected by evidences of oppres- 
sion and poverty which he saw on every hand. The misery and hard- 
ships of the poorer people of Japan became his own suffering but 
he felt utterly helpless to alleviate their lot.
Just when life seemed to have resolved itself into a
V
baffling perplexity out of which there was no avenue of escape, 
Kagawa came under the influence of Christian missionaries. In their 
home he discovered the love and affection, the gentleness and ten- 
derness, the comradeship and congeniality, which he had been so 
long denied. But more than these things he heard for the first 
time the words of the Mew Testament and listened to the mission- 
aries 1 witness to the saving love and power of Jesus Christ. 
Kagawa 1 s conversion was not so sudden as was Augustine's or Sundar 
Singh's, it was perhaps not so intense, but it was nevertheless 
real/
1. William Axling, Kagawa. p.28.
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real and permanent. His biographer tells the story how one of 
his missionary friends talked to him out in the open one day saying 
to the sad Japanese, "Look at the sky, look at the sun, let your 
tears evaporate and then we will laugh." They did laugh and for 
the first time in his life a heavy load seemed to slip from Kagawa's 
shoulders. He read the words of Jesus which run, "Consider the 
lilies of the field, how they grow" and the passage so impressed 
him that he finally fell to his knees and prayed, "0 God, make me 
like Christ." 1 From this time on life was worth living. He de- 
serted the camps of despair and volunteered his services in the 
lists of those who fight for Christ. To be a Christian meant one 
thing surely, that he must live as much like Christ as he could. 
To minister and not be ministered unto became his battle-cry as he 
sallied forth among the slums to deal with the old problems in a 
new way and with a new power.
There is no need to enter here into the well-nigh mira- 
culous work which Kagawa has done and is still doing among Japan's 
poor. i'rom a despised and persecuted street-preacher he has be- 
come the most outstanding of modern social workers whose name is 
revered and loved by an ever-increasing multitude and whose ser- 
vices, though once regarded as hostile, have been commandeered on 
more than one occasion by the Japanese government. He who found 
it difficult to speak his own mind and heart because of persecution 
and opposition has been the mouthpiece of the working classes v/ho 




totally blind in one eye and partially blind in the other, often 
starved and half frozen, he has been at death's door frequently, 
but so robust is his will-to-live and so indomitable his spirit 
that in spite of physical handicaps he has lived on to pursue his 
life's work. The Western tiorld is just beginning to hear of 
Kagawa's work in Japan. The Christian service which he has been 
rendering is just beginning to find its echo in other parts of the 
world, and there is every reason to believe that we shall hear more 
an.d more of "Japan's No.l Christian."
But Kagawa is primarily a Christian end only secondarily 
a socialist. His work among the poor is the outcome of his Christ­ 
ian experience. TO love Christ means for him to love all of man­ 
kind and to serve it as the Master Himself did. Social readjust­ 
ments must be Christ-centred. "The Christian in Kagawa overshadows 
the Socialist," says his biographer. "The follower of the Nazarene 
in him takes precedence over the advocate of economic reform. The 
prophet in his soul is Christian, capitalized and written in letters 
of light. Of all the emotions which race through his finely strung 
personality, the passion to make Christ known and adventurously 
incarnate His life is uppermost and controlling. He is the flaming 
apostle of the Kingdom." 1
Jj'or Kagawa the standard by which all phases of life must 
be judged is Christ. He repudiates denominations and conventional 
restrictions and preaches a Christ who can be understood by the 




he has at hand a powerful social weapon. .But Kagawa 1 s Christian- 
ity is no merely social programme, he "bases everything upon the 
Person of Christ who as a living reality gives power and efficiency 
to social readjustments. He has never become lost in his social 
reconstruction or allowed the Gospel to fade in importance, it is 
always the primary consideration, the heart and soul of his social 
work. "If we do not discount the Gospel," he says, ""but take it 
seriously and live it adventurously, we will "be able to do far more 
than Russian communism ever dreams of doing in building a better 
world." And again he makes the same declaration, "The Gospel of
Christ is for society as well as for the individual. Unless Christ
f) 
is made the centre of the social movement, the world is doomed."
"The formula," he says, for the Kingdom of G-od, "is the G-olden Rule 
plus the blood of Christ. The blood of Christ is circulating all 
the time and every where. It goes into every festering place, 
every weak place, every place of need. It goes with healing, re- 
storing, and upbuilding power into every phase of life, both for
3 the individual and for society."
Kagawa calls himself "Christ's fool 1." because he is the 
laughing stock of countless who have no use for his Christianity. 
But he delights in their mockery for he loiows that fool though he 
be, he is Christ's fool, and if it seem to some that his life has 
been wasted, "tied up to society's rubbish-heap," he is unconcerned 







a social worker, his name would be highly revered Tmt he would "be 
likened in kind, if not in degree, with other social workers. 
Kagawa's social work is distinguished because it is Christian. He 
places his life in touch with Christ and it is only through His 
power that he has been able to do what he has done. Kagawa would 
be the last to claim that he himself has accomplished wonders in 
Japan. He would refer all his work, as well as his life, to the 
love of God in Jesus Christ. Christianity is for him no mere 
principle separable from Christ, it is Christ Himself who makes 
Christianity a power in the world for good.
Kagawa has nothing in common with dtrauss, JBiedermann, 
and Troeltseh who speculate and theorize about Christ. "He who 
delights in theorizing would better steer clear of Jesus," he says. 
Paralleling the mystical experience of union with a Living Christ, 
Kagawa takes his stand with Augustine and Sundar iingh against all 
that would dethrone Christ from His rightful place by the father.
i/hen the experiences of such Christians as Augustine, Sundar 
iingh, and Kagawa are opposed to the speculative Christologies of 
Strauss, Medermann, and 'I'roeltsch several distinct differences 
emerge in the contrast. That the Christian experience of the 
former is rooted in the Person of Christ, while that of the latter 
is concerned with a principle apart from the Person, is the great- 




further points worth mentioning.
The positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and i'roeltsch are 
seen to lack the sense of sin which characterizes the experiences 
of Augustine, sundar Singh, and Kagawa. The nineteenth century 
avoidance of the fact of sin has "been considered above, "but in 
connection with the experiences of these three great Christians 
that avoidance is put into prominent relief. The nineteenth cen- 
tury attempt to skip over sin, to define it as moral lethargy, or 
to regard it as a lower stage of existence from which man "by his 
own efforts can extricate himself, these definitions have no place 
in the Christian experience. Sin for the Christian is a very real 
thing. jj'or Augustine it was the one big problem for which phil- 
osophy had no solution. i'or Kagawa it was an irresistible force 
which worked for misery and wretchedness. The Christian experience 
thinks not so much about sins in the plural as about sin in the 
singular. Sin is a part of human personality, a "radical evil, 11 
as Kant said. But the Christian experience not only has a deep 
sense of sin but a sure knowledge that sin can be forgiven through 
Christ, not through moral struggling as the nineteenth century 
urged, but only through Christ, the i'orgiver.
Further, the nineteenth century Christology appears a 
very hopeless, uninspiring thing in the light of the power and 
radiance which spring spontaneously from the Christian experience. 
«e have followed the lives of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch 
and discovered that each of them in varying degrees verged toward 
a pessimism and despair. Strauss could find no inspiration in 
his myths or eternal truths and eventually landed in materialism
where/
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where he found rational laws but no comfort for his soul. Bieder- 
mann on his deathbed, as it were, "began too late to see that his 
principle of Christianity was a poor, emasculated thing. The last 
lectures of Troeltsch exhibit a pessimistic attitude which sees 
things as they are but sees no hope of improvement. But the 
Christian experience is rooted in the Gospel of hope, "But as many 
as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, 
even to them that believe on his name." Doubtless, Micah T s de- 
finition of religion, "to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk
2 humbly with thy God," would have appealed to the nineteenth century
temper, but God's requirement and man's meeting of it are two very 
different things. I>uty and deed do not always go hand in hand, 
and if the nineteenth century had high hopes and good intentions 
it lacked energy and power, the means of attaining high hopes and 
good intentions. Augustine, Sundar Singh, Kagawa, - these names 
spell joy and hope and unlimited power. Augustine felt compelled 
to publish abroad the glad tidings which he had received. When 
Sundar Singh became a Christian he travelled around the world 
preaching the Gospel, and his message of joy and peace took him 
into forbidden territory where he went gladly but from whence he 
never returned. Kagawa, the great social worker, illuminates his 
work with the Gospel of hope.
Moreover, the Christian experience which Augustine, 





withoiit the reach of the poorest or commonest person, while the 
positions of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch were based upon 
definite philosophical and speculative principles for which the 
ordinary person has no affinity. Neither Augustine, nor Sundar 
Singh, nor Kagawa would have claimed for himself the epithet "re- 
ligious genius". They felt that the experience which they had of 
a Living Christ was also the experience of countless others. Their 
faith was not in any way better or more real than the faith of the 
most obscure Christian. But we cannot imagine Strauss, Bieder- 
mann, or Troeltsch as representatives of the faith of the common 
man. me cannot picture an uneducated and untutored pilgrim coming 
to Strauss for the words of salvation. -b'irst, he would have to be 
grounded in the mythical criticism and then in Hegelianisml Pro- 
fessor Karl Heim of Tubingen in a sermon on the text, "What must 
I do to be saved?" points out that Paul and Silas did not bother 
the guard of the prison with questions of doctrine but gave him 
a simple straightforward answer, "Believe on the -uord Jesus Christ."-'- 
A sinner at the eleventh hour may be saved. No one can claim a 
monopoly on the Christian experience - not even the theologians. 
The Christian experience is open to all, to the student and to the
peasant, to the rich and to the poor, to the Oriental and to the
2 Anglo-Saxon.
The/
1. Die lebendige Quelle, Predigten von Karl Heim, p.26.
2. cFEHer differences which are evident in the contrast between
the evangelical experience and the speculative theology of the 
nineteenth century are: the utter lack in the latter of the 
sense of awe and mystery, and the neglect of worship.
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'i'he Christian experience which has its source in the Person 
of Christ may "be illustrated further in the great hymns of the Church, 
Christianity is a singing religion. Christians have taken to 
heart Paul T s words, "Let the word of Christ dv/ell in you richly in 
all wisdom; teaching and admonishing one another in psalms and 
hymns and spiritual songs, singing with grace in your hearts to the 
Lord." There has grown up through the centuries a tremendous 
library of sacred songs which "bear witness to the Christian faith. 
If the experience of Augustine, Sundar Singh, and Kagawa are sym- 
ptomatic of the experiences of thousands of Christians the world 
over, so, too, the great hymns of the Church find a ready response 
within the hearts of countless multitudes. Ho other religion can 
claim so many poets or so many musicians as Christianity. Prom the 
Magnificat of Mary down to the present day the Christian faith has 
"been sung without ceasing. From the reference in Pliny's letter 
to the Emperor Trajan that Christians whom he watched sang a praise 
to Christ as G-od, Christianity has sung its way into the hearts 
and lives of men.
This is not the place to make a survey of hymnology, tut 
a look at some of the great hymns of the Church will reveal several 
points of interest for our problem. It will reveal that the 
Christian experience is not confined to any one hymn-writer, or to 
any one century, or to any one nation. The universal and timeless 
character of the Christian experience can be no more fully illus- 




From the long list of early Greek and Latin hymns "by 
such as G-regorius Nazianzenus, Anatolius, Bernard of Cluny, and 
Bernard of Clairvaux, we may select the well-known hymn by the last 
mentioned, De Nomine Jesu, which is best known in the translation 
of the Rev. Edward Caswall. The first stanza reads:
"Jesus, the very thought of thee
'.Vith sweetness fills my breast; 
But sweeter far thy face to see 
And in thy presence rest."
In passing from ancient times to Reformation times, we 
come face to face with Luther who exerted as much influence through 
his hymns as through his translation of the Bible. Bin feste Burg 
is Luther's best known hymn, in fact it is often called simply, 
"Luther's hymn." The second stanza is of special significance:
"Did we in our own strength confide,
Our striving would be losing; 
Were not the right man on our side,
The man of G-od's own choosing. 
Dost ask who that may be? 
Christ Jesus, it is he; 
Lord Sabaoth is his name, 
.From age to age the same,
And he must win the battle."
This faith in Christ as the only Mediator and Redeemer 
is the theme of many a Reformation hymn. The name of Paul Ger- 
hardt brings to mind such well-known hymns as, "Since Jesus is my 
friend" and "All my heart this night rejoices." Count von Zinzen- 
dorf gave us, "Jesus, still lead on" and "Jesus thy blood and 
righteousness." Carl Johann Spitta of the nineteenth century 
stands in strange contrast to the speculative theologies of his 
time./
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time. Consider a few lines of his () Je.sru meine Sonne:
"I know no life divided,
0 Lord of life, from thee: 
In thee is life provided
For all mankind and me; 
I know no death, 0 Jesus,
Because I live in thee; 
Thy death it is that frees us
.b'rom death eternally."
The field of English hymnody is so "broad and spacious 
that it is difficult to make an effective short-cut. But surely 
the great hymn of Isaac Watts, "The v/ondrous Cross," deserves 
mention in the shortest account of hymnology. There are those who 
readily pronounce this hymn as the greatest in the English language. 
Others, not so decisive, put it on a par with Toplady's "Rock of 
-Age s."
If Watts was the father of English hymnody, Charles Wes- 
ley was its greatest and most prolific contributor. He wrote over 
six thousand hymns. The one which is "by common consent his best 
reads:
"Jesus', lover of my soul,
Let me to thy "bosom fly 
While the Mllows near me roll,
iilhile the tempest still is high; 
Hide me, 0 my Saviour, hide,
Till the storm of life is past; 
Safe into the haven guide;
Oh, receive my soul at last!"
We cannot pass by Charles «/esley without mentioning two 
other hymns which reveal a like experience, they are, "Oh, for a 
thousand tongues to sing" and "I know that my Redeemer lives."
On the fringe of the nineteenth century, in the closing
years/
-310-
years of the Enlightenment, William Cowper sent forth his evangel- 
ical hymns which were sung eagerly "by many who were wearied with 
the heartless Deism. The one that is "best known and which has re- 
ceived much criticism "by modern liberals who feel that the language 
is obsolete, is:
"There is a fountain filled with blood,
Drawn from Immanuel 1 s veins; 
And sinners plunged beneath the flood, 
Lose all their guilty stains."
Among the many women hymn-writers the name of Charlotte 
Elliott stands foremost. There is an interesting story which lies 
behind the inspiration for what has been called the greatest evan- 
gelistic hymn in the English language, "Just as I am." The hymn 
is the poetic expression of her new found faith in Christ, and the 
words have been seized upon by countless others who like her did 
not know how to come to Christ.
"Just as I am, without one plea 
But that thy blood was shed for me, 
And that thou bid'st me come to thee, 
0 Lamb of God, I come!"
The English nineteenth century Oxford Movement found its 
hymnist in John Keble whose "Evening Hymn" is one of the favourites 
to-day:
"Sun of my soul, thou Saviour dear, 
It is not night if thou be near: 
0 may no earthborn cloud arise 
To hide thee from thy servants 1 eyes."
In America perhaps the greatest hymn writer of the last 
century was Ray Palmer. Among his many hymns, the best loved of
all/
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all is n My faith looks up to thee," "but a close second choice is 
"Jesus, thou Joy of loving hearts."
One of the most popular of all hymn-writers, if we are 
to judge by the number of his hymns included in many different 
hymnals, is Horatius Bonar of Edinburgh. Two of his famous hymns 
are, "I lay my sins on Jesus" and "I heard the voice of Jesus say."
The hymnal is the poetic expression of the Christian ex- 
perience. The hymns quoted above are alike in their reference to 
Jesus Christ. There is in the hymnaries of the world no distinc- 
tion "between Person and principle which characterized the nineteenth 
century. The followers of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch were 
never inspired to hymn their faith. Ho one ever wrote a hymn 
about the principle of redemption. Ho one would think of singing, 
"0 Principle of Redemption, my faith looks up to theeI" The specu- 
lative theologies of Strauss, Biederniann, and Troeltsch do not lend 
themselves to song, they remain within the boundaries of the in- 
tellect, they never enter the heart. It is the Christian experi- 
ence in a Living Christ which makes the hymnal possible , and in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it was oftentimes the hymnal 
rather than the preaching which kept the Church alive.
The attempt has been made to show that the common Christ- 
ological position of Strauss, Biedermann, and Troeltsch stands in 
contradiction to the teaching of the Mew Testament, the Apostolic 
Fathers, and the experience of the Christian Church throughout the 
centuries. Rather than separating the Person of Christ from the
principle/
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principle of redemption, the Christian Church has consistently 
centred its doctrine of redemption in the Person of the Redeemer. 
If we were to reduce the teaching of the New Testament on the sub- 
ject of redemption, as well as the experience of Christians in all 
ages, to a least common denominator, it would "be this: redemption 
is always defined in terms of a personal relationship. Whether 
we look to the New Testament, or to Augustine, or to the hymnal, 
we see that redemption moves on a personal plane. It is this 
word "personal" which serves ultimately as the index which dis- 
tinguishes between the Christological position of Strauss, Bieder- 
mann, and Troeltsch and the traditional experience of the Church.
The principle idea "by which Strauss, Biedermann, and 
Troeltsch wished to define redemption is, in the final analysis, 
an intellectual idea, it is impersonal. In the realm of science 
we see this principle idea illustrated in discoveries which are 
useful and valuable apart from their discoverers. We switch an 
electric "button a dozen times a day without thinking of Thomas 
Edison. We ride on trains unconscious of the name of James Watt. 
Once revealed, scientific inventions and discoveries are forever 
true regardless of the person responsible for initiating them. 
In the world of art the principle idea is illustrated in a painting, 
for example, by an unloiown artist. One has only to watch the 
great throngs of tourists who make their pilgrimages to the world's 
art galleries to realize that such things as paintings have beauty 
and truth in themselves without the aid of the artist's name. Or 
in music, it is auite possible to enjoy a great symphony without 
the slightest knowledge of the composer or director. In literature
too,/
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too, the principle idea is manifest. The age-old Shakespearean- 
Bacon controversy really means nothing as far as our appreciation 
of Hamlet or The Merchant of Venice is concerned. But religion is 
something quite different from science, art, or literature. Re- 
ligion can only lie described in personal relationships, it is not 
intellectualism or aestheticism.
"The Christian message," says Professor H.R. Mackintosh, 
"is concerned not with a number of things "but with one comprehen- 
sive and infinitely precious gift of salvation, i.e. fellowship 
with G-od; and while this includes a variety of aspects, it is 
above all a spiritual unity." It is through this idea of fellow- 
ship, this personal relationship, that Christianity must be under- 
stood, for this is how it is experienced. The response which the 
Christian makes to Christ is the sort of response which one loved 
one makes to another. It is to "be understood only on its personal 
plane. Love cannot be separated from lovers and examined dis- 
passionately under the microscope. It is bound up with the persons 
who experience its power. It is not always logical or intelligible, 
but it is nevertheless very real. We do not speak of a principle 
of love or a principle of friendship, nor can we speak correctly 
about a principle of redemption. The Hew Testament never speaks 
of redemption apart from its personal revelation. Paul does not 
say,/
1. H.R. Mackintosh, lihe Christian Experience of forgiveness,
p.5; of. also The Originality of the Christian Message, p.5 
for the same definition of Christianity; also such a book as 
Herrmann's Communion with God which defines Christianity as 
"a communion of the soul with the living G-od through the media- 
tion of Christ," p.7.
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say, "I live, yet not I, "but the principle of redemption within 
me!" John does not say that eternal life is to know God and the 
principle of redemption which He has given usI It is the personal 
relationship that distinguishes the new Testament teaching on re- 
demption. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only 
"begotten Son, that whosoever "believeth in him should not perish, 
"but have everlasting life." 1 Professor John Baillie in his book, 
The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity, dwelling for some 
pages on the fellowship of the early Christian community finds the 
source and centre of this fellowship in the Person of Christ. 
"Jesus of Nazareth is the explanation of it all!,'1 he writes. 
"The new spirit was just His spirit. The new outlook was His out- 
look. The ! Way' was His way. And that agape* which was the sub- 
stance of the fellowship, what else was it but the temper that was 
in Him in the days of His flesh?" And he goes on to say that the 
Christian community did not regard Jesus merely as an example or 
illustration of their fellowship with one another and with God but 
that He Himself had imparted this fellowship and through Him it 
continued to enliven his followers. TI The truth," says Professor 
Baillie, llhad originally come to them not through abstract think- 
ing but through contact with a living personality, and they felt
that not all the thinking they would ever be able to do could ex-
2 haust its many-sided richness and depth."
A study of Paul's epistles leads to an understanding of 
the/
1. Jn. 3:16.
2. The Place of £ej3"iis_ Christ in Modern Christianity, p.55 f.
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the depth of this personal relationship. In recent years the 
accent of Paul's religion has been placed on his familiar phrase 
"in Christ." In his "book, A Man in Christ. Ilr. James 3, StewaEt 
brushes aside the usual complicated and intricate systems of Paul- 
inism and makes this phrase the corner-stone of Paul's thought. 
"The heart of Paul's religion," he says, "is union with Christ. 
This, more than any other conception - more than justification, 
more than sanctification, more even than reconciliation - is the 
key which unlocks the secrets of his soul." 1 And as typical of 
Paul's thought he quotes such texts as, (i l live, yet not I, "but 
Christ liveth in me;" "There is, therefore, now no condemnation
to them which are in Christ Jesus;" "He that is joined unto the
2 Lord is one spirit."
There is no necessity for a detailed exegesis of Paul's 
phrase "in Christ" in order to understand that it signifies a per- 
sonal relationship. Nor is the question as to whether Paul's 
Christology is little short of mysticism a pressing one. Obviously 
Paul's mysticism is to be distinguished sharply from what Herrinann 
calls the "piety of mysticism" or what Professor Mackintosh terms 
"an unbridled and capricious mysticism" which steps beyond the
r?
Person of Christ and finds union with God without His mediation. 
Uor need anything be said about Paul's relation to his contempor­ 
ary Philo which might imply that the phrase "in Christ" was to be 
understood/
1. James S. Stewart, A Man in Christ, p.147.
2. Gal. 2:20; Rom. 8:1; I Cor. 6:17.
3. Communion with God, p.19 f.; The Person of Jesus Christ. 
p.378.
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understood in the pantheistic thought patterns of Alexandria. In 
Paul's thought there is no "overriding" by Christ of man's person- 
ality, to use Stewart's word. Leaving aside all the controver- 
sial problems of exegesis and interpretation, the one indelible 
impression which this phrase makes is that Paul was thinking of 
His own Christian experience in personal terms. To "be "in Christ" 
was not for Paul to follow a principle, Taut to love, trust, and 
serve his Redeemer. "'Christ in me' means something quite differ- 
ent from the weight of an impossible ideal, something far more 
glorious than the oppression of a pattern for ever beyond all imi- 
tation. 'Christ in me' means Christ bearing me along from within, 
Christ the motive-power that carries me on, Christ giving my whole
life a v/onderful poise and life, and turning every burden into
2 wings." Christ was for Paul something more than an ideal. Human
genius and perfection do not readily attract, they rather repel. 
It is like an amateur composer who comes home after hearing a 
Beethoven symphony and tears his own score to bits. If Christ is 
only am example, we are undone. How can we become like Him with- 
out His help?
Paul's thought on union with Christ is double-edged. 
Just because this idea of union can be explained only in personal 
terms there must be two sides to the idea, and so Paul divides his 
thinking on the grace of G-od, His gift in Christ to us, and man's 
faith,/
1. A Man in Christ, p.166.
2. IT "TT" TI H p. 169-
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faith, the response to this gift. "By grace are ye saved through 
faith," this is the double-edged truth which Paul declared. 
Whatever faith may be, it certainly depends upon a personal re- 
lationship. "Faith as a conviction of the unseen," says btewart, 
"as a confidence in the promises of G-od, as an acceptance of the 
historic facts of the Gospel, and as an epitome of the Christian 
religion - such are some of the different shades of meaning which 
the word bears in Paul's epistles. But the characteristic Pauline 
conception comes into view only when faith is seen as utter self- 
abandonment to the G-od revealed in Jesus Christ. It is faith
which begets the deepest and most intimate of all personal experi-
p enees - the mystical union of the believer and his Lord." i'his
is the sort of faith revealed in the G-ospels where we see Jesus 
drawing men and women and little children to Him in love and 
fellowship. "Whom say ye that I am?" - this is not a theological 
question but a personal question which can be answered only by 
those who are in fellowship with the Master.
Union with Christ was for Paul no lifeless metaphysical 
principle but a personal relationship which not only revealed to 
him what he might become but gave him the power to achieve the goal
so that he could say, "I can do all things through Christ which
2 strengtheneth me." It is this power, this resevoir of spiritual
energy, which characterizes Paul. Ind it is the lack of this 
that/
1. Eph. 2:8.
2. A Man in Christ, p.182
3. Phil. 4:13.
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that characterizes the nineteenth century. -fc'rom Kant 1 s insistence 
 upon morality and the ideal of human perfection down through the 
century there was a felt need for the power to reach the goal. 
What a shallow, lifeless faith beside the energetic, passionate 
faith of Paul. And not only of Paul, but of all Christians, 
what Dr. u-lover has said of the early Christians is no less true 
of modern Christians. "The Christian 'outlived 1 the pagan," he 
says,"'out-died him', and 'out-thought' him. He came into the world 
and lived a great deal better than the pagan; he beat him hollow 
in living." 1
The conclusion of this thesis cannot go beyond Paul's 
thought of union with Christ. It is the personal element in 
Christianity which makes it a religion of redemption and not just 
another legalism or logos philosophy. What Christianity is apart 
from Jesus Christ the Kedeemer may be of interest to the specula- 
tive theologian but it cannot concern the Christian believer who 
is a Christian because of what Christ has done for him. Strauss, 
Biedermann, and Troeltsch, for all their logical and critical 
niceties, seem to be far from the Christian centre of gravity. 
"It is useless," says Professor John Baillie, "to hope that a body 
of principles can ever do for men what the U-ospel story has done 
for them. Words, words - we grow so weary of them! The world, 
we/
1. T.R. Glover, The Jesus of History, p.213.
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we feel, is too full of talk, too full of good advice! But we 
thank G-od that once at least the word was made flesh and dv/elt among 
us and we "beheld its glory I" 1 in the Christian experience Jesus 
Christ is the Redeemer, nothing whatever is known of a principle 
of redemption, and it is only through identification or union with 
Christ "by faith that Jesus can "be called Redeemer.
1. The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity, p.74.
The End
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